


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A BULWARK AGAINST
GERMANY
BOGUMIL VOSNJAK



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A BULWARK AGAINST GERMANY

POLAND AND THE POLISH QUESTION

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A BULWARK AGAINST GERMANY

THE FIGHT OF THE SLOVENES, THE
WESTERN BRANCH OF THE JUGO-
SLAVS, FOR NATIONAL EXISTENCE

BY

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
LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

ILLYRICUS: La Question de Trieste.
Genève, 1915.

JUGOSLAV NATIONALISM.
London, 1916.

A DYING EMPIRE (*In preparation*)



*Also a French Edition published by Imhouse et René Chapelot,
Paris.*

DB
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PREFACE

ONE of the primary causes of the World-War was Germany's determination in the interests of Pan-Germanism to crush the Jugoslavs ; and from this point of view the cataclysm of 1914 was merely the crisis in the long and dogged struggle which has been waged for centuries between Germanism and the Jugoslavs, and of which European public opinion has been so curiously ignorant.

In this struggle the Serbs and Croats were more fortunately placed than their brothers the Slovenes, who, being the most westerly of the Jugoslavs, were compelled to bear the brunt of the German attack. In the early Middle Ages the Slovenes were first among the Jugoslavs to found an independent State, and though they were also fated to be the earliest victims of German conquest, they nevertheless continued to form a strong ethnical barrier, beyond which Serbs and Croats, sheltered from the tyrannical influence of the Holy Roman Empire, could develop their social and national characteristics. But it was not until the nineteenth century, when Pan-Germanism began to expand towards the southern seas, that the Slovenes became in truth the Bulwark of their race, and the severity of

their struggle warned the rest of the Yugoslavs that their fate too was hanging in the balance. Owing to their north-westerly position the Slovenes form the true national, political, and economic rampart of Yugoslavdom, and like outposts on exposed ground they watched the advance of the gigantic foe whose purpose it was to destroy the Yugoslavs and enslave Italy. For the dire menace of the German peril was always felt in the Slovene north sooner than in Zagreb (Agram) or Belgrade or in the cities of Lombardy.

A recognized State has its diplomatic representatives abroad, whose duty it is to represent its interests, and to keep other nations informed as to its home affairs. A nationality without an independent State organization is in an unfortunate position, as its diplomatic work perforce devolves upon private enterprise. Undoubtedly the political leaders of a nation without a State owe it to their position to keep foreign countries informed of the conditions at home, especially if these conditions might imperil the peace of the nations. Unfortunately, the leaders of the nation dealt with in this book have not done this, and now, in the midst of the most tremendous upheaval the world has witnessed, a Yugoslav who has never before taken a share in politics has been called upon to rectify their omission. As the book had to be written in a foreign

country, the author was obliged to draw mainly on his personal knowledge and memory, and the material at his disposal unfortunately, was not as extensive as it would have been in his own country.

For this and other reasons the book does not pretend to deal exhaustively with Slovene life in all its aspects. Only a historian of literature could adequately interpret Slovene intellectual life to the British public, and illustrate the value of Slovene literature to the nation and to humanity ; for the Slovenes boast a considerable number of men of letters worthy of a niche in the world's pantheon of literary genius. And only a master of word-painting could do justice to the beauty and charm of the Slovene lands in language of sufficient wealth and beauty.

The author is conscious of being neither a poet nor a literary expert, and has therefore contented himself with sketching in broad outlines the origin and history of the Slovene people, in an endeavour to acquaint the British people with a small and unknown ally, but one whose pluck and perseverance has long and sturdily withstood Pan-Germanism on the shores of the Adriatic.

The chapters in this book were written in spring, 1915—with the exception of Chapter II, which was written in spring, 1916—with the object of bringing the Slovenes nearer to

English readers, and to unfold to them a new national world and its past and present, its aims and aspirations. It may come as a surprise to some readers to realize that German methods have been at work for a thousand years in the Slovene lands, and to trace the connection between the events and conditions described in these pages and some of the burning questions of the hour.

It is almost an article of religious faith with the Slovenes that the present crisis will decide their fate. They feel that it is a question of now or never, and that the long, grim struggle must at last lead to national independence, or else end in national extinction.

But the end of this struggle cannot be a matter of indifference to Europe, for by the national death of the Slovenes an extremely important strip of territory would become German. In that case Germany would be the real gainer, as German Government tactics and German social ideals would triumph where to-day the Slav democratic ideal is still holding its own against fearful odds.

My book is not conceived in a spirit of hate or controversy. It is merely intended to throw an important light on the life-or-death struggle waged by a poor but self-reliant and courageous people who are coming forward at this great moment in history, convinced of the justice and integrity of their cause.

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A BULWARK AGAINST GERMANY

CHAPTER I

NATIONAL STRUGGLE OF THE SLOVENES OCCASIONED BY THE POLITICAL ATTITUDE OF GERMANY

THE Great War has brought the Yugoslav question into prominence, and the greatest event of a generation is indissolubly bound up with the Yugoslav struggle for existence. Yet Western Europe at present knows very little of the most western branch of the Yugoslavs (Southern Slavs), which, though caught as in a wedge between Germans, Magyars, and Italians, yet dares to look forward to a happier future. If it is true that England has only recently discovered the Serbs and Croats, it is fairly safe to say that as yet she knows not enough about the Slovenes. And yet for centuries the Slovenes have opposed German aggression in the cause of democracy and the equal rights of nations—in short, for the same ideals which impelled the Allied Powers to take up arms on behalf of Belgium and Serbia; only with this difference,

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that the conflict between German brutality and the Slovenes was confined to the narrow borders of home politics far removed from the general knowledge of Europe, whereas the World-War is being fought out in the full light of public opinion.

Hitherto the Slovenes have attracted very little interest, and yet they occupy an important geographical position in the Slav world, as their territory lies close to the very heart of Austria and they constitute the only obstacle between Germany and the Adriatic. They are a Yugoslav nation numbering about one and a half millions, and forming the bulk of the inhabitants of Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, Gorica-Gradiska, Istria, and Trieste—that is to say, of six of the kingdoms and principalities represented in the Vienna Reichsrat. More than any other Slav nationality, excepting the Czechs, they have become imbued with Western civilization and Western ideas, and it would be a great misfortune, not only for the Slav race but for Europe, if this sturdy, industrious, and intelligent young nation were condemned to be Germanized or Italianized through oversight or neglect on the part of the statesmen whose task it will be to formulate the terms of the world-peace.

At the end of the war Yugoslavs will be confronted by the great task of reconciling and fusing the ideas and ideals of the Slav races in

the East with those of the Latin and Anglo-Saxon races in the West. And the solution of this problem will be greatly helped by strengthening such Slav elements as by their nature form the link between East and West.

By instigating the World-War, Germanism has shown itself a champion of race-hatred and racial conflict, and certainly not an element of culture capable of uniting the nations of Europe in peaceful progress. Europe has learnt to its cost what immense sacrifices and efforts will be necessary if the spectre of German world-rule is to be laid for ever. Experience is proving the danger of having allowed Germany to become so great that German organization and German "discipline" could imperil the peaceful relations between the States of Europe, and the issue of the present war can only assure us the blessing of peace in the future if all the natural obstacles to German aggression are adequately supported and strengthened. From this point of view the case of the nations who have had to fight for their very existence with Germany has become a European problem, and it is from this point of view that this book on the Slovenes has been written.

The history of the Slovenes is the story of a desperate struggle for national existence. From the days of Charlemagne till the World War this struggle has been waged without peace, armistice,

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or hope of reconciliation, and it can only end in victory or national extinction. Germany has denied the right of existence to the Slovenes, who have had to fight in turn for their language, their land, civil and democratic freedom, social existence, and the chance of development.

The watch-word of the Slovenes is, "War to the knife against Germanism," and for centuries nothing has stirred the soul of the nation so deeply as the hope and expectation of seeing the detested German Junkerdom finally crushed by the Allied Powers. Thus would the Slovenes be rid of their worst enemy, and they might reasonably look forward to a freer and happier future.

In speaking of the fate of the Slovenes, we might aptly draw a comparison between the principles of government as observed in the British Empire and those practised by Germany. On the one hand, we find wise, common-sense, practical statesmanship, political tolerance; on the other, clumsiness, absurd pedantry, brutal illiberality, and fatuous pettiness. And a people so wanting in statecraft, so lacking in tact and political wisdom, have the ludicrous audacity to call themselves Lords of the World!

In the treatment of the languages problem in Austria by the Germans and their puppets, the Austrian Government provided an exhibition of ridiculous incapacity. Years ago, the Government

regarded it as decidedly unpatriotic if a German candidate for an official position in a district of mixed nationality showed himself conversant with the non-German tongue of the district ; whereas it surely would seem more suitable to send a German official, who only knew German, to an exclusively German district. But the German mind cannot entertain the idea that a native population has any conceivable claim to having its administration carried on in its own language.

The behaviour of the Germans in Posen, Schleswig, and Alsace-Lorraine affords ample proof of their incompetency to deal with a civil population possessing a separate language. Not strong enough to exterminate the non-German nationality, their aggressive intolerance has only roused intense opposition, and has made the Germans the worst hated of all nations in the world.

It is amazing that the Germans in Austria should have been equally short-sighted. The Slavs have contributed greatly towards safeguarding the Empire against the Turks, and surely had a full claim to a just share in it, seeing that they formed the majority of the population. Moreover, the Austrian Slav tongues are closely related, they boast an important literature, and are sister-tongues of the Russian language, which is spoken over more than one-sixth of the globe ; good reason, one would

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suppose, why a German official should study the language of his district and thereby greatly facilitate his official duties.

English procedure in India has been very different throughout. The languages problem is a hundred times more complicated in India than in Austria, yet it has been solved by England without any difficulty. An Austrian official would only be called upon to master a few different dialects of one of the principal Slav tongues, and by no means the forty-two radically distinctive languages of India. An English Indian civilian is absolutely compelled to know the vernacular of the district where he holds his appointment. The languages examination for the Indian Civil Service is exceedingly stiff, and if a candidate fails in this, he is disqualified for the Service. The national susceptibilities of the natives are treated with consideration. The author once had occasion to explain the Austrian languages problem to an Englishman who had held a high position in the Indian Civil Service, and who at once volunteered his opinion, that if Austria were by chance to become possessed of India, the country would be ablaze with rebellion within a month, and every German and Austrian massacred, even if every single native were guarded by a policeman.

The genius which has prompted England to grant to each of her colonies a suitable form of

self-government proves her one of the greatest civilizing factors in the world, and has justly aroused the admiration of students of political science as well as of practical statesmen. Canada, Australia, and South Africa bear witness to the colonizing genius of the English, and their Constitutions are founded on the principle that the liberty of the subject forms the basis of all social and economic development.

The clumsy tactlessness of the Germans renders them quite unfit for the creation of a great colonial Empire, and it is to be hoped that the world-peace will reduce them once more to the position of a continental nation which is content to grow potatoes and speculate on metaphysics. A nation that has proved itself incapable of creating a regime of civil liberty at home, has no right to compel other nations to submit to a yoke of blind obedience to an aristocratic and military bureaucracy ; but if Germany were to become a world-Power, she would still remain incapable of evolving either Home Rule or any other form of independent Constitution for even the most civilized nations which had the misfortune to fall under her sway. For the hideous conditions now prevailing in the Dual Monarchy Austria is indebted chiefly to the Germans, whose influence on the Austrian Germans prevented the granting of reasonable autonomy to the various Austrian nationalities. It is the incredible narrow-

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mindedness of the Germans which has reduced Austria to a state of chaos and made her a danger to the peace of Europe. When it is too late, Austria will doubtless discover that true and healthy imperialism cannot exist without national autonomy.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE SLOVENE LANDS

DURING the course of centuries the Slovenes have lost quite half their national territory, but the true interest of their case lies in the historical importance attaching to their fate. With the German encroachment upon Slovene territory from the north-west, and Magyar inroads from the north-east, the bridge that linked up the Northern Slavs with the Jugoslavs was broken down. This ancient fact has acquired renewed political and diplomatic importance through the World-War, and it will be one of the problems of European diplomacy to restore this lost connection between Northern Slavs and Jugoslavs.

In the seventh century the Slovenes and their kinsmen, the Serbs and Croats of to-day, migrated into the lands south and west of the Danube, and if they had been guided by a judicious policy when settling in their new home, they might easily have developed into one of the Central Powers of Europe. The heritage then occupied by the western Jugoslavs comprised present-

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day Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, Gorica-Gradiska, eastern Friuli, eastern Tyrol, the Lungau in Salzburg, all Upper and Lower Austria south of the Danube, and all Pannonia west of the Danube. Thus the Slovenes were masters of a large tract of country, practically the whole of the later Habsburg possessions, and at least one-fourth of Hungary. As this territory reached as far as the Danube, the Slovene lands bordered on Czech territory on a frontier in the north-west. Besides their brother-Slavs, the Czechs, the Slovenes had the Bavarians as their neighbours in the north, and the Lombards of Northern Italy in the south-west.

Many of the place-names in the Austrian Alpine provinces are Slovene to this day. The word "windish" (i.e. "Slovene") which occurs frequently in the place-names of the Tirol, Salzburg, Lower Austria, and even of Bavaria, is always proof of a former Slovene settlement.

Unfortunately as settlers the Slovenes proved themselves neither judicious nor far-sighted. Instead of occupying the marshes, and thus protecting the country against possible attacks, they preferred to concentrate in the hilly interior, leaving the gates open to foreign invaders. Their descendants have had bitter cause to rue this neglect, for if the early settlers had been wiser, Slovene territory would never have dwindled as

it has actually done. Originally extending from the Inn, the Erno, and the Danube right down to the Adriatic, it has now shrunk to barely half its former size, to the incalculable detriment of the whole Slav race.

At one time the Czechs were neighbours of the Slovenes, not only in the north-west but also in the north-east. In proposing to unite Bohemia with the Jugoslavs by a strip of territory extending southward from the neighbourhood of Pozun (Pressburg), Denis, who has delved more deeply into Slovene history than any other modern writer, touched upon one of the Slav peoples' most important geographical and political problems. The Magyar wedge which now divides the Northern Slavs from the Jugoslavs did not exist in the early days of Slav settlement when Bohemian territory bordered upon the Slovene. To this day the counties of Szala and Vas as far as Szopron are largely inhabited by Slovenes, and so the distance between the most northerly of the Jugoslavs (in Szopron) and the most southerly of the Northern Slavs (the Czechs in Pozun (Pressburg)) is scarcely greater than the distance between Vienna and Pozun. During the centuries of Slovene independence, before the Magyars came into the country and settled on the shores of the lake of Balaton, western Pannonia was the centre of Slovene political power and intellectual life. Thus far east did

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the Slovene sway extend, and to this day Nagy Kanizsa and many other important towns in Hungary bear Slovene names.

A map of the Slovene lands of to-day forms a melancholy contrast to a historical map of a few hundred years ago. German aggression from the north and Magyar aggression from the east have woefully encroached upon the borders of the Slovenes, by sheer force of numbers pressing more and more heavily upon the most western of the Jugoslavs and gradually ousting them from their inheritance. In this respect the Italians have been far less dangerous neighbours.

At present Slovene territory extends about as far towards the west as does the territory of the Czechs farther north. It reaches its north-western extremity in sv. Mohor on the Zila, north of Pontafel, and is bounded on the west by a line drawn from sv. Mohor down to Resiansia on Italian soil, and then east of Cedad (Cividale) and as far as Kormin (Cormons). From Kormin (Cormons) the Slovene boundary runs to the south of Gorica (Gorizia) and along the Soca (Isonzo) almost as far as Gradiska, and then along the southern slope of the Kras (Carso) down to the sea. In the south the Adriatic forms the boundary via Trieste and Koper and as far as Pirano, where the Croat element begins to predominate, and mingles with the Slovene element on the coast. In Istria Slovenes and

Croats live side by side, and it is not necessary to define a boundary between the two branches of the Yugoslav race. Towards the east a boundary is provided by the political frontier of Croatia, extending northwards from Reka (Fiume) as far as Radgona (Radkersburg) in Styria, the inhabitants of Zumberak (Sichelburg) being more Croat than Slovene. North of Radgona (Radkersburg) the linguistic continuity of the Yugoslav territory extends only as far as St. Gothard on the Raab, but a few scattered Yugoslav communities exist in Vas and Szala, as has already been stated, and there is an isolated Slovene-speaking district near Szopron.

No Yugoslav can think without bitterness of the northern racial boundaries, for it is there that the Yugoslavs have lost most ground, and that the full force of the German attack has told most heavily on the Slovene people. The northern frontier has always been the vulnerable point in Yugoslav territory, and nowhere has the national struggle been waged more violently or with heavier losses than in the fruitful wine country of Styria, and the Alpine forest-land of Carinthia. In this connection it is interesting to note that none of the maps dating from the days of Austrian Absolution betray any attempt to belittle Slovene territory. In its dealings with the various national problems of the Dual Monarchy, the absolutism of a bygone age was

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far more just than the German National fanaticism of to-day.

In the fifties of the nineteenth century the official linguistic boundary ran considerably farther north than it does now. On the old maps it is traced as passing between the districts of Maribor and Graz in Styria, and therefore coincides with the true dividing line between German and Slovene linguistic territory. Beyond a doubt, therefore, Austria was in those days more generously disposed towards a nationalist policy, but this tolerance vanished as soon as the various nationalities were handed over to Prussianism. At present the official northern linguistic boundary runs from Radgona (Radkersburg) on the Mur, through Spielfeld and Arvez (Arnfels) to Labod (Lavamünd) in Carinthia. From there it passes north of Velikovec and Klagenfurt, through the historically famous Gosposvetsko Polje to Blatograd (Moosburg), thence through the Vrbsko and Osojsko Lakes to Beljak (Villach), till it reaches the north-western limit of Yugoslav linguistic territory in sv. Mohor (Hermagor) in the Zila valley.

This territory includes the crown lands of Carinthia, Styria, Carniola, and the Austrian-Illyrian littoral. Roughly speaking, it is bordered on the north by the rivers Mur and Drave, in the west by the Soča (Isonzo), in the south by the Adriatic, and in the east by the Croatian

political frontier, which is identical with that of the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages. From this it may be seen that Slovene linguistic territory extends for some distance into Italy, and that several counties in western Hungary are likewise inhabited by Slovenes.

The home of the Slovenes is rich in beautiful and varied scenery. In the north it includes part of the Alpine world, with all the solemn grandeur of its rugged peaks—a world of wondrous beauty, which is reflected in the frank and kindly souls of its inhabitants. Farther southward, the Carinthian forest-land with its far-flung range of wooded hills gives place, in Styria, to one of the richest wine-growing countries in the world. The rhythmic outlines of the vine-clad hills, and the harmonious and picturesque charm of this country are well expressed in the cheerful temperament of the Slovenes, and in that glad acceptance of life which is one of their chief characteristics. In Carniola the towering majesty of the Alps stoops to the lovely, hilly country that unites Slovene territory with the kindred soil of Croatia. Here, in the Bela Kraine, the regular outlines and sober green of the sunny vineyards bring a touch of subdued colour, a note of satisfied repose into the tender beauty of the landscape. In Southern Carniola, where the mighty amphitheatre of the Kras looks down upon Trieste at its feet, the Slovene landscape assumes a new and sombre

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aspect. In the Kras country the cheery poverty and sunny temperament of the Slovene changes to a graver, almost melancholy mood, and the rugged, unspoilt nature of the country seems reflected in the equally rugged simplicity of the minds of the natives. The rocky soil of the Kras hides a strange dark world of giant caves, full of weird shapes and fantastic outlines. From the roof of this world of subterranean marvels the eye travels over a boundless horizon to the blue distance of the Adriatic. Down there on the coast, where capital and labour are bestirring themselves in one of the world's great seaport towns, Slovenedom breathes the crisp, salt air of the sea ; and under that invigorating touch our people are concentrating all their strength in the hope that they may yet be united with their brother Jugoslavs, and in union with them win their rightful place among the nations.

Towards the west the Karst descends to the Vipava Valley, beautiful under a southern sun, and rich in fruit-gardens and vineyards. These lead into Gorica, the most western of the Yugoslav lands, and the varied beauty of the landscape cannot fail to charm the traveller. Here lies the heart of the Slovene South, here under the glowing sun of Gorica, in the vineyards whose southern slopes mark the Italo-Slovene linguistic frontier, and from whose ridge is visible the first silvery glimpse of the sea, and here

Slovene energy and Slovene patriotism were most highly developed.

It is only natural that this country, so near to the very heart of Europe, should have been felt by Germanism as a formidable obstacle on the road to the south and the east. A strong Slovene element is quite equal to the task of shutting off Germany from the Adriatic. Pan-Germanism conceived it to be one of its first national duties to break down the Slovene barrier in order to occupy the hinterland of Trieste. It should never be forgotten that Bismarck called Trieste "the point of the German sword." Nowhere does the German desire to destroy the independence of the smaller nationalities appear so openly as in these lands between the Alps and the Adriatic. The position of the Slovene country is analogous to that of Switzerland, and, like Switzerland, it is surrounded by countries and races of different languages. When the Great Powers of Europe proclaimed the neutrality of Switzerland, they did so because they considered an independent Switzerland essential to the welfare of Europe. Perhaps Europe will some day discover that it would greatly assist the cause of peace, and indeed fulfil one of the pre-conditions of peace, if the Slovene countries were definitely placed beyond the reach of both German and Italian ambitions, and accorded unity with Jugoslavia.

The Slovene question is a European question.

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In olden times this country was the great highway between north and south, a land where north and south met and blended in quite a special fashion. Here, at the junction of three great, distinct civilizations, the German, the Italian, and the Yugoslav, the Great Powers ought to create civic liberty, and the possibility of free, untrammelled development in the future. Romans, Goths, Byzantines, Slavs, and Germans have for centuries contended for this strip of land, but none have been able to retain their hold on it, until the Habsburgs succeeded in incorporating it for centuries in their agglomeration of States. But this is the age of nationalism. The highest power is no longer vested in dynasties, but in the nations, whose fate is bound up with the fate of the land, and the Slovenes also must be accorded the right of deciding their own fate, and of crying "Halt!" to the aggressive schemes of Germany, Austria, and Italy.

CHAPTER III

THE MOST WESTERN BRANCH OF THE JUGOSLAVS

HAVING considered the importance and extent of the national territory of the Slovenes—the lands between the Mura, the Triglav, the Soca (Isonzo), and the Adriatic shore as far as Reka (Fiume)—their national character and history deserve to be dwelt upon.

The Slovenes are Jugoslavs. Their fate is inextricably bound up with that of all other Jugoslavs, and there can be no future for them apart from the rest of their race. It is not easy to find a parallel to the precise relationship between the Slovene and the rest of the Jugoslavs. The population of the British Isles affords no suitable comparison, as the difference of race and language between the Scotch, Welsh, Irish, and English is considerable, and even the dialects spoken in various parts of England differ far more than does the Slovene from Croatian or Serbian. Perhaps the linguistic and national conditions in Italy offer the best

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comparison. If the Tuscan speech had not been adopted as the Italian literary language, and the Tuscans were in the habit of writing in their dialect, the Venetians in theirs, and the Piedmontese in theirs—that would give a fair idea of the difference between Croatian and Slovene. Only a Slovene would understand a Croat, a Serb, or even a Bulgar far more easily, than a Venetian would a native of Tuscany. Moreover, modern Slovene and Croatian have been established as literary languages for barely a century, and neither tongue can yet be considered stereotyped. It certainly seems more than likely that the changes following upon the World-War will also affect the language of the country.

Lubor Niederle, the well-known Czech ethnologist, maintains that in 1908 the Slovenes numbered 1,500,000, and the Serbo-Croats 8,550,000 souls.

In no Yugoslav country has the struggle between Slav and German been contested so fiercely as in the Slovene provinces. German lack of consideration, coupled with that brutal disregard of the rights of all non-Germans which is so faithfully reflected in Germany's foreign policy, have long been experienced at first hand by the Slovenes. The struggle for the land between Drava and Mura is a scene in the World's Tragedy, and it will be played out in the World-War. In view of their historical significance, the

story of the Slovenes is well worth considering in detail.

The Austrian census affords a glaring example of Austrian double-dealing. The Slavs form the overwhelming majority of the population, and ought as such, to be the governing party in the State. Therefore the Government seeks to minimize their numerical importance in every possible way, and very often by underhand expedients. It is impossible, even by the help of "cooked" statistics, to prove that the Slavs are in a minority in the Dual Monarchy. So the Government has tried to break the force of the Slav majority by classifying the population in such a way as to give the impression that even the purely Slav districts contain many German inhabitants, and the census is falsified accordingly.

In order to establish the nationality of an Austrian citizen, he is not asked by the State to what nationality he belongs by extraction, but what language he habitually uses. Now, most of the districts which Germanism is trying to annihilate are multilingual, and the Slav, whether in business or as a simple citizen, usually can speak several languages. The census in many ways resembles an election. There is the same canvassing, the same coercion on the part of the employer and those in a position of social advantage towards the employee and the social inferior. There are no voting papers, but the

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entry in the census paper is of more importance than a ballot. At the time of the census-taking hundreds and thousands of Slavs are coerced into recording their "language habitually used" in deference to the demands of their superiors, usually Germans or Italians. This falsification is facilitated by the expression "language commonly used in intercourse," as it is an easy matter to convince the Slav labourer that his command and use of the German tongue establishes a certain claim. In a multi-lingual state an expedient of this kind obviously works out to the advantage of the party which is able to apply social pressure, and in the Austrian Slav provinces it is the Germans and Italians who benefit by it.

According to the Austrian census there are only 1,252,940 Slovenes, but it is obvious that this statement does not tally with the facts, and that, owing to the methods employed during the census-taking as well as to deliberate falsifications, the number of Slovenes actually living in Austria is grossly understated.

There are 491,000 Slovenes in Carniola, 410,000 in Styria, 120,000 in Carinthia, and 437,385 Slovenes and Croats in the Austro-Hungarian Littoral. In Carniola and the Littoral the Slovenes are in absolute numerical majority, but in the other provinces, although forming a compact population, they are in actual, but large minority. In Styria 29 per cent. of the popula-

tion are Slovenes, and 71 per cent. Germans, in Carinthia 22 per cent. are Slovenes, and 78 per cent. Germans. The following statistics will show the force of the German thrust towards the Adriatic.

In 1851 the Slovene population of Styria amounted to 36 per cent., in 1910 only to 29·37 per cent. In Carinthia the percentage has declined even more, and during the latter sixties it fell from 29·99 per cent. to 21·23 per cent. Not counting the Croats, the Slovene population in the Austro-Illyrian Littoral declined from 39·07 per cent. to 32·22 per cent. during the years between 1857 and 1910. Surely these figures are enough to refute the Italian argument that the Slav element in the Adriatic provinces is encouraged by the Austrian Government.

Within the last fifty years the number of Slovenes in the Austro-Illyrian Littoral has not only not increased, but actually declined by 7 per cent. Only in Carniola the Slovene element has increased from 88 per cent. in 1857 to 94 per cent. in 1910. In this province, therefore, the Germans are in a minority of 6 per cent. against 94 per cent. Slovenes. Like Prague in Bohemia, Ljubljana (Laibach), the capital of Carniola, was only very recently captured by the Slavs. In 1881 Ljubljana elected its first Slovene mayor.

In a State in which various nationalities

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compete with each other, it is not only important to establish the actual number of each nationality, but also its rate of increase. In this respect the Slovenes have to enter a decided deficit. The Slovene rate of increase falls short of the average in the Empire. The average increase of the population between 1900 and 1910 amounted to 9.44 per cent. But during this period the Slovene population only increased by 1.37 per cent., the Germans by 8.38 per cent., and the Italians by 7.67 per cent. These figures speak volumes. The whole national tragedy of the Slovenes is expressed in these dry statistics, and they prove the appalling pressure exercised by Pan-Germanism upon the Slovenes better than reams of writing. As the Slovene population has not increased at the same rate as the State average, it stands to reason that within the last fifty years one-third of the Slovene population has been absorbed by their foreign neighbours.

The decline of the Slovene population is not due either to a low birth-rate or to racial degeneration. It is accounted for chiefly by forcible denationalization and emigration.

Slovene women are more prolific than German or Italian women. Slovene family life is healthy and natural, and to this day they are a plain, rustic, totally unspoilt and undegenerate people, and certainly the healthiest race in Austria. Their percentage of adults between fifty and seventy

and of septuagenarians is second only to that of the Italians (in Austria), which is very slightly higher.

The Slovene emigrant goes either overseas or to work in the industrial districts of Prussia, or, nearer home, in Styria. Already the immigrant Slovene working population has distinctly altered the industrial districts of Upper and Lower Styria. Out of one hundred persons resident in Graz (Styria) but domiciled elsewhere, seventy-five come from German parishes and twenty-five from Slovene. In the industrial districts of Upper Styria, 75 per cent. of the immigrant population come from German parishes, and 24 per cent. from Slovene. In the Graz-Köflach district the percentage is 81 from German parishes as against 19 from Slovene. These figures show that the influx of Slovene labour from the almost purely agricultural Slovene rural districts is very considerable ; but as this Slovene element soon becomes entirely Germanized in the German industrial districts, these emigrants are lost to their own people.

Certain towns in Lower Styria, such as Maribor, would at once lose their "German" character if the Germanization of the Slovene immigrants were to cease. If all coming from Slovene parishes were designated as Slovenes (as indeed they are by birth) and added to the Slovenes already domiciled in the following

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"German" towns, we should find that in Celje (Cilli, "the most southern of German towns") the Slovene population amounts to 69.63 per cent., in Maribor to 71.03 per cent., and in Celovec to 31.78 per cent. Even this calculation is in so far unjust to the Slovenes, as the number of old-established families, originally of Slovene extraction, is very considerable in all these towns. In 1857 Celovec (Klagenfurt) had 6,000 Slovene inhabitants as against 3,419 Germans. Moreover, an analysis of the political conditions will clearly prove that the growth of the German element in the towns is due wholly and solely to systematic support from the Government. If the Slovene element were proportionately represented among the State officials, and in the local government, the German element would soon disappear automatically in the towns. At present it is being artificially fostered by the Government, as it would otherwise be a mere question of time until it was entirely Slovenized by the influx from the rural districts. Other powerful factors contributing to the relative decrease in the Slovene population are undoubtedly the process of forcible denationalization through the schools, the Government system, military service, and the power of German capital, all of which militate strongly against the Slovenes in their heroic struggle for existence.

The Slovenes lost their independence in the

days of Charlemagne. On the other hand, it is an overwhelming proof of their national vitality that their national consciousness has never perished, and that, after a thousand years of foreign domination, they could begin afresh to cultivate their native language, culture, and politics, as soon as the nineteenth century brought with it the dawn of constitutional government.

The modern reorganization of national life among the Serbs and Bulgars is really of more recent date than that of the Slovenes, whose culture has always belonged rather to the west. European civilization never encountered the same difficulties among the Western Yugoslavs as in the Balkan States. Yet the Slovenes have one political feature in common with the Serbs and Bulgars. Owing to the extreme newness and lack of tradition in their political life, their party differences are imbued with a spirit of vehement intolerance, as yet untouched by the mellowing sense of political moderation which pursues its aim with calm but courageous determination. In politics, the Slovenes have not yet achieved the necessary equanimity. This lack of tradition makes itself felt everywhere among the Slovenes. They are, essentially, a sturdy, healthy race of peasants, and even their town-bred middle classes plainly show their descent. Their life is fresh and natural and free from contamination by hyper-refined decadence, and in all classes

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the lack of intellectual tradition is largely compensated for by a keen appetite for learning and education. There are no sharp class distinctions, and prevailing conditions point rather to the formation of a State on strictly democratic lines. In the absence of well-defined classes, all social strata are equally engaged in the struggle for national defence and political and social solidarity. It must be admitted that recently a lower middle class has sprung up, which has unconsciously begun to ape German class distinctions. But this element is too weak seriously to endanger the intrinsically democratic character of the Slovenes, and it will disappear with the introduction of a truly democratic form of government.

The native aristocracy of the Slovene has long been extinct. Within recent years the Austrian Government has conferred patents of nobility on various higher officials, but this titled class possesses no prestige with the people, who are inclined to suspect its members of being tools of Germanism. The true leaders of the nation are the "intellectuals," the professional classes derived from the native peasant stock, and who are energetic representatives of democratic ideals. Several old Slovene families have been settled for generations in towns, but this native urban population has already proved itself a powerful factor in the national struggle.

The democratic tendency of the Slovenes shows itself particularly in this, that education and political talent are considered qualifications for social leadership before either birth or wealth. In the Alpine districts the Slovene peasant farmer is inclined to be conservative, but among the foot-hills of the Kras, and especially in the south, he is decidedly progressive, and takes a strong interest in education and industry. The Styrian peasant is docile, law-abiding, and industrious, the Carniolian is by nature an excellent man of business, and all Slovenes make splendid soldiers. The Graz corps, which is almost entirely composed of Slovenes, was the finest corps in the Austrian Army. The natural good health of the race has been undermined in the north by drink and Teutonic corruption, and emigration has also helped to lower the national health standard, but these influences will disappear under altered conditions. The Slovene nation is sound at the core, and not yet in danger of racial degeneration.

The gradual increase of German influence and political pressure has caused the Slovenes to become perhaps the strongest, the most energetic, and the most order-loving among the Slavs, except the Czechs, whose talent for organization and solidarity reappears in the Slovenes coupled with the more lovable characteristics of the true Slav. This mixture of Slav and German

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qualities renders the Slovene exceedingly efficient economically and peculiarly capable of political resistance. Beyond all doubt the Slovenes, in connection with the other Jugoslavs, may confidently look forward to a great future. They will provide an element of discipline, economy, and order in the new State. The sympathetic mixture of Slav and Western culture has had a beneficial influence on the character of the Slovenes. The warm and profound sincerity of their feelings comes out strongly in their lyric poetry, in which the Slovene unquestionably excels the rest of the Jugoslavs.

Strong in the feeling of youth, and with the health-giving breath of the Alps and the bracing wind of the Kras in their lungs, the Slovenes are boldly and resolutely setting forth to win the right of liberty and independence in union with all Jugoslavs.

CHAPTER IV.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SLOVENES UP TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

THE history of the Slovenes is by no means devoid of incident. On the contrary, it is most interesting to trace the vicissitudes that befel these Western Slavs, who had established themselves at the gates of Italy, in a country whose political importance and geographical position forced them to take part in every great European movement, whether in the east or in the west. Unlike the Serbs and Croats, the Slovenes did not actually fall victims to the conflict between Rome and Byzantium, but they suffered from it in so far as they were too much exposed to Western influence ; with the result that they lost their independence as a State, that their Church was completely Latinized by the Roman Catholic clergy, and that Germany, with the help of the Church, reduced them to complete dependence upon her own type of civilization. Special interest attaches to the struggles of the Slovenes in the early Middle Ages, but the time that elapsed between the settlement in the Alpine countries on the end of the sixth century

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forms the brightest chapter in their ancient history until the Germanizing policy of the successors of Charlemagne. Long before the end of the Middle Ages they had sunk to the position of a subjugated nation.

The present home of the Slovenes was, before their advent, inhabited by the Illyrians, whose territory, however, had not been undisputed. The first invaders were Celtic tribes who subsequently mingled with the native stock. When Rome became the Mistress of the World the land between the Drave and the Adriatic formed part of her possessions. The Slovene provinces of to-day formed part of the Roman provinces of Noricum, Pannonia, and Venetum. In Styria the Romans founded the flourishing towns of Celeia (Celje), Poetovium (Ptuj), Emona (Ljubliana), Tergeste (Trieste), Verunum.

Roman civilization, which achieved so much in the Slovene lands, was by no means confined to the southern tracts now claimed by the Italians, but spread equally over Styria and Carinthia. The achievements of Roman civilizations afford no reasonable basis for Italian claims, or half the world might be considered her legitimate heritage.

At the time of the great migration these Adriatic coast-lands were especially exposed to the inroads of the barbarians from the north. The Adriatic coast-lands were the gate of Italy, and Huns, Herulers, Goths, and Lombards all in

turn swept through them on their way to the south. Many a fierce battle was fought on the south-west frontiers. The Jugoslavs in company with the Avars were also borne to their present home on one of these waves of migration. At first the two nations lived side by side as allies and equals whose qualities fitted them to be the complements of each other. Later, however, the Slovenes slipped into a position of comparative dependence.

The foreign colonists living between the Drave and the Adria were forced to submit to the invaders, and the old colonial dominion had to yield to new forms of authority, but mighty roadways and remains of noble cities persisted as witnesses of the past.

When, in the seventh century, the ancestors of the present Slovenes took possession of the lands south of the Danube, they overran almost all the countries known as Inner Austria under the Habsburgs. It extended beyond Linz and Wels, past the mountains of the Dachstein, Grossglockner, and Dreiherrnspitz as far as the River Inn in the very heart of the Tyrol, i.e. a tract including Lower Austria south of the Danube, the whole of Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, the Austrian Adriatic littoral, part of the Tyrol, Salzburg, and Upper Austria. In the south-west they penetrated as far as Videm (Udine) and the plains of the Tagliamento in Friuli. In the

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north-east their frontiers extended far beyond the lake of Balaton. Blatnigrad, on the shores of this lake, was the centre of the political and social life of the Slovenes in the early Middle Ages, and the capital of the native princes Pribina and Kocel. Thus the northern and western borders of the Slovenes extended much farther than they do at present, and subsequent territorial losses were all the more galling to endure.

It was, undoubtedly, a difficult matter to occupy and organize this large country into a State, and the evil consequences of haphazard settlement soon became apparent. The new-comers quite neglected the marshes, and settled in considerable numbers only in the land south of the Drave. This is the chief reason why their northern and western conquests so soon passed into the hands of the Franks and Bavarians.

The Slovenes were the first among the Jugoslavs to create an independent State system. The heart of the Slovene State was Carinthia, and to this day the oldest Slovene traditions are preserved in this province. The installation and homage of the Duke on the Gosposvetsko polje, a ceremony which persisted until the year 1651, for some time served to recall the ancient glories of Slovene independence, and to this day the Duke's chair, before which the symbolical homage took place, may be seen on the Gosposvetsko polje in Carinthia.

On the day of the ducal installation, a free-born peasant seated himself in the chair, and received the Duke-elect, followed by his brilliant train of nobles. The Duke had to put off his princely robes, and don those of a simple peasant. In his left hand he held a staff, in his right a rope, and with these he guided a dappled mare and a dappled ox. In this guise he approached the ducal stone. The peasant then questioned him in the Slovene tongue. "Who is it that draws near to me?" The Count of Gorica replied: "It is the lord of the land." Again the peasant demanded: "Is he a just judge—one who has the welfare of the people at heart? Is he a free man? Is he a protector of the faith?" When the count had replied to all these questions in the affirmative, the peasant touched the face of the prince with his hands, took charge of the ox and mare, and withdrew. Then only did the prince assume the ducal stone, and formally take possession of the land. In this ceremony the inherent sovereignty of the people was clearly indicated, and the homage of the Duke on the Gosposvetsko polje was an important revival of Slovene independence.

The ancient Slovenes were distinctly averse from any form of centralized government, and preferred the rule of their native Zupans (dukes), which allowed full scope to their democratic instincts. But the failure of the

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Slovenes to maintain an independent State like the Serbs and Croats was not due to political incapacity, but merely to the defenceless position of the Western Yugoslav lands. The Slovenes were confronted with the gigantic task of holding back the overwhelming pressure of the German element, and thereby protecting the formation of other Yugoslav States south of the Drave. It was the misfortune of the Slovenes to have established themselves on the high-road of the nations, and to create and organize their young State at the cross-roads of the civilizations of the east and west.

In the seventh century, before the Magyars forced themselves, like a wedge, between the Northern Slavs and the Yugoslavs, the Emperor Samo created a mighty Empire, which included the Slovenes, Czechs, and the Slav tribes inhabiting the plains of the Laba (Elbe). But it required the statesmanship and genius of Samo himself to control so vast a realm and keep it together, and his Empire, which might have greatly furthered European civilization, crumbled rapidly away in the hands of his weak successors.

In the early Middle Ages first the Avars and then the Magyars owed their culture to the Slovenes. The oldest towns in South-Western Hungary are of Slovene origin, as the names of many of the principal towns show to this day. When the barbarous Magyars descended

upon Pannonia, they based their own organization on Slovene customs and institutions, and from the Slovenes these nomad tribes derived their knowledge of agriculture, commerce, and industry.

Even in these conflicts of the early Middle Ages nothing short of great racial tenacity could have withstood the double pressure from the east and west. Nevertheless, the Slovenes survived where other tribes before them had disappeared, and although their territory dwindled considerably during the course of centuries, they succeeded in preserving their national existence.

During the Middle Ages the Slovenes had two great forces to contend with, one social and the other political—the Church of Rome and the German Empire—and in the measure in which the Church became established among the Slovenes, German political and military influence began to make itself felt, and the small principalities into which the Slovene Empire was broken up succumbed before the weight of the German attack. As in every crisis in their existence the Slovenes invoked the help of their southern kinsmen. Under Ljudevit, Prince of Posavia, the united Slovenes and Croats fought for Slovene independence from Germany, and were defeated.

The consequences of this defeat were above all things of an economic nature. The German

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sovereigns filled the land with German colonists, by whom the Upper and Lower Austrias were completely Germanized, and even apart from this colonizing policy the German rulers sought in every way to restrict the independence of the Slovenes.

In 952 the Emperor Otto I created the frontier province of Great Carantania, which extended from the Danube to the Adriatic, and was to protect Germany and the west against the inroads of the Magyars. Great Carantania included Carinthia, and the adjacent counties of Styria, the Tyrol, Istria, the Margravate of Verona, and the Furlana, so that in Great Carantania all the Slovenes were practically united. About half a century later this whole territory was reorganized, and divided into the Carniolian, Eastern, and Carantanian Marches.

All this time the Slovene struggle for existence continued—a losing fight, it is true, but so stubbornly contested that it has lasted from the days of Charlemagne until the twentieth century. The nobles were the first to succumb and turn their backs upon the national cause.

Within the course of the next few years the peasants, owing to economically altered conditions and changes in the laws relating to land tenure, gradually lost their freedom and became serfs to the German nobles; in fact, from the time of Otto I until the Reformation the Slovenes

were slowly being crushed out of existence, socially and economically enslaved and politically subject to foreign domination.

Under the House of Babenberg the Ostmark (Eastern March), from which Austria derives her name, became detached from Carantania. When the Babenbergs became extinct, Premysl Ottokar, King of Bohemia, sought to emulate the example of Samo and to unite the Slavs of the north and south in one great Empire. But in 1278 he was defeated in the battle of the Marchfeld and it fell to the House of Habsburg to create the Austrian Empire, and thus Austria became a German instead of a Slav State.

The division of land according to the feudal system was also introduced to the Slovene lands when the Habsburgs took in hand the task of unifying them. Styria became subject to them in 1282 directly after Ottokar's defeat. Carniola shared this fate in 1282, Carinthia in 1335, Istria not till 1374, Trieste was united with Austria in 1382, and the principality (formerly county) of Gorizia became Habsburg property in 1500 with the extinction of the line of the Counts of Gorica.

For some time the Habsburgs had to fear the rivalry of the Counts of Celje, whose seat was the Castle of Sunek on the Savinja (Sann), and whose ambition always coveted the Yugoslav lands. One of them, Count Hermann of Celje,

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was Ban of Croatia, and sister's son to the Bosnian King Stjepan Tvrdko II, who bequeathed Bosnia to him. Ulric, the last of the Counts of Celje, married a daughter of the Serbian King Jurij Brankovic. He was murdered in 1456 in Belgrade by the Hungarians, and with him perished the Yugoslav ambitions of the lords of Celje and their possessions became the property of the Habsburgs.

It would be wrong, however, to assume that Slovene speech and political tradition came to a sudden end. The legendary King Mathias lived on in the hearts of the people as the symbol of Slovene independence, and through the greater part of the Middle Ages they possessed a national aristocracy which was only very gradually absorbed by the German nobility. The records of the thirteenth century show a large number of Slovene titled names. Till the thirteenth century the Slovene tongue possessed a legal status, and was spoken by both princes and nobles. In 1227 the Minnesinger Ulric von Lichtenstein greeted the knighthood and nobility of Carinthia in Slovene. Slovene was the language used in solemn ceremonial of the ducal investiture, and Slovene was the language of the Court of Celovec and Vienna.

The Abbot Ivan of Vetrinje, in describing the investiture of 1286, relates that when the Duke of Carinthia was accused before the Emperor

of certain offences, he had to conduct his defence in Slovene, and moreover had to deliver judgment in that language before the Emperor. At the time of the Turkish wars the approach of the Turks was signalled by messages in Slovene, written in Glagolitic characters, and called *Turski glasi* ("Turkish voices"), and the missives convoking the Diet of Carniola contain Slovene signatures written in Old Slav characters.

But all this time the Holy Roman Empire of the Germans pressed upon the Slovenes with all the weight of its huge organization, stifling every possibility of further development, confiscating land and liberty. And their greatest calamity lay in this, that the frontier of the Empire, passing from the Quarnero across the Kras to the Drava, constituted an insurmountable barrier between them and the Yugoslav States, and prevented all political co-operation between them and their kinsmen.

On the other hand, they enjoyed certain advantages by being united under Habsburg suzerainty in the historically and socially homogeneous group of provinces corresponding to the former Great Carinthia. The Habsburgs have always recognized the indivisibility of Carinthia, Styria, and Carniola, and at each redistribution of the lands, these three with Gorica and Istria have been grouped together. In support of our

assertion that the cohesion of these lands is based upon historical law no less than upon economic expedience, we would refer the reader to the expert opinion of Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth, the German nationalist professor of Austrian Historical Law in Graz, who in his "Grundriss der Oesterreichischen Reichsgeschichte" makes the following statement: "On the other hand, certain ancient relations subsisted between the three Alpine countries, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, which had at one time been included in the Dukedom of Carantania, which after the invasion of 1335, revived speedily, owing to a similarity of population and economic conditions. In matters of law as well as of politics Styria then assumed the leadership of the three lands which in the fifteenth century were referred to collectively, as the lower Inner Lands, and subsequently, as Inner Austria."

The great events of history, however, have always brought out the solidarity of all the Jugoslavs, not excepting the Slovenes. Thus the Turkish wars created a powerful bond of union between the Jugoslavs, not merely because of the common danger and necessity for defence, but because the Turkish invasions drove many of the more southern of the Jugoslavs northwards, and these migrations by intermingling the south and north greatly strengthened the sense of racial unity.

The Reformation reacted greatly upon the Slovenes. It seemed as if the nightmare of centuries had come to an end; a free national intellectual life began to spring up from the ashes of the past, and spiritual freedom quickened the beginnings of a new national awakening; but to a pauperized peasantry opposed to an estranged aristocracy the economic problem of material welfare was of greater importance than the spiritual awakening.

The struggle of the Croat and Slovene peasantry for the old *pravda* (rights) for economic emancipation came to a tragic end, but it was of incalculable material and social value. For the first time the mass of Croat and Slovene peoples felt the mighty bond of common interest, and the effort to obtain better conditions became a political necessity. The armed crowds, headed by the Croato-Slovene peasant, King Matija Gubec, demanded, not only an improvement in their economically desperate position, but that the common people should have a voice in a national government. This Croato-Slovene peasant-insurrection was stifled in blood.

After this the national life of the Slovenes sank into hopeless apathy. In the seventeenth century that great apostle of Germanization, Joseph II, almost succeeded in completing the work of Charlemagne, and both Church and State

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strove with increasing persistency to rob the Slovenes of their national consciousness.

In this extremity help came most unexpectedly from that titanic war of liberation, the great French Revolution.

The political ideas and theories of the French Revolution were of decisive moment for the regeneration of the Slovenes. From secular humiliation, social misery, and intellectual backwardness the new political idea led the peoples forth to a promised land of nationalistic ideals, and no nation benefited more by this mighty awakening than the Slovenes, who in spite of their wonderful racial tenacity no longer had the strength to resist Germanism in its new form of absolutism.

CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH IN THE SLOVENE LANDS (1809-13)

IN striking contrast to the somewhat drab and uneventful course of Slovene history as a whole the four years of French rule stand out as a brilliant period of prosperity and incident, deserving special mention in the history of French civilization and statesmanship. Any student of Yugoslav history comparing those days with our own time cannot help being struck by many points of resemblance. To-day, as it did one hundred years ago, the world is passing through a momentous crisis which will decide the fate of future generations. Napoleon I created the first modern political union between Slovenes and Croats by which they might have attained independence and become the nucleus of a national State. Guided by his genius and intuition, Napoleon gave birth to a polity which during the course of the nineteenth century might easily have expanded into a great Yugoslav State if Napoleon's own Empire had not perished so soon. Napoleon was the first to

understand the Yugoslav question and to realize the inherent possibilities of the Yugoslav future. He fully appreciated the unique geographical position of the Slovene lands, and was convinced that they contained the promise of a great commercial development. The Illyrian provinces were to be the link between France and the East.

What France achieved in the Slovene lands within the space of a few years forms one of the most important chapters in the history of Napoleonic administration and politics. .

According to Napoleon the whole country between the Soca (Isonzo) and the Sava, "as far as Bosnia," was Slovene territory. By the Peace of Schönbrunn Carniola, the Slovene portion of Carinthia, part of the Tyrol, Croatia south of the Sava, also Trieste, Gorica, Gradiska, and the Austrian portion of Istria were ceded to Napoleon by the Emperor of Austria. Dalmatia, Venetian Istria, and the Republic of Ragusa had been previously taken by France. Out of all the countries Napoleon created the *pays Illyriens*; and it was a polity in which Yugoslavs, Italians, and Germans were to live side by side. But the Yugoslavs were to be the mainstay of this State, in which they formed the overwhelming majority, and the Slovene city of Ljubljana was to be the capital of this new Yugoslav State. Never before had Carniolians, Dalmatians, Tyrolese been united

under a common administration. Marmont justly remarked that Croatian frontiersmen, Triestine merchants, Carniolian landowners, miners from Istria and Bleiberg, as well as sailors from Dalmatia and Albania, were all made subject to the same laws within this polyglot State. But Napoleon never doubted the possibility of including all these apparently divergent factors in one State under a homogeneous legal administration.

It is significant that Napoleon did not include the *terre irredente* with Italy but with the *pays Illyriens*. Napoleon fully realized that Trieste without a Slovene hinterland could not exist any more than the Slovene hinterland without Trieste. He readily discerned that Venice and Trieste must always be rivals, and never could be allies. On September 15, 1809, one month before the Peace of Schönbrunn, he wrote that he would crush Trieste as being after all of no importance, since Venice was in his possession, and his genius fully endorses the forecast that an Italian annexation would mean the economic and commercial ruin of Trieste as a seaport.

The administration of the new State was defined by the decree of 1809. Illyria was divided into seven provinces: Carniola (with its capital of Ljubljana), Carinthia, with Beljak (Villach), Istria (with Trieste), Civil Croatia (with Karlovac), Dalmatia (with Zadar), Dubrovnik

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(Ragusa) and Kotr with the capital of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), and finally the military frontier as a seventh province. The object in creating this State was (as the author observes in his "Constitution and Administration of the Illyrian Territory," page 114) to enable France to penetrate towards the East. Napoleon was the first who rightly understood the importance of the Balkan States, and the value of the Illyrian territory for the conquest of the Near East. One hundred years later Pan-German expansionist policy chose the same route towards the East through the Yugoslav lands. But compare the wisdom of Napoleon with the clumsy brutality of the Prussian Junkerdom of 1914.

The Illyrian lands were in every way distinct from the Kingdom of Italy, though both were subject to the same sovereigns. An Italian possessed no right of citizenship in Trieste, any more than an Illyrian did in Milan.

At first the French statesmen in Paris were undecided as to the best way of organizing the Illyrian lands, and the decree which finally regulated their Constitution was not completed before 1811. It was an extremely difficult task to devise a homogeneous system of government for a territory including such contrasting elements as regards nationality and culture. The same problem which will have to be faced by the Yugoslavs at the conclusion of the war was

energetically taken in hand by Napoleon and his fellow-workers one hundred years ago. Conflicting interests, the creations of centuries, had to be reconciled. Three languages, the Yugoslav, the German, and the Italian, and two religions, the Catholic and the Orthodox, contended with each other for supremacy in these countries. The Venetian Government, in this respect a worthy compeer of the Austrian, had consigned its subjects to total economic and intellectual neglect. The *ancien régime* had been a régime of conservative reaction under which the country had vegetated and languished in ignorance and thriftlessness. The new age brought a new type of official of the French school, full of new and entirely different ideas on administration. The very sharpness of the contrast prevented many a wise and noble project from maturing. A Governor-General stood at the head of the Illyrian administration. He was Commander-in-Chief of all naval and military forces. In many ways the Illyrian lands bore the character of a military frontier province. Strictly speaking the Governor-General was not the chief administrative official, but the chief control of the administration was vested in him. The Emperor appointed the officials, but the Governor-General had to confirm the appointment. The decree especially provided for the employment of native officials in the various departments of local

administration. But in practice it proved exceedingly difficult to carry out this order of the decree, owing to the insufficient number of natives possessing the necessary qualifications. The Governor-General appointed the Mayors of the various provincial capitals, a provision which was consistent with the general tendency of the decree to minimize the power of the local government. The whole machinery of the administration rested in the hands of the General Intendant, the modern counterpart of the French Intendant of the old régime. The French Intendant of a former generation had been a finance official. The finances of the State are the first and most important administrative problem, and so the Intendant of Illyria bore the suitable title of "Intendant-General des finances." The Governor-General was the military head of the Illyrian Provinces, and the Intendant-General the head of the Civil Administration. As the country was more or less of the nature of a military frontier province, it is obvious that the whole administrative system was subordinated to the Governor-General.

Such a system has one fatal drawback—it fosters an opposition between military and civil administration, which is apt to hinder its efficiency. And as a matter of fact this opposition caused many difficulties in the government of Illyria.

The two highest finance officials under the Intendant-General were a "Receiver-General" and a "Tresorier." The Governor-General was assisted by the "Lesser Council" (*le Petit Conseil*), consisting of the Intendant-General, the Commissioner of Justice, Chief Justice of the country, and two Judges of the Court of Appeal in Ljubljana. The *Petit Conseil* was the highest Court of Appeal, and at the same time the supreme Court of Administration.

Each province had its own Intendant. According to the decree "the Intendants of the Illyrian provinces exercise the same functions as the prefects of the Departments of the Empire."

Each province was subdivided into districts, which were governed by "sub-delegates."

The creators of the Illyrian provinces committed an error in not creating district local government; but we must remember that the official attitude of the Empire was not favourable to local government, or indeed to any form of Home Rule.

The worst reproach, however, that can justly be levelled at the French administration is that it sought too rapidly to engraft French institutions upon a new and immature State. The Napoleonic era was characterized by a tendency towards centralization. But the weakness would doubtless have been eventually remedied in Illyria.

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*and
policy*

Napoleon separated the administrative from the judicial system in Illyria, whereas hitherto there had been no division between the two departments. Judicial procedure was modelled strictly upon the French plan. ~~It was Napoleon's greatest merit that he introduced the Code Civile.~~ By a decree of the Illyrian Government the Code Civile was translated into the three languages of the country. The Napoleonic Code abolished the law of entail, but this led to the land being gradually broken up into holdings too small to be practical, especially in the Slovene lands.

The chief support of the Illyrian Government was the Army. Marmont, the first great organizer of Illyria, caused the French military regulations to be translated into the Illyrian tongues.

Napoleon devised a special régime for the Croatian military frontier, formerly the bulwark of the country against the Turks. Here the old military constitution remained in force, and the military commandants also acted as justices and administrators. When the abolition of the Croatian military frontier was suggested to Napoleon, he cried, "Are you fools? The Croats are not Frenchmen!" He had the greatest admiration for the disposition of the military frontier. His military genius was fascinated by this typical organization of a people remarkable

in arms. Undoubtedly the military virtues of this nation of soldiers were well calculated to arouse Napoleon's unreserved approval.

The French introduced an entirely new system of taxation, which, however, provoked strong opposition from the Conservative element.

Illyria suffered heavily under the Continental Blockade. The whole customs policy of Illyria was founded on the assumption of a great increase in French trade, and the creation of an Illyrian industry. It was a time of high protective tariffs; only on the Turkish frontiers there was no duty upon export.

On January 3, 1812, Trieste was declared a free port, but of course the Continental Blockade was exceedingly detrimental to its development. The economic policy of the Illyrian Government was both far-sighted and liberal. In 1812 the Intendant wrote to Paris: "The day is at hand when the products of Bosnia will be shipped on the Save to the very gates of Ljubljana." And with his mind's eye the Intendant saw the wealth of the East rendered accessible through the possession of the Illyrian lands. Illyria was to be the starting-point for a network of roads through the Balkans. During the few years of their occupation the French erected public works and buildings which still command admiration, especially high-roads.

The greatest achievement of the French régime

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was the abolition of mediaeval feudalism which was the legacy of the Austrian and Venetian dominations. The French took the problem of the emancipation of the peasants most vigorously in hand. The "Robotés" were abolished; the French introduced social equality directly after the Annexation, and the magnates of the old régime lost their influence and social prestige.

The French unified the system of education; the so-called "Université" was introduced into Illyria and modelled on the system of the mother-country. The Slovene language, which the Austrians despised, received every consideration in the schools, and a High School (the Academy) was founded in Ljubljana.

The Budget of 1810 amounted to 18,809,000 fr. expenses, and the revenue to 12,475,000 fr.

The history of the French administration of Illyria undoubtedly presents a record of the most amazing and successful educational experiments ever carried out by any nation in a foreign country. France spent much ability, capacity, and talent in creating a strong frontier State in the Yugoslav Near East; although the genius of Liberty had already been restrained by the Empire at the time of the annexation, the ideas of the great Revolution took root here in this far-off country. A breath of civil equality and Heaven-sent liberty pervaded these lands which had never known freedom, and whose people were

stifling in the fog of Austrian and Venetian absolutism.

A most touching allusion to the French rule occurs in a simple folk-tale.

"In the days of the French, men paid few taxes. The judges were strict, but just. Money was as plentiful as hay; there was no misery, and thieves were unknown. The great lords had to be modest. We were treated well and humanely. Men lived without care and were happy and good, better than in later times. But such pleasant times are not created for mortals to enjoy them for ever."

May France, the great country who a century ago gave to Illyria social and civil equality and the possibilities of progress, not in these momentous times forget the sons of Illyria. A younger generation is striving for freedom, and hoping for a better future, which France, for her honour's sake, should help to create.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL RENASCENCE OF THE SLOVENES

IT is only by studying the underlying causes of the political renascence of the Slovenes that the fundamental features of their political life and the preconditions for their development on Nationalist lines can be rightly understood.

As the Slovenes were among the earliest victims of German Imperialism, and Slovene political independence broke down before the invasion of German feudalism, one can scarcely speak of a political existence of the Slovenes prior to the era of the French Revolution. The Slovene language was the idiom of a peasant class. There were no Slovene nobles, few Slovene burgesses.

Whoever wishes to consider the causes of the rise and growth of Slovene Nationalism, and that of every other small nationality, must pause a moment to consider the great ideas which have created the political and social institutions of the present day. The Renaissance of the sixteenth century and the great Reformation paved the way for the French Revolution. The individual had

to be set free, the society to be emancipated from the Church, ere the minds of men could grasp the idea of independence for a national unit that had hitherto lacked political independence. But only a few chosen intellects of the eighteenth century grasped the meaning of Slovene Nationalism, and acted as pioneers of the future. The masses remained dumb and indifferent.

Even the ideas of the French Revolution found no response among the bulk of the people. Only a small number of intellectuals began to realize that these ideas would eventually lead to a resurrection of the Slovene nation. The best men of the nation, among whom Vodnik was one of the most notable, hailed the French occupation and the creation of Illyria with enthusiasm. But although this did not yet constitute the beginning of the Slovene political movement, yet the memory of the short but glorious time of the French rule proved a powerful lever for the Slovene movement.

When the French quitted the Slovene lands, and Austria resumed her reactionary sway, it was impossible for an Austrian conservative régime to eradicate all traces of the French interregnum. The Austrians turned Napoleon's *pays Illyriens* into a Kingdom of Illyria. The Slovene nation was never so broken up and divided under the old absolutist rule as during

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the second half of the nineteenth century, when the German Liberals came into power in Austria.

At this juncture an important intellectual factor arose, which even during the gloom of the Metternich era helped to pave the way for the great events of the future. This factor was the Romantic movement. The future spokesman of the Slav nations came in contact with the German Romantic movement.

It was this that wakened the Austrian Slavs to a new life. National life, national history, legend, and tradition created a new literature, and this literature led to the development of political revival. Long before the masses began to rouse themselves, the ideals of the Romantic period filled the minds of the intellectuals and scholars of the nation.

Among the Northern Slavs, Kollár was the leader of the Slav Romantic movement, which crystallized into the political and Nationalist All-Slav idea. In the south it was Illyrism which strove to unite Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. The Slovene poet Vraz and the Croato-Slovene Ljudevit Gaj initiated a far-reaching social movement in the Slav south. The younger generation quivered in the glad presentiment of the dawn of a new spiritual and political life. Deliverance from the shameful foreign yoke in all spheres of political and intellectual life became the watchword of the day, and the greatest men of the

nation strove to give a new and national life to their country. Away with the German-Latin and Magyar languages ! Let the language of the nation be reborn, and a national literature arise ! A people that realizes its Yugoslav nature will no longer tolerate a political foreign rule.

The " Illyrians " were under no necessity to create an artificial literary language. The Bosnian idiom, in which the people sing their hero-songs, was obviously a natural, melodious, literary tongue, understood by the whole nation. It had the great advantage of being not only the idiom of most of the Croats, but also that of all the Serbs. The Croats of the old Croat counties of Krizevac, Varazdin, and Zagreb certainly spoke a dialect, which was that of their Slovene neighbours in the west, rather than that of the Slavonians and Dalmatians, or the Serbs in what was then still part of Turkey. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Illyrian movement were undoubtedly prompted by a right and sane instinct which enabled them to foresee that in time to come the focus of Yugoslav national life would be transferred towards the south-east, to Serbia.

The position created by the " Illyrians " of Zagreb was not altogether without difficulty for the Slovenes, who had first to rid themselves of both German and Italian pressure. The new literary language, the *stokavscina*, was, after all, not the same as the *kajkavscina* of the Slovenes.

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The poet Presern and his followers thought it would be better for the Slovenes to adopt a Carniolian dialect as their literary language. The matter was, however, decided by practical considerations. A literary language which differed too greatly from the popular idiom would, Presern thought, have less chance of competing successfully with the German and Italian languages. The Slovene colloquial tongue would, according to the opinion of the Slovene leaders, prove a better weapon against the anti-Nationalist tendencies which were even then beginning to make themselves felt. But in spite of this, even the staunchest upholders of a separate Slovene literary language never doubted the possibility of a future fusion of the Slovene with the Serbo-Croat literary language. As Fran Levstik, the eminent Slovene critic, expressed it: "The Slovene and Croatian idioms appear to me like two streams arising from the same source . . . it is our task to see to it that the two streams are reunited in one river, seeing that both have arisen from the same source."

Although the Slovenes did not adopt the Illyrian literary language reform, but began instead to develop their own Slovene language and literature, yet the Slovene Nationalist movement owed its first impulse to the Illyrian movement. Slovene Nationalism was merely a further expression of the Illyrian idea of emancipation

from foreign speech, culture, and political influence. It would be wrong to assume that the Slovenes repudiated the Illyrian literary tongue, or even became less friendly disposed towards the Croats. A study of the mutual relations between the Slav peoples reveals no friendship so frank and loyal as that which has existed from time immemorial between the Slovenes and Croats. Never have the two brother-nations been divided by conflicts or animosities, such as have not infrequently occurred in the Slavonic family.

The divinely gifted poet Presern was the true creator of Slovene intellectual life, and the modest beginnings of Slovene political life coincide with the zenith of his creative power. Bleiweis made a beginning by editing the *Novice*, a journal that certainly had no violent revolutionary tendencies. Bleiweis himself was no adherent of Illyrism, and it was he who recommended the leaders of the Slovaks to separate their language from that of the Czechs, and to create an independent Slovak literary tongue. For in the north the same differentiation took place between Czechs and Slovaks as in the south between Slovenes and Croats.

The years prior to the Viennese March Revolution were of incalculable importance to Slovene Nationalism. The All-Slav idea, which encountered no great opposition on the part of

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Austrian absolutism, and in those days rather bore the character of an idealistic fad, had already taken root among the Slovenes, and a new literature had arisen. But it was a misfortune for the Slovenes that the year 1848 found them both socially and politically immature.

The Slovene peasantry were in a wretched position, both socially and economically. The reforms by which the French had improved the lot of the Slovene peasantry in the countries they had conquered had been gradually replaced by the old land system under the Austrian rule. Under the arbitrary aristocratic régime of the great landlords, who regarded the peasants simply as so much live stock on the land, the Slovene people could not be educated to a sense of national self-consciousness and manly pride. The German was the landlord, the Slovene was the submissive, servile, devoted peasant, who drudged and slaved for the foreigner. And although the Slovene lands were shamefully neglected by the Government, they were, in proportion, the most heavily taxed part of the Empire, as was pointed out by a Slovene deputy in the Reichsrat of 1848.

During the period of absolutism the management of all secondary schools in the Slovene lands was exclusively German. The greater number of the primary schools were bi-lingual. In Styria it was above all the great Archbishop Slomsek

who strove to introduce the use of the Slovene tongue into the primary schools.

In all Government offices the Slovene language was practically banned. German was the official language. One of the first reforms demanded by the Slovenes in 1848 was the introduction of the Slovene language into the schools and Government offices.

The absolutist régime, supported by the Dynasty, the aristocracy, the military, and a petty system of press censorship, was quite incapable of resisting a vigorous popular movement. When the February Revolution in Paris heralded the approach of a new era, Metternich's Old Austria collapsed like a house of cards. In Vienna the March Revolution scored an almost bloodless victory in its first impetuous onslaught. All resistance on the part of the old régime was hopeless.

The Czechs were the first among the Austrian Slavs to formulate their Nationalist and political programme, in the meeting at Václavské lázni. The Slovenes could not rise to prompt and efficient action. Events had taken them unawares, and they lacked leaders possessing the necessary energy and insight. The situation could be summed up in the words, "The hour had come ; but the hour is nothing without the man." The first leaders of the Slovenes were intellectuals and inexperienced youths. In these

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days of the Revolution, the same as so often in later years, the Slovenes developed far greater activity abroad than in their own country.

Carniola, and especially Ljubljana, were entirely without energetic initiative. Abroad, in Vienna and in Graz, the intellect was sharpened by wider social intercourse with other Slavs. It was on foreign soil that the first political organizations were founded and the first Nationalist programmes formulated.

The academic youth of the Slovenes was very strongly represented in the Revolution during those days in March. The issue was decided on March 13th. The Court and the police simply capitulated. Two days later the Emperor granted freedom of the press and consented to the introduction of sundry other liberal reforms. On March 29th the "Slovenija," the first Slovene Union, was founded in Vienna. The first president of the society was the subsequently famous Slavist Miklosic. Nor were the Slovenes inactive in Graz, where Mursec and Joseph Kranjec, afterwards a well-known jurist, created the Graz Slovenija, a society pursuing the same aims as the Viennese society of the same name. The Viennese "Slovenija" formulated the following programme :—

"The Slovenes of Carniola, Styria, the Coastland, and Carinthia are one people; they are therefore to be united in one kingdom, which

is to bear the name 'Slovenija.' This kingdom is to possess its own Parliament. The Slovene language shall enjoy the same rights in Slovene countries as German enjoys in German countries." Special importance attaches to that part of the programme which defines the relations between Austria and Germany. "Our 'Slovenija' is to be an integral part of the Austrian, not of the German Empire. We do not desire our country to be represented in the German Parliament, and shall only feel bound to obey such laws as are given us by our Emperor in conjunction with our deputies. Our Emperor has given us our Constitution; we can do nothing without our Emperor and our deputies. . . ."

A few days earlier, Palacky, the leader of the Czechs, had likewise sent his reply to the Committee of Fifty at Frankfort. The Frankfort Parliament had issued a manifesto to the Austrian Slavs requesting them to send their delegates to the German Parliament. But the election of delegates from Austria would have been tantamount to an admission that Austria belonged to the German Empire. The instinct of self-preservation prompted the Austrian Slavs to take up a firm stand with the Parliament of Frankfort. Palacky's answer to the invitation from Frankfort was at the same time a statement of the programme of the Austrian Slavs. Palacky refused to recognize the Union of the German

Empire. Within the borders of Austria the Slavs might hope for the possibility of national development, but not within the borders of Germany. His document contains the following world-famous passage: "Truly, should the Austrian State cease to exist, it would be necessary to re-create it as soon as possible in the interests of Europe, nay, of humanity." Yet this sentence does not fully express Palacky's thought. Only an Austria which would be just toward all nationalities, an Austria in which none was lord and none was slave, could fulfil so great a task. And only under these conditions Palacky was a friend of Austria. His "Idea of the Austrian State" contains an instructive parallel to the passage just quoted. "We were before Austria; we shall also be after her! The existence of the Slavs is not dependent upon the existence of Austria. An Austria which oppresses the Slavs has lost the right to exist. National equality is justice before God and man. If Austria is unable or unwilling to grant us this, we have no further interest in her preservation, for we can suffer injustice equally outside Austria, and that free of cost!" In this passage Palacky's thoughts are clearly expressed. In 1848 Palacky was firmly convinced that Austria would be just towards her various nationalities, and it was within the confines of the Austrian Empire that Palacky strove to create a happier future

for the Czechs and other Slavs. He realized that the German Empire would mean national death to the Austrian Slavs, and his refusal of the invitation of the Frankfort Parliament was the first historic action taken by the Austrian Slavs against that current of ideas which several decades later was called Pan-Germanism.

Palacky formulated the Slav programme as follows: The Austrian Slavs will send their representatives to Vienna, not to Frankfort. Vienna must not sink to the level of a provincial town. Side by side with Germany there must be a completely independent Austria, and this Austria must gravitate towards the East. Austria must develop her life as a State entirely apart from Germany.

This idea is also contained in the manifesto issued by the Viennese "Slovenija" to the Slovenes. In this manifesto the Slovenes were called upon to protest against the holding of elections for the Frankfort Parliament. It was pointed out that all who sent representatives would thereby divest themselves of their national rights. Austrian history affords the clearest proofs of the disastrous nature of a union with Germany; of all her promises Germany keeps but few. Let a constitutional Austria be the refuge of the Slovenes.

Then began an extremely interesting controversy with the German poet and subsequent

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statesman Anastasius Grün, Count Auersperg. Grün's reply to the manifesto of the "Slovenija" is still steeped in the old Liberal spirit of conciliation, which later on disappeared entirely. In his opinion it is paradoxical of the Slovenes to protest against the election of delegates for the Frankfort Parliament. "Slovene brothers, if you separate yourselves from Germany, you will separate yourselves from Austria also. . . . But if you will not remain with Germany, together with Austria, pray reflect, that the further you alienate yourselves from Germany, the nearer you will approach to Russia." And Russia, according to Grün, and even in Palacky's opinion, was the great enemy of Western civilization. Austria—thus argued Grün—could only be worthily represented in the Frankfort Parliament if all her nationalities sent their representatives. Let the Slovenes also send the best sons of their nation.

But the Slovenes had an answer ready for Anastasius Grün. A political union with Germany would be a betrayal, as thereby Austria would sink to the position of a Crown land, and the Emperor to that of a Lieutenant-Governor under a Frankfort Government. It would be dangerous for Austria to form a United State with Germany, or to join the German Confederation. One hundred and ninety Austrian deputies would be powerless against the six hundred German deputies

in Frankfort. The following view upon Germany is really most characteristic: "In Germany, humanitarian ideals and liberty have no abiding place; but they will have one in an Austria filled with the spirit of Equity and Justice. The Slovenes have no reason to fear Russia. But above all things they desire to see Austria independent.

To these views Grün opposed fresh arguments. He confessed himself a friend of the Slovenes. He argued that the Slovenes had no reason to fear that Germany would wish to Germanize them, a view which reveals the guilelessness of his poetic soul. But it is significant that Grün foresaw the future emancipation of the Slovene lands. "Let Slovenija yet awhile take her ease, being led by the hand of her elder sister Austria. She need not be ashamed of such guidance. . . . When Slovenija is mature, separation will be only natural, even if not less painful." In one respect Grün was certainly right. He said that a separation from Germany would throw the Slovenes into the arms of Russia. The true import of these words will be at once apparent if we replace the word "Russia" by another, to wit, the word "Jugoslavia."

The Slovenes did not abstain from the elections for the Frankfort Parliament in the same well-ordered, politically disciplined manner as the Czechs. Their political sense and organization

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were yet in their infancy. Yet it is safe to say that the agitation against Frankfort was not without good results.

When the Archduke Joachim gave audience to the deputation of the States of Carniola, in order that they might interpret the wishes of the Carniolian Diet, it was Bleiweis who preferred the petition for the unification of the Slovene lands. With true Austrian bonhomie the Archduke Joachim replied: "Well, you are right; in several ways that would be quite useful."

According to the Constitution of April 25, 1848, all the countries belonging to the Austrian Empire formed a Constitutional Monarchy. One of these countries was Illyria, consisting of the duchies of Carinthia and Carniola and the Coast-land. Thus the revolution of 1848 did not cause "Illyria" to disappear from off the scene. Members for the Viennese Parliament (Reichsrat) were elected by universal indirect suffrage. The Slovenes sent up sixteen deputies, although they were by right entitled to twenty-one. The Slovene delegates were not an altogether united party. They lacked strong leaders, who would have compelled the Slovenes to pursue a consistent policy. This want of solidarity was a consequence of ignorance of parliamentary routine and political inexperience on the part of the Slovene deputies.

Besides the Imperial Parliament each country possessed its own Diet. The discussions upon the future provincial Constitution in the Styrian Diet afford characteristic proof of the conciliatory mood and the friendly spirit towards the Slovenes in those days. The Constitution was to provide for national and political equality of Slovenes and Germans. This resolution was passed without debate in the provincial Diet. Styria was to be divided into three districts. The Slovene (Lower Styrian) district was to include the Slovene parts of the districts of Maribor and Celje. Truly, there was a spirit of international brotherly love and kindness abroad in the Parliament of Graz in those days, which was never to be found there afterwards.

In October the revolution in Vienna made it impossible for the Imperial Parliament to hold its sittings in the capital. The Reichsrat was therefore transferred to the quiet little Moravian town of Kromeriz. Special importance attaches to the debates in the Constitutional Committee in Kromeriz, at whose sittings important suggestions regarding the reform of the Monarchy were put forward. Dr. von Löchner, a German, proposed the formation of a Polish, a Czech, an Italian, a German, and a Slovene Austria. Slovene Austria was to include Carniola, Styria, Carinthia south of the Drave, and the Slovene part of Gorizia. In this country the official language

Kromeriz
part

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was to be Slovene. With these Slovene lands Croatia was to be united. This was the programme of the German Left. Palacky suggested that Austria should be divided into nine national territories, viz. German, Austrian, Czech, Polish, Slovene, Italian, Yugoslav, Magyar, and Roumanian Austria.

But all these far-seeing plans came to naught. The reaction was too powerful. On March 7, 1849, the Debating Hall of the Austrian Imperial Parliament was occupied by the military, and the Austrian Constitution had come to a swift and sudden end.

Although in 1848 the Slovenes did not yet display a determined political spirit in the full consciousness of their existence and rights, yet the spell was broken. A people that had for centuries lain in lethargic slumber was now awakened. Henceforth no power on earth would be strong enough to stop the Nationalist movement. It is true that the years of absolutism that followed upon 1848 rendered political life impossible ; but the Slovene ideal of the year 1848 lived on in the heart of the Slovenes.

CHAPTER VII

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION

THE so-called March Constitution of 1849 was a Constitution that never came into force. It was the last Royal Charter in which "Illyria" is still mentioned among the Crown lands. Henceforward the word disappears from the official nomenclature, and the memory of the kingdom of Illyria is preserved only in the title of the Official Gazette of the Littoral, which to this day bears the heading *Official Gazette of the Austro-Illyrian Coastland*.

We must not omit to mention that the March Constitution, under whose charter no Parliament was ever elected or convoked, was far more favourable to the Slovenes than the Constitutional laws of the sixties. The March Constitution bore a Centralistic character, and under it Croatia was still represented in the Reichsrat; the position of the Slovenes in such a Reichsrat would have been very strong indeed, as in conjunction with the Croats they would have constituted a numerous Nationalist group. But as

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the March Constitution infringed the historic prerogative of Hungary, and Croatia, it was unacceptable to these two countries.

Then followed the dark years of the absolutist régime. The Slovene movement of 1848 could scarcely yet be called a purely popular movement, for the masses—in the true sense of the words—took no great part in it ; but, nevertheless, the main principle of Slovene Nationalism was clearly and energetically expressed in 1848. During the drab and soul-destroying monotony of the years of absolutism the leaders of the Slovenes had time and leisure to prepare themselves for future struggles.

It is exceedingly significant of Austrian ways and public opinion in Austria that defeats on the battlefields arouse no feelings save those of satisfaction among the social elements in favour of political freedom and nationalist sentiment. The memoirs of Joseph Vossjak contain an interesting comment on the impression produced by the defeat at Magenta : " No one was depressed by the defeat of our army, because we hoped that the absolutist régime would now come to an end." ¹ Certainly this is a state of affairs revealing a most unhealthy condition of the body politic ; but if we consider Austria's position to-day, we must confess that these words are as true as if they had been penned yesterday.

¹ Dr. Joseph Vossjak, " Spomini," i. p. 64.

The year 1860 was the great turning-point in Slovene political life. It was then that the mass of the people entered the arena. Hitherto only a small intellectual minority had occupied itself with politics, but now the new political ideas were spread among the masses. The events of 1848 showed the political organization of the Slovenes yet raw and inexperienced. Now they understood how to organize and agitate. A life-giving tide of enthusiasm surged over all the Slovene lands, and it was as if those fair, impassioned years when the young Illyrians, filled with romantic fervour, proclaimed the national ideals with lyre and sword, were now celebrating a glad rebirth. But these were more practical times. Men aimed at more tangible political prizes, and instead of striving for the great idea of Yugoslav unity they sought to provide the foundations of greater national prosperity for the Slovenes.

Federalism and Centralization—those were the two opposing principles which eventually led to most confusion in Austrian home politics with regard to the Constitution. It is a peculiarity of Austrian constitutional conflicts that the most antagonistic political principles are found in the strangest juxtaposition. The October Diploma, much abused for being Federalistic, contains many Centralist elements, and the February Patent is not without Federalist features. Both afford

glaring instances of Austria's unpardonable and demoralizing habit of doing everything by halves. Neither of the two Constitutions gives clear expression to a well-defined political thought. It is as if their framers had sought mutually to deceive each other with vague and deceptive ambiguities. Here lies the reason why Austrian constitutional law has become a kind of inner mystery, which drives the expert to despair and provides every facility for a quibbling interpretation. Thus the year 1860 saw the beginning of the great Comedy of Errors, which was to occupy the weary years of a full half-century, and to lead to the general downfall.

German Liberalism—which was Centralistic—was opposed by the Slav Federalism—unfortunately inclined to be somewhat reactionary—of the so-called Historically Constituted Units (*Staatsrechtlich historische Individualitäten*), such as Bohemia. It was difficult for the Slovenes to make a choice. They were not an historic entity, with historic and constitutional traditions. On the other hand, German Centralism was likewise fraught with danger to them. The uncertain, undecided attitude of the Slovenes in face of the great constitutional problems was a great evil, but it was an evil that sprang from the very nature of Slovene policy. Carniola was the only Slovene country that could have benefited by an increase of the autonomous power vested in the Provincial

Parliaments. In all other Provincial Parliaments the Slovenes were in the minority, and the constitutional legislation of these Provincial Parliaments might easily have proved disastrous to the Slovene minority. The Slovene politicians discovered very soon that the local administration and Provincial Government were both completely dominated by German and Italian influence, whereas the Central Government in Vienna was much more complaisant, principally because of the pressure exercised by the great Slav parties there.

Thus the Slovenes could not pursue a definitely Federalist policy, nor yet one that was purely Centralist; they were obliged to compromise. There was, however, a third course between these two extremes, which would have absolutely suited the position of the Slovenes. This was the principle of National Autonomy, according to which Home Rule was to be granted—not on the strength of the historic boundaries of the Crown lands, but of the actual, present, ethnographic boundaries between the different nationalities. The Constitution drafted by Palacky in 1849 and the Slovene programmes of 1848 were all founded on the principle of National Autonomy. But the times were not ripe for this idea in the sixties, as too much value was attached to Centralistic ideology and certain aspects of constitutional law.

Military and bureaucratic absolutism broke down helplessly at Magenta and Solferino. On

May 31st the Enlarged Reichsrat (Imperial Council or Parliament) began its debates on the question of the Constitution. It was an assemblage of specially appointed magnates and dignitaries of State. Bishop Strossmayer was the spokesman of the Croats; the Slovenes had no representative in the Enlarged Reichsrat. The result of these debates was the October Charter, a masterpiece of political hypocrisy and casuistry. The Federalist parties saw in it a victory of their efforts, and the German Centralist middle classes a defeat; yet the Charter by no means satisfied the Croats, and still less the Slovenes.

By the October Diploma the powers of the Reichsrat (Imperial Council) were strictly limited and circumscribed, while the Diets (Parliaments of the Kingdoms and Crown lands) were given a very free hand indeed. It was precisely this freedom of action as regards legislation in the Provincial Parliaments that constituted the value of the October Diploma in the eyes of the partisans of Federal Autonomy. The October Diploma was proclaimed an immutable and irrevocable fundamental law (*Reichsgrundgesetz*). But now followed a truly Austrian proceeding. Within a few months of its promulgation this "fundamental law" was repealed. The German middle classes set every law in motion, and the German Liberal Party succeeded in carrying through the February Patent. By this Charter

the Reichsrat became an instrument of German Liberalism, entirely suited to the wishes of the Germans.

By the February Patent the political centre of gravity in the Monarchy was transferred to the Imperial Council in Vienna. One of the results of the February Constitution was the increased number of the Diets, and in this respect the Slovenes had no cause to be satisfied with the February Constitution, which became a scourge, devised by German Liberalism, for the Slovenes. The fair Illyrian dreams had vanished; henceforth Slovene policy was paralysed by being divided between six Diets. In five of these the Slovenes were bound to be in a hopeless minority. The primary conditions for effective political activity were destroyed.

The Provincial Parliament elected the Members of the House of Deputies for the Imperial Parliament. What manner of representation the Slovenes enjoyed in the Imperial Parliament may be deduced from the fact that only in the Carniolian Diet they were in a majority. The Czechs alone had it in their power to support the Slovenes in their Nationalist demands. But the Czechs pursued a policy of abstention and boycotted the Imperial Parliament in Vienna. Thus it was almost impossible for the Slovenes to obtain any success at all.

The years between the February Patent and

the Austro-Prussian War represent a period of struggle for the form of the Empire. Hungary refused to come into the Imperial Parliament in Vienna, and it became necessary to find a new formula to define the relationship between Austria and Hungary. After the defeat of Königgrätz, the Austro-Hungarian Dualism was constituted in all haste and superficiality. Palacky, in his *Idee des Österreichischen Staates* ("Idea of the Austrian State"), aptly describes it as "an experiment so dangerous that it may cost the existence of the State." The contemporary generation of Slovene politicians cannot be held altogether blameless, because they failed to foresee and to realize the terrible danger which was threatening to destroy both them and the Croats. But we must take into account that, after all, it did not depend upon the Slovenes whether the Dualism were introduced or not. That great crime was committed by others.

The statutes of 1867 granted freedom of assembly and association, and enabled the Slovene leaders to spread the idea of national rights among the mass of the people. The Slovene movement became a truly popular movement, when the national rights of the Slovenes were formulated amid great enthusiasm at numerous meetings. This was the time of the "Tabori," in which the hitherto lacking contact between the intellectuals and the masses was at last estab-

lished. At the first great "Tabori" in Ljutomer a resolution was passed demanding the introduction of the Slovene language in schools and Government offices. A united Slovenia with national administration was another point in the Nationalist programme, which had already been put forward in 1868, and which now deeply stirred the people. The leaders of the Slovenes fully realized that Article 19 of the Statute Law, which dealt with national equality, was a mere dead letter so long as there was no executive law to regulate the linguistic claims in detail. The Slovene programme found an enthusiastic echo among the masses, and men realized that a certain German Styrian politician, who had opined that fifty years hence the Slovenes would have ceased to exist, would certainly prove a false prophet. The spell was broken, and there was no need to fear for the vitality of the Slovene movement. The nation was full of faith in the future. In 1868 Joseph Vosnjak and his friends founded the *Slovenski Narod*, the first important Slovene daily—a great event in the annals of Yugoslav journalism. The new paper professed Liberal and Nationalist tendencies.

During the next few years the national struggle became especially acute in the Styrian Diet. In this Parliament a small Slovene minority was pitted against a majority of Chauvinists, who refused to concede any rights at all to the Slovene

language. The Slovene deputies upheld the principle of nationality with sound and vigorous arguments, and many a true and weighty word was spoken in the debates and questions of that time. The following sentence from an interpellation (in 1869) is well worth quoting : " The Slavs would have made infinitely better progress if as much had been done for them as has been done against them, and even if they had been left to their fate. The Austrian Slavs have not had one red-letter day."

In 1873 the Provincial Parliaments were deprived of the right of sending delegates to the Imperial Parliament ; henceforth the elections were direct. This somewhat improved the position of the Slovenes in those countries where they were not in a majority, and it is only since then that a true parliamentary activity of the Slovenes has been possible.

After the Hohenwart-Schäffle Government had made one last attempt to federate Austria, and the cardinal demands of the Czechs had failed of their realization, the period of the great struggle for the Constitution came to a close. The rising power of the German Empire and of the Magyars, to whom the dynasty became subservient, wrecked every scheme of Federalist reform. A thoroughly mistaken foreign policy was a further, inevitable consequence of the Germano-Magyar hegemony.

But at first, when the main guiding-lines of the Austro-Hungarian Dualistic policy were but newly laid down, the statesmen of Berlin and Budapest were still moderate, and those in charge of the Austrian State timidly sought to render the fate of the Austrian Slavs less unjust. Not by laws, but by bylaws and regulations, they sought to satisfy the Nationalist demands of the Austrian Slavs. But a bylaw was the very means whereby, with truly Austrian insincerity, linguistic rights could most cautiously be granted and then hedged in with clauses. The annals of the Austrian languages regulations afford a most characteristic illustration of the inadequate means by which Austria sought to overcome the languages problem.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SLOVENES AND AUSTRIA

TO-DAY we are witnesses of the breaking-up of Austria, and her friends must note the changes of time and circumstance with sorrow. But Austria is herself the cause of her own downfall. She showed herself incapable of adapting herself to the leading ideas and thought-currents of our age. If Austria had rightly grasped the idea of nationality, and had realized it on a democratic basis, her transformation into a Monarchy after the pattern of the Swiss Republic might have been possible. But when the ancient Empire of Austria allowed itself to be taken in tow by the upstart Power Germany, and was — most unnecessarily — dragged into Germany's *Weltpolitik*, then all was lost indeed.

When we remember the leading part played in European foreign politics by Austria in the days of Metternich, we cannot but marvel at the subservient position now occupied by Austria with regard to Germany. In those days Austria was the arbiter of Europe ; to-day she has neither

initiative nor a will of her own in foreign politics. At the Congress of Ljubljana (Laibach) Austria imposed her will upon Europe, and the international protest against so many Liberal Governments was the work of Austria. This intervention was set on foot in the name of Europe, and at Austria's behest. But it is possible to reverse the principle. An intervention may take place, not only on behalf of the principles of Conservatism and Divine Right, but also on behalf of those of national existence and the freedom of nationalities ; and a Europe which desires world-peace must intervene in the latter sense, and incidentally in favour of Jugoslavia.

The history of Austria and the Slovenes forms an interesting chapter. Of all the Slavs the Slovenes have lived longest under Austria's sceptre. They were the first to lose their independence, the first victims of German feudalism. They shared every turn of fortune that befell the Habsburg Empire. The Old Austrian system of Government was a régime of patriarchal tutelage over both nationalities and individuals. The limited intellect of the subject was not permitted to evade the guardianship of absolutism. Not only was the individual treated as a political minor, but the nationality likewise. The Sovereign ruled the peoples well or ill by rule of thumb, *more paterno*, and the police, modelled on a Tuscano-Spanish system, interfered

in all private affairs of the subjects—not citizens—of the State. Foreign politics and the Army were the exclusive domain of the Sovereign. The middle classes, the intelligence of the nation, and the mass of the people had no say at all in the matter. Such a régime is of course not calculated to educate the individual to a sense of civic liberty, personal independence, and self-consciousness.

In this stifling atmosphere of insincerity, thralldom, and absolutism the Slovenes lived until 1848. This eventful year overtook them in a state of national unreadiness. The Slovene policy of 1848 was confused and by no means clear as to its issue.

The Dynasty was not in the least hostile in its attitude towards Illyrism, which even in those days proclaimed the principles of what was subsequently called Great Serbia. The House of Habsburg, which had never grasped the wisdom of attaching the Balkan Slavs to itself by an anti-Turkish policy, looked upon Illyrism, which proclaimed the unity of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, as a counterbalance to the Hungarian bid for independence. The policy of the Habsburgs was always ambiguous and insincere, as is most amply and clearly proved by the story of Croatia and the fate of Jelacic in 1848. Yet it is an incontestable fact that the Imperial Court in Vienna furthered Illyrism.

The Austria of absolutism looked upon the unity of the Jugoslavs as a natural, incontestable fact, and in Vienna the expression "Illyrian" had a more familiar ring in it than "Slovene" or "Croat." Vienna even assisted in the work of unification. In 1850 the Viennese Government appointed a Commission to establish a unified Yugoslav legal nomenclature. This Commission, which consisted of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, accomplished its work within a few years, and the first Yugoslav "Legal Terminology" appeared during the heyday of absolutism.

It was Austria's misfortune that she could never carry a plan, once conceived, to its logical conclusion. Thus the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which added a large Yugoslav population to the Jugoslavs of the Empire, finally became a wretched piece of political patchwork. If the ruling political system of those days had not been the Austro-Hungarian Dualism, but a system of Federation, under which all the Austrian nationalities would have been equally privileged, this occupation would have rendered Austria the predominant Power in the Balkans, and Austria would have solved the Yugoslav Question. But Germany and Hungary made such a solution impossible, and Bosnia became an awful example to the rest of the Balkan Slavs. Joseph Vosnjak was quite logical in his forecast, in 1878, when he expressed his apprehension that the Slavs

would derive no advantage from the occupation, and that it would only strengthen the hands of the dominant German-Hungarian régime.

It is most interesting to note the different phases through which the Austrian administration in the Slovene lands has passed during the last forty years, since the foundation of the German Empire. During the years when Germany was not yet allied to Austria-Hungary, and at the time when Austria's foreign policy was not yet abused in the interests of home politics, the Slovene element came greatly to the fore in the administration. It was, comparatively speaking, a time of national justice. As a matter of fact the Government under Taaffe introduced no radical innovations in the administrative system, but contented itself with introducing the Slovene language gradually into the law-courts and the administration. The Slovenes felt that this was only justice "so far as might be practicable," an enforced concession to the Slovene Nationalist Idea. The regulations issued under Taaffe with regard to linguistic rights were half-measured, but they reveal at least an inclination towards impartiality, towards a more just handling of the administration. Moreover, under him, the Slovenes were of the Government party. The Nationalist struggles in Styria and Carinthia were not particularly bitter just then, and "live and let live" was not only the motto of the

Government, but also of the various Nationalist parties.

But already in Taaffe's time the Pan-German Party began to develop in Austria. Fully imbued with the old Austrian spirit, and feeling instinctively that a *rapprochement* with Germany would be disastrous to Austria, Taaffe ruthlessly persecuted this party. German Irredentism was taboo in Vienna, and this circumstance helped greatly to strengthen the true Austrian State Ideal. In every way the eighties and nineties of last century were years of quiet and unostentatious progress in Austria; Austrian statesmen were prepared to develop the idea of a State of Nationalities, and the consequences of the Dualist system were not yet so disastrously apparent.

Badeni's fall in 1897 suddenly brought a vein of non-compromise into Austrian Nationalist politics which had been unknown before. During his premiership Badeni issued the Bohemian languages regulations which were to place the German and Czech languages on a perfectly equal footing in Bohemia. The complete change in policy of the Germans most particularly affected the Slovene lands, where the Nationalist conflict in Styria and Carinthia at once began to assume a sharp and uncompromising character.

An energetic system of Germanization was at once inaugurated all along the German and

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Slovene linguistic frontier. The German marches began to encroach upon Slovene territory, and the Government assisted the activity of the Pan-German organizations with truly paternal solicitude.

The old Austrian distrust of Germany, which had so strongly inspired Taaffe, had disappeared. The Government did not betray any inclination to interfere with the Pan-German propaganda ; it was even assisted in Vienna, although its final objects were quite openly vowed. An independent Austria is incompatible with Pan-German ambitions.

The true cause of Austria's policy of oppression is Pan-German Imperialism. It is important to bear this fact in mind, and especially in this connection.

There is an instructive task in store for the statesman of the future in the study of contemporary opinion upon the causes of the present war. It will be interesting to follow the unparalleled ingenuity with which the Germans in Austria and the Magyars aver that Serbia alone is responsible for the Great Slaughter. Most certainly Serbia has contributed to the cataclysm of the world-drama ; but it is for the simple reason that she constitutes a barrier to the *Drang nach Osten*, to German Imperialism.

To make Germany mistress of the Mediterranean route, of Asia Minor and Bagdad, the

Balkans had to become a German province. In little Serbia Germany found an implacable adversary, of unique political ability, and unshakably devoted to her patriotic ideals and Nationalist mission.

During the whole of their past history the Germans have never been a political nation in the true sense of the word. They were incapable of creating a clear and simple State ideal. Their Holy Roman Empire was a monstrosity, a caricature of all political common sense. The Empire was an absolutely vague conception, devoid of all political actuality; it was the very opposite of a State, it was a dream, it was Imperialism clothed in the mystic masks of the Middle Ages. Even in the nineteenth century the Germans could not rid themselves of this conception, which smothered all rational political development. During the course of centuries Germany has not produced one single original political idea. If we study German political theories we shall find that the Germans are behind all other nations in this respect.

Germany has remained a complete stranger to all the great modern ideas of liberty, which were conceived in other countries. Her greatest sons have always detested political life. The fate of the country was in the past lost sight of in the cloudland of vague cosmopolitan sentiment.

Whenever one of these minds has ventured to

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approach the problem of State evolution, one feels the complete lack of originality. They create nothing new ; all they give us are copies characterized by amateurishness, or a philosophy which has nothing to do with practical statecraft.

The experience of 1848 likewise proved that the Germans are incapable of discarding political ideals which had formerly proved unrealizable. At the Frankfort Parliament the idea of the Holy Empire was still alive, and it remained for Bismarck, the only political genius whom Germany has produced, to evolve a practicable conception of German unity, by excluding Austria from the new Federal State. From that moment Germany became a Great Power, which is, however, not tantamount to saying that she possesses a highly developed political sense. The growing wealth of the nation gave birth to an unparalleled pride of race. Caste spirit and militarism combined to make Germany the typical anti-democratic State. But yet she would not have had the audacity of aspiring to impose her will upon the world if Austria had fulfilled the just aspirations of the Slavs. Austria had the opportunity to reform herself, and at the same time to become more Slav, during the years that elapsed between the rise of Constitutionalism in 1860 and the foundation of the German Empire. But the Austro-Hungarian Compromise,

the greatest mistake committed by the Monarchy for centuries, was the great obstacle to the necessary reform of the Empire. In the Magyars, Germany found a ready instrument for the degradation of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Since then Germany has permitted no reforms in favour of the majority of Austrian subjects, and by this very fact the downfall of the Monarchy has become inevitable. Austrian home politics were determined by the régime of the Triple Alliance.

Through the Triple Alliance the New German Empire tended to resume the ambitions of the Holy Roman Empire. Dead Germanic aspirations came to life under new aspects. Germanism, led astray by its successes in industry and economics, desired to impose itself upon all the nations of the world. Although they possess none of the colonizing genius of the English, the Germans aspired to be the greatest colonizing nation in the world, and strove to attain universal dominion. Unlike the English, the Germans lack the instinct for creating centres of political liberty by a permanent assimilation of the conquered countries under a system of civic liberty. The sense for political transactions which avoids conflicts and strives to overcome obstacles by wise moderation is quite foreign to German nature.

Having no political ability, they endeavour to replace it by the brutal coercion by material

force. Germany was to owe her dominion of the world, not to the wisdom and moderation of her statesmen, or to the prudence of a well-informed public opinion, but to the insolence of a military caste.

The Germans have always shown themselves incapable of reconciling intellectual with political and practical life. Either they are dreamers, thinkers, and philosophers who deprecate politics, or they are politicians who despise intellectual values. It takes but little sagacity to realize the decadence of the Universities and all intellectual life in Germany. Science has become a business, and German scientific men have renounced the austere simplicity of the great intellectual and philosophical era during the early part of the nineteenth century.

Large cities have tended to spread the taste for luxurious life. The old-fashioned frugality has given place to an extravagance and dissipation formerly unknown. Berlin has become the most vice-riddled city in the world. Nepotism is rooted in the whole of the State organization. In a word, the evil consequences of a too sudden acquisition of national wealth and power are obvious in all walks of life in Germany.

Germany has become the classical type of a parvenu nation. The too swift rise of the Germans has demoralized them and destroyed all social and political harmony. They have

emancipated themselves from the intellectualism of other days, and have devoted themselves to the cult of force with the complete insolence of parvenus.

The Germans, the Magyars, the Bulgars, and the Turks—these are the four master-nations, the four *Herrenvölker*, in the sense of Nietzsche's brutal philosophy. The present war is best characterized by describing it as a war of these four nations, whose ambition it is to dominate, without permitting other nations to enjoy free and independent national life. The victory of the Triple Alliance of hate, oppression, and aristocratism would mean death to all small nations. All the lesser nationalities see their very existence endangered by this new league of terror. Faced by this alliance of all that is hateful and contrary to national liberty, the Jugoslavs are reminded of the most tragic chapters in their history.

No one can fail to see how a German victory would affect international life in Europe. It would mean the triumph of the barracks, of inquisitorial rule in all conditions of life, of the automatic discipline of a materialism laying claim to the absolute power of the Cæsars. We should be dominated by the coarseness of a race incapable of creating a full and harmonious life.

Law and justice would lose the traditions of political liberty safeguarded by the victories of

the British and French spirit. The world would become a vast barracks where mediocrity would rule supreme, with the discipline of the drill-sergeant, and a total absence of noble aspirations and individual enterprise.

Small nations require independence and political freedom even more than great ones. What is to become of them in the barracks of the future? Their existence would be negatived, and they would be swallowed up in the great levelling machine. The struggle is therefore a struggle for a principle, for a faith, for the better life of the day to come.

Therefore a grave responsibility rests with all those who desire to strive successfully with this reactionary force, with all who desire to help in the creation of a new world. It were worthy of contempt, for instance, if Italy, in taking part in the Great War, were to imitate the procedure of Germany.

A comparison between Italy and Germany will at once reveal a great contrast. Italy achieved national unity at the same time as Germany. But between these two State-formations there are many differences arising from the difference of mentality between the two nations.

Modern Italy owes her most important ideas of public law to the Italy of the Renaissance. The origin of the modern State must be sought in the small Italian republics and principalities.

During the sixteenth century Italy possessed many profound and brilliant statesmen, many able diplomats, who were forced to apply their genius to the modest affairs of a small State. There was no economy of intellect in the country. Besides many brilliant politicians, the Italians gave us the first exponents of political science, Machiavelli and many others formulated the new political ideas. In Italy there was perfect harmony between political and intellectual life. Her greatest men knew nothing of the radical aversion to politics characteristic of the finest German intellects. Hers was another world, another mentality.

For centuries Italy, no less than Germany, was unable to create a unified State. Rome, the Church, was the most implacable enemy of national unity, whereas in Germany there was no such dangerous obstacle. United Germany was created at a far smaller cost in blood and effort than united Italy. And the sons of the creators of modern Italy are greatly superior in political ability to the sons of the victors of 1870.

We cannot but realize that it is Germany's system of authority which has become the basis of her violent Imperialism. But Italy likewise tends towards an Imperialism, more subtle, though less violent. Italy's economic evolution has caused the ideals of the political *risorgimento* to be forgotten. The old idealism has vanished, and

commercial tendencies have given rise to a new mentality. Business considerations have dictated Italy's new Imperialist leanings. The desire for wealth has overwhelmed political idealism; Italy's foreign policy has become materialistic.

It is an incontestable fact that Austria was never sincere in her attitude towards the Slovene struggle for national existence. Austria regarded Slovene Nationalism as a necessary evil, which had to be tolerated because it unfortunately happened to exist. Neither the dynasty nor the Government ever rose to a loftier conception of the problem of nationalities. It never occurred to them to seek a new, *sound* basis for a reformed and regenerate Monarchy in a harmonious development of the various nationalities.

The State always remained a stranger to Slovene character and culture. What the Slovenes are to-day, they have become absolutely by their own labour and their own energy, not only without the help of the State, but even in opposition to it. Indeed, the efforts of the State were more truly directed towards hampering the Slovenes in their intellectual development. They were rigidly debarred from all advancement, and only under pressure and very occasionally granted a few pitiful crumbs of national equality. Never has the State furthered Slovene culture, art, or science, but only generously permitted the Slovenes to bear the cost themselves.

The beginning of this century ushered in an era of unprecedented intensification of the national struggle for the Slovenes. Although only a few hours by rail lie between Vienna and the Slovene linguistic frontier, Vienna was blind and deaf to the remorseless conflict for the Slovene soil. Whereas in all progressive countries it is an accepted law of practical politics that the governing body should be accurately informed as to the facts and conditions upon which the State bases its administrative principle, the soulless Viennese bureaucrat knows no world but his office ; the conditions out yonder in the province are utterly unknown to him. This narrow-mindedness of the Viennese, whose political horizon does not extend beyond the Prater, is not peculiar to Vienna, but characteristic of all leading circles in Austria. Thus Vienna was blind to the fact that Germany aimed at a forcible Germanization of the Slovenes, and that all the German Nationalist organizations, whose task it was to exterminate the Slovenes, were but so many tools of Berlin. But the powers that be in Vienna merely watched this life-and-death grapple with true Austrian bonhomie not unmingled with frivolous indifference.

If Machiavelli were still alive he would probably give the following advice to the Slovenes : " Be Irredentists ; you will go farthest that way." As a matter of fact, in the Habsburg

Empire those nationalities have always fared best who have succeeded in pursuing an Irredentist policy. The Poles and Hungarians are the oldest Irredentists, and these are the two nationalities which have latterly been most fortunate under the double eagle of the Habsburgs. Smolka, at one time condemned to death, subsequently became the Polish President of the Reichstag in '48. Andrassy, subsequently Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was condemned to the gallows during the Hungarian Revolution and hanged in effigy! Nothing is to be gained in Austria by modesty or loyalty, and the sharper the weapons, the greater is the likelihood of success.

A catastrophic policy was altogether contrary to Slovene interests, and when Austria-Hungary began recklessly to endanger the peace of Europe, every far-sighted Slovene was filled with consternation. That in the case of a European conflagration Italy would at once snatch at the Slovene frontier-lands, and that then the Slovenes of this territory would run the terrible risk of being cut off from the rest of their Yugoslav brothers—these were dangers which every Slovene politician of average acumen realized very fully. When the Dual Monarchy conjured up the World-War by a monstrously aggressive and bungling foreign policy, the Slovenes were fully conscious of the gravity of their position. The

Slovenes desired peaceful development for Austria and for themselves. They had no natural gifts for cultivating an Irredentist pose. But now it was the Government itself which by its terrible bungling created a new attitude.

The Slovenes regretted that the Monarchy pursued an unfortunate foreign policy, which rendered consolidation impossible. By an inexcusable act of distrust and utterly unfounded suspicion almost all the political and intellectual leaders of the Slovenes in the Littoral were thrown into prison during the days of the Austrian mobilization. Subsequent investigation proved that there was not the slightest ground for these arrests, and that the accused were absolutely blameless. It is surely almost unprecedented that men belonging to all classes of society—University professors, literary men, judges, lawyers, mill-owners, and priests—should be incarcerated for months, while not even the smallest offence could be proved against them. The Government finally proved their innocence by discharging all the prisoners after several months' detention.

It might be worth while for the Austrian masters to remember the noble words of Madame de Sévigné: "*Rien n'est plus capable d'ôter tous les bons sentiments que de marquer de la défiance ; il suffit souvent d'être soupçonné comme ennemi pour le devenir.*"

But the Slovenes are inspired by the conviction

that they will save their existence in the midst of the great world-cataclysm. They can draw comfort from the knowledge that they were independent masters of their home before the days of Austria, and they hope to continue their existence under new conditions after Austria's downfall.

CHAPTER IX

THE SLOVENES AND AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY

AN old State does not easily change its methods, and still more rarely and less easily will it alter the guiding principles of its foreign policy. Austria's foreign policy remained the same as it had been under Metternich, reactionary and, above all things, the supreme weapon against Nationalism and the Nationalist States. Foreign politics remained exclusively the sphere of the Sovereign and his Minister, the high aristocracy. The various nationalities of the Austrian Empire were rigorously excluded from all co-operation in the problems that beset Austria's foreign policy. In this way an utterly anomalous state of affairs was created. A country with universal equal and direct suffrage and corresponding universal military service was absolutely at the mercy of the hopeless incompetency of an aristocratic clique in all vital questions concerning the fate of the nationalities and the Empire. A wholesome political atmosphere was rendered impossible by the fact that the foreign policy of the State was

hidden from the light of public opinion, and, to render the anomaly complete, it was conducted with the object of maintaining the German and Magyar supremacy. In this environment of universal distrust, in this stifling atmosphere of vested interest and hereditary authority, there was no room for true political freedom, for the free development of a healthy civic body politic. The few liberal reforms, sparingly granted by the December Constitution and carefully pruned by watchful hands, were almost lost entirely in the drab political workaday struggle.

To the Germans, with their political stolidity and complete lack of political temperament, such a régime was quite tolerable. To the Czechs and Jugoslavs, with their strong political sentiment and democratic instincts, a state of political atrophy became an unendurable torment. The Yugoslav temperament desired a State constituted on free, democratic lines, but a hidebound bureaucracy had nothing but conservatism and undemocratic sentiment for the democracy of the Empire.

Slovene Nationalism at once found itself badly in opposition to the ideas of an utterly antiquated Imperial policy, which had had its day at the time of the Holy Alliance, and was quite incompatible with the ideals of a young and democratic nation. We must admit that the contrast was not so glaringly apparent at first. The Slovenes were fully occupied with their struggle

for linguistic rights. For the moment the struggle for a modest measure of national existence was more important than the greater political issues. They even failed to realize that a Slavophil foreign policy would necessarily entail internal reforms favourable to the Slavs. This train of thought lay beyond the horizon of their leading politicians. The national issues of the day and the problems of home politics occupied public opinion to the exclusion of all else.

The Slovenes could count upon the inevitable opposition of Germans and Italians. Germany employed every resource placed at her disposal by the Alliance policy to make it impossible for a politically strong Slovenedom to block her way to the Adriatic. Under no condition would Germany permit the sturdy Slovene nation to be master of its own fate and in a position effectively to resist all foreign influence. German Imperialism and Slovene Nationalism were sharply, irreconcilably opposed to each other. A strong, purposeful Austrian foreign policy would never have permitted Austria to become a mere under-strapper of Germany. But this under-strapper had a task to fulfil, and this was to prevent the Slovenes from attaining political importance. A resolute, strong-willed Austria would have made the Slovenes an important factor in her Imperial policy. But an Austria which became the mere executor of orders from Berlin

was compelled to aim at crushing the political existence of the Slovenes.

But the Slovenes were really doubly sacrificed. The alliance with Italy entailed upon Austro-Hungarian internal politics an obligation to oppress the Slovenes and Croats of the Illyrian coast-lands. Orders, not only from the Friedrichstrasse but from the Consulta in Rome, were carried out with alacrity by the Viennese helmsmen of the State. The Slovene pariahs had to pay the cost ; no one considered them, and as they were loyal subjects, it was obviously unnecessary to deal justly and fairly with them. But presently this game was played out, to the annoyance of certain purblind Viennese circles. Italy herself turned traitor to the pro-Italian foreign policy. The cooling off of the Austro-Italian friendship produced an immediate effect upon Austrian internal politics. Austrian statesmen began to fear possible complications between Italy and the Monarchy. Not because the cause of the Slovenes is a just cause, not because it is in harmony with the interests of a democratic State, but purely in order to counterbalance the Italian element, the Slovenes were granted a few concessions. These by no means amounted to full justice, from a Nationalist standpoint, but only to an act of conciliation by no means proportionate to the true social importance of the Slovenes in the Littoral. Those in power were too timid to undermine the

foundations of the Italian influence. If political life in the Littoral had been democratized by granting universal, equal, and direct suffrage in commune and Parliament, the collapse of the unnaturally privileged position of the Italians would have been the inevitable and natural result. But Austrian traditionalism shrank from taking recourse to such wholesome, if somewhat radical, measures.

It is perhaps only natural that Slovene public opinion was never in sympathy with the Triple Alliance policy ; nay, with the sound, healthy instinct peculiar to a young nation, the Slovenes even foresaw the terrible danger towards which Austria was steering. The instinct of self-preservation taught the Slovenes to favour a foreign policy of the Monarchy which would seek a *rapprochement* with Russia. The most eminent men of the Slovenes always felt strongly sympathetic towards kindred Russia. This sympathy was not without a touch of sentiment. It was a platonic affection, without fulfilment or possession.

Nothing is more untrue or childish than to accuse the Slovenes of being influenced by the "rolling rouble." Never did the shining rouble roll down into the fair land between the Drava and the Sava. The Slovenes built the schools which the Government refused to give them ; they organized a National Defence Society, but

they did it with their own money. It was a petty, somewhat cheap political device of the Germans and Italians to speak of Russian money. Whenever this accusation is brought forward the Slovenes can afford to smile at foreign ignorance of Slovene affairs. Without exaggeration, it may be said that probably no other nation can show so clean a record as the Slovenes in the achievement of their political independence without speculating on foreign financial support.

Not only the German mailed fist was a strong argument in persuading the Slovene intellectuals to feel kindly towards the English and French national character. France had at one time made the first attempt at uniting the Slovenes, and had thereby won the hearts of the Slovene nation. The collapse of the French Army in 1870 filled the Slovenes with consternation, for they knew that Germany's ascendancy would mean national death to them. The Slovenes sought to derive moral support from France, as was only natural for a people which was driven to seek its national preservation in an opposition to all that was German. The encircling tide was becoming a nightmare to the Slovenes. German speech in school, Government, office, and commercial life, German science in the foreign-tongued Universities, everywhere and always threats of further German encroachments—that was the terrible refrain of the past and the thousandfold echo of

the present. "Escape from this baneful spell!" became the rallying cry of the nation.

This was the frame of mind, these were the sentiments with which the Slovenes entered into the World-War. They hated all that misguided patriotism, a hireling army, and the rulers of the land in Vienna admired as the most perfect phenomenon on earth, to wit, German character and German overbearance—German militarism. They loved all that had no connection with the foreign policy of the Monarchy, and every one whom Germans and Magyars hated and despised.

It is easy to imagine the spirit with which the Slovene intellectual leaders hailed the outbreak of a war of which all the world knew that it was to be a Pan-German crusade. They realized the terrible ruthlessness of an anti-Nationalist, anti-democratic foreign policy, the suicidal madness of the whole Germano-Magyar system of exploitation hitherto. They also realized at once which were the true issues at stake. War was resorted to as a last expedient in order to frustrate the reform of the Monarchy in favour of the Slavs. Millions were to perish on the field of battle so that despotism and the tyranny of caste privilege and the vainglorious ambitions of two races might be supported and perpetuated. This slough of perversity was the result of a criminal political system, which did not aim at securing national prosperity, but rather

the social and national degradation of the peoples of the Empire.

It is true that Austria has on several former occasions waged wars which were distasteful to the Austrian Slavs ; both Germans and Slavs rejoiced in 1859, when the Absolutist régime collapsed ignominiously on the Italian battlefields, and in 1866 the defeat of Königgrätz was not at all looked upon as a disaster. But these wars were not fought by an army created by universal National Service. The war of 1914 is the first war in which an Austro-Hungarian National Army—the expression is in itself a contradiction in terms—is striking for victory, or rather for defeat. The psychological consequences entailed by this war, and still more by a defeat of Austria, are incalculable. First of all, the nations have been dragged into a war which is directly opposed to their own interests, and soon the consequences of a shameless system of foreign exploitation are bound to appear. The blood of the Slav peoples will not be shed with impunity. Consider the impression produced upon the Austrian Slavs by the insolent threat of the Magyar magnate, Tisza, that he would exercise the right to reward or to punish whom he himself should consider deserving of reward or punishment ! This language breathes the spirit of such incredible arrogance that it would be truly marvellous if the Austrian Slavs were still in doubt as to the fate reserved

for them by a Pan-German and Magyar providence.

The eyes of the Slovenes were always turned towards the Balkans. As the inner workings of Austrian foreign policy were not at once apparent to them, they believed for a long time that Austria was seeking a footing for herself in Salonika, although Austria was merely carrying out the behests of Germany. During many years the Slovenes were filled with a burning desire for Yugoslav unity. The Yugoslav idea became the gospel of the Slovene intellectuals, and now the World-War has appeared, a gigantic writing on the wall, bringing great aims nearer to the Slovene people. The World-War may be compared to a hurricane of terrific force, bearing the seeds of new political ideas to millions of hearts, and the cause that is leading the united nations of Europe to make head against Germanism is identical with the old faith and principle of the Slovenes.

There is a truly amazing analogy between the ideas underlying the life-and-death grapple of the Slovenes and all those ideas in whose name the nations are now waging war against German Imperialism, and it is a matter of no little satisfaction to the small nationality of the Slovenes that the full justice of its own political struggles against the onslaught of brute force is now openly vindicated before the eyes of all Europe. Hitherto

they stood alone in their unostentatious defence of the heritage of their fathers against the arrogance of a nation which is now shamelessly parading the doctrine of Force and Wrong-doing in all its nakedness. Without exaggeration, we may fairly call the Slovenes brave pioneers in the struggle against the Power that unchained the pandemonium of the World-War. The struggle between Slovenes and Germans, which fills the whole of Slovene history, is in itself a glorious proof that the Slovene nation has the right to recognition and development. What the social body of Europe has in 1914-15 recognized as the supreme world-calamity has from the beginning been considered by the best of the Slovenes a crime against their own nation. Thus the stream of Slovene thought flows into the great river of world-ideals and world-happenings.

CHAPTER X

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PAN-GERMANISM

AT the beginning of this century the position of the Slovene cause was most precarious, almost desperate. The strength of the nation was frittered away in violent, but in reality petty, party politics. Instead of opposing a united front to the foreign enemy, so as to make as good a defence as possible against the terrible onslaught from without, the Slovenes gave themselves up to a bitter conflict between rival parties among themselves, whereby a sound Nationalist policy was rendered impossible. And yet there was a truly gigantic task to hand, waiting to be faced by a good strong Nationalist policy. A nationality of one million and a half had to hold back and endure the full force of the economic pressure of seventy millions. That the Slovenes were able to do this they certainly did not owe to their system of parish-pump politics, but wholly and solely to the innate vigour and vitality of the nation. But there were other dangers beside the great menace from the north.

The Magyars in the north-east and the Italians in the south were neither of them contemptible rivals. Under these circumstances the pressing need for national defence ought to have united all available forces. As a matter of fact, all the best and most patriotic of our leaders did so unite, facing the greater task and turning their backs upon unprofitable party squabbles.

Perhaps it would be as well to give a short sketch of the Pan-German movement, and to describe and discuss its virulent hostility towards Slovene Nationalism.

A short exposition will elucidate many important points of contact, and show our problem in its proper relation to the most important international questions of the day. And the first question to be answered in this connection is, What were the relations between Germans and Slovenes in the past?

In itself the form of this question is scarcely correct. During the Middle Ages, and even in modern times up to the present, the conflict was not really one between Germans and Slovenes. The contrast was not one of nationality in those days, but of class. The German feudal lord oppressed the Slovene peasant, not because he was of Slovene descent but because he was the subject of economic exploitation. The past knew nothing of Nationalist struggles as we know them now. National States and national culture did not

exist in the past. The rivalry between Church and State in Catholic countries and the supremacy of the Latin tongue both militated against the rise of Nationalism as we know it to-day. The social structure, as well as the culture of the past, was much more unified and incomparably more cosmopolitan and more equalized than that of to-day. Class distinction was due to economic position. In the Slovene lands class distinction coincided with the contrast between the German lord and nobleman on the one hand and the Slovene peasant and commoner on the other.

The mighty state of ferment which gave rise to the spirit of European Nationalism owed its first impulse to the Renaissance and the Great Reformation. And it is a strange coincidence that the development of the Slovene language and, indirectly, the Slovene Nationalism also owed its inception to the Reformation. With ever-increasing energy society, politics, and science emancipated themselves from the supremacy of Latin-European cosmopolitanism. The pillars of the old, unified culture had already fallen when the French Revolution came to set the individual free, and thus to lay the foundation of the present-day Nationalism of the nations without a State.

While the ideas of the French Revolution were yet in a state of ferment German Nationalism found its first, consistent representative in Joseph II, the Emperor of enlightenment. The

old Austrian State, prior to Joseph II, had revolved in the circle of ideas pertaining to the cosmopolitan instinct of rulership of the Habsburgs. For reasons of Nationalist administrative routine, and absolutely in the spirit of a Nationalist conception of State problems, Joseph II desired to make Austria into a German Nationalist State. The experiment failed, but it was in consequence of it that the Nationalist aspirations of the Austrian Slav peoples were awakened. The Germanizing tactics of Joseph II found their strongest reaction in Hungary. The nationalization of the Hungarian administration was an inevitable outcome of the reign of Joseph II. The stone had been set rolling. Hungarian Nationalism, Chauvinistic and aggressive even from its birth, called forth the first passionate outburst of the Croatian national spirit. The spell was broken. Society, politics, and State were becoming nationalized.

The current of Magyar Nationalism produced a strong reaction among the Croats. And what of the Slovenes? The French interregnum exercised a great influence upon them, and as a matter of fact the best men among the Slovenes of that day were fully alive to the historical importance of the moment. To a certain extent the Slovene tongue replaced the German official language, in so far, at least, as the French tongue did not hold sole sway. This was not the only

gain ; there was another item of vastly greater moment. Slovenes and Croats were then united in one administrative unit, and a strong precedent was created with regard to subsequent aspirations towards unity.

An important event preceded the coming of the French to the Slovene lands by only a few years. The Roman Empire of the German nation, that asthenic vehicle of the Imperialist thought of those days, had come to an ignominious end, and the House of Habsburg assumed its heritage, which consisted solely of traditions and in no sense of political power. The succeeding decades mark the period of the political weakness of Germanism, which was incapable of rousing itself to political action. The Germanistic tendencies of the House of Habsburg pursue practical administrative aims. In a large establishment, which is to be run on patriarchal lines, it is undoubtedly more convenient if the records are kept in one language, and it is from purely utilitarian considerations that Austria desires to give a German character to her Crown lands.

Nothing is more significant of the relations between Slavs and Germans as such than the demonstrations of brotherly feeling in 1848. In the towns of Styria Germans hoisted the Slav tricolour. Germans and Slavs fell on each other's neck like devoted brothers. But this was of short duration. This tolerance ceased as soon

as Germanism became conscious of new political strength. Already in the Parliament of Frankfurt language was heard the phrases of which savoured strongly of Pan-Germanism. It was a sound political instinct that caused Palacky to warn the Austrian Slavs against Frankfurt. He foresaw that a united Germany would assume a very different attitude towards the Slavs to that adopted by the idealistic and cosmopolitan Germany prior to 1848. In those days List, the political economist, expounded the fundamental ideas of the future Pan-Germanism. The Socialists Marx and Lassalle also betrayed suspiciously Pan-German sentiments.

But the German dream of unity was once more buried for awhile. Until the creation of the German Empire, a constitutional reform of Austria was still within the limits of possibilities. While Germany was still a mere geographical conception, and while the multitude of small States still prevented the German Philistine from developing his innate arrogance, the transformation of Austria into a federal State was almost possible. But after 1870 all efforts were in vain. German influence frustrated the realization of the Bohemian fundamental Articles. But an Emperor's word had to be broken to prevent their realization.

The foundation of the German Empire created that accumulation of forces which tended with

ever-increasing impetus towards world-dominion. Austrian Slavdom was an obstacle in the way and had therefore to be eliminated; but whereas during the first years of the German-Austrian Alliance diplomatic intimidation was employed to influence Austrian affairs, these methods were subsequently replaced by those of organized agitation and propaganda.

The "German School Union" (*Deutscher Schulverein*) and "The Southern March" (*Die Südmark*) were the two associations which were to achieve the denationalization of the Slovenes. Pan-Germanism spared no effort in the inauguration of its campaign at the beginning of the present century. In 1895 the total membership of the Austrian Associations for Pan-German propaganda—oddly enough, they style themselves "National Protective Unions"—only amounted to 240,000 members, and their income to 714,000 kr. In 1909 the number of members had risen to 600,000 and the annual income had increased by 38 per cent.

The "Southern March" has no object, except to assist in the denationalization of the Slovenes. In 1908 this association had 50,000 members and an income of 226,000 kr. The German School Union exists for the purpose of founding German schools in Slav territory. In 1908 it had 100,000 members, and its income reached the sum of 617,200 kr. These two associations

were uncommonly active just before the outbreak of the World-War, and from a financial point of view, highly successful. The silver mark of the German Empire travelled in broad streams to Austria. German financial institutions munificently assisted the German Nationalist organizations in Austria, and the Germanization of the Slovenes was systematically pursued with the help of monetary aid from Germans of the Empire.

The most successful and the surest instrument for denationalization is the primary school. German primary schools are founded in bilingual districts, and Slovene school-children enticed into them by promises, gifts, and threats. Thus the Slovenes are not only faced by the task of neutralizing this dangerous activity, but also that of henceforth defraying the cost of their own system of primary schools. In communities with a German majority the State is not empowered to compel the parish to provide Slovene schools for the Slovene minority, and as a matter of fact the State is quite well pleased that the community should undertake the denationalization of the Slovenes in place of the Government; wherefore in these communities the Slovenes are most illegally burdened with the entire cost of their own school system.

The Slovenes possess a comparatively strong organization for the subsidizing of the Slovene educational system. From small beginnings the

"Druzba sv. Cirila in Metoda" ("Society of SS. Cyril and Method") has developed into a powerful weapon in the Nationalist struggle. If we take into consideration that the Slovenes are one of the poorest of the Austrian peoples, then the subscription-lists and bequests in favour of this Association bear witness to a great spirit of sacrifice. The "Druzba" is proof of the vigorous patriotism of a nation of peasants possessing practically no capitalists. Slovenes of all classes have made bequests in favour of the "Druzba." Indeed, a regular system of taxation was devised to meet the case. We must also take into account that not all Slovenes assist the "Druzba," and that the strong clerical party regards this organization with extreme disfavour. In 1911 the funds of the "Druzba" amounted to 1,139,700 kr., and in 1913 to 1,203,225 kr. Expenses for 1913 amounted to 334,850 kr. and the receipts to 140,000 kr. On the other hand, in 1914 expenses had sunk to 301,000 kr. and the receipts risen to 145,000 kr. The schools of the Association are attended by 2,618 children. The activity of the Association is most conspicuous in the south; Trieste absorbs the lion's share of its resources, and it can only afford to assist the schools on the northern frontier to a lesser degree, although there also the need is very great.

But the Slovenes are not only compelled to

fight for a national tuition, but for the very land they live in. Following the Prussian example, the Germans are endeavouring to transfer the land on the linguistic frontier into the possession of German colonists. This is the special mission of the Union "Südmark." Until recently its operations were not brilliantly successful, in spite of a liberal expenditure of money from the German Empire. Up to 1908, 700 hektares of land, purchased by the "Südmark" in the territory north of the Drava, passed into the hands of colonists from the German Empire. But these Germans failed to establish themselves in the Yugoslav lands. Several of them left the country again, others got into debt. But the "Südmark" disposes of a hundred means of corrupting the Slovene border population. The Union renders pecuniary assistance, lends money without demanding interest, and distributes Germanistic papers and Pan-German literature generally.

To neutralize this activity, the Slovenes created a protective Union called "Branibor," whose special task it is to strengthen the Slovene peasant and artisan class on the linguistic frontier, which is to be done by assisting the Slovene peasant and artisan with cheap credit, advantageous loans, and other economic aids. It is the business of this organization to protect the Slovene peasant against the danger of falling into

the hands of the "Südmark." But hitherto, the activity of the "Branibor" has not yet been so successfully developed as that of the "Druzba."

Without exaggeration, it might safely be asserted, that before the outbreak of the war the entire Slovene administration was in Pan-German hands. With all sails set, we were being steered towards a Pan-German future. Even as regarded its constitutional law, the Empire of the Habsburgs was to be brought under the protection of the Hohenzollerns. "An Empire reaching from the North Sea to the Adriatic"—that was the slogan of the Pan-Germans. Very cunningly did Germany make her preparations for the annexation of Austria.

During recent years Austria has ceased to be her own mistress. Not the official Government, appointed for the time being by the Sovereign, but the German *Nationalrat* ("German Nationalist Council") controls the country. This body is a Committee formed by the German Nationalist parties in Austria, and during recent years not a single higher official or judge has been appointed in Slovene lands whose name had not first been submitted to the *Nationalrat* for its approval. The *Nationalrat* had a suitable German candidate for every post and succeeded in obtaining the appointment from the Government.

The net result of this policy has been that in

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the Slovene lands not a single Slovene has recently been entrusted with a higher official appointment or been made a judge, so that the legal administration has been systematically Germanized under pressure from the German National Council, and the Slovene element brutally thrust aside. Pan-Germanism held undisputed sway in the Viennese Cabinet, and even in some of the Provincial Governments. A thin veneer of the old Austrian manner was still retained by the bureaucracy, so as to give the impression that the good old days had not passed away. In one respect, at least, the ruling powers showed themselves conservative—the old slipshod methods and bureaucratic pedantry, coupled with extreme dilatoriness and circumstantial red-tapeism, were retained in all their good Old Austrian glory !

Austria possesses no local government in the true sense of the word. To deceive the world and, principally, to weaken the Slavs, the so-called Statute Municipality has been created. Statute Municipalities are municipalities enjoying a specially privileged constitution. These municipalities become regular strongholds of Germanism, as German Liberalism was exceedingly careful to bestow these privileges only on such municipalities as might safely be expected to render yeoman service to the German cause. The Statute Municipalities developed into small Pan-German

States within the State, and above all things, the so-called "Southernmost German towns" in Styria became veritable Teutoburgs of Pan-Germanism.

The resources of Pan-Germanism were not limited to the schools, State administration, and the Constitution of the community. Capital and economic development were likewise at its disposal. Alone of all the Austrian nationalities the Germans possessed a strong, old-established, middle class, and well-developed industries. The great Viennese banks are almost all in German-Jewish hands, and the Austrian Jews ape the Pan-German and Magyar system of oppression to the best of their ability. But not only Austrian capital but, first and foremost, German capital from the German Empire tendered its services to Pan-German endeavours. If we call to mind how mightily German industry has developed within recent years, we shall realize how, like a gigantic nightmare, Pan-Germanism weighed upon the Jugoslavs.

But all these weapons of a Prussianized, absolutely anti-democratic social system—which was what Pan-Germanism presently showed itself to be—were outdone by yet another danger. In consequence of the absurd ineptitude of an utterly purblind diplomacy, the strict and exclusive preserve of the high aristocracy, Austro-Hungarian foreign policy became a shuttlecock in the hands of the Pan-German wirepullers in

Berlin. Austro-Hungarian foreign politics were neither Austrian nor Hungarian, but purely Pan-German.

This, then, was the hundred-headed dragon against which a poor and democratic nation had to contend, and in its apparently very modest struggles this nation has revealed so much silent, quiet, and modest heroism, so much unassuming self-sacrifice!

This was not only a struggle for the native language, but a fight for national existence in every meaning of the word. In their efforts to reach Trieste the Pan-Germans sought to efface the Slovenes. Every means justified this end. The school was pressed into the service of Pan-German brutality. The Slovenes, who, being farmers, are more attached to their native soil than other nations, were to be ousted from the possession of what they prized most dearly—their heritage of the soil. The wheels of the administration were greased with Prussian oil, and the result was a peculiar and ill-assorted union between Old Austrian go-as-you-please methods and the pride and arrogance of Prussian Junkerdom. Added to this was an irksome, merciless, economic coercion, which sought to bring the whole of Slovene agriculture and industry under the control of Pan-German capital.

And against all this a democratic people had

to contend, a people which had realized the ideals of social and socialistic equality in its midst—without capital, seventy times smaller in number than its mighty enemy in the north, whose increasing stature filled the greatest nations of Europe with dread and apprehension.

CHAPTER XI

SLOVENES AND ITALIANS

I. LAND AND PEOPLE

Administration, Courts of Justice, School System, and Social Conditions in the Littoral.

THOSE parts of the territory formerly known as the Illyrian Kingdom, and partially inhabited by Italians, comprise the countries of Gorica-Gradiska, the town of Trieste with its territory, and Istria. These three provinces are administered by the Government of Trieste and form an administrative unit. Beside the State administration in Austria there is here the self-government of the crown-lands; beside the State legislation there is the legislation of the diets.

The Illyrian Littoral—the name recalls the days of Napoleon when the *terre irredente* was united with the Austrian Yugoslav lands, under the joint names of *pays illyriens*—is divided into three provinces, viz. Gorica-Gradiska, Trieste, and Istria. Each crownland possesses its own legislative body in its own Diet, and its self-governing administra-

tion, founded on the Constitution of 1861, which defined the boundary between the powers of the State and those of the province.

The eastern frontier of Gorica-Gradiska coincides with that of Austria. It is well defined, first by a chain of mountains, and then by a small river, the Indrio, but a little farther on the frontier is less satisfactorily defined by a line drawn somewhat unfortunately across the plain of Friuli. The county of Gorica falls naturally into four districts, viz. the mountains, the Kras, the Vipava valley, and the plain. The first three are inhabited by Jugoslavs, the last-mentioned is altogether Italian. Nothing would be more just and natural from the point of view of nationality, than to divide this territory.

The problem of Trieste and Istria is far more complicated. It is unnatural that Trieste and Istria should be separated from their Hinterland, with which they have been united for so many centuries, during which they have formed a political unit with Carniola. Trieste detached from its hinterland has really lost its *raison-d'être*. In connection with this fact it is significant that the Italians are proposing to annex, not only the *terre irredente* but also Carniola as far as Postojna. Nothing but the formation of a great and strong Yugoslav State comprising a large territory extending towards the north and north-east could guarantee the

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economic development of Trieste. I shall doubtless be answered that part of Istria at one time belonged to the Venetian Republic, but the reasonableness of claims based on historic precedent is open to discussion.

Let us return to the problem of the moment. It is not possible to divide Istria and the territory of Trieste into distinct parts, like the county of Gorica. At the best only the towns of the western coast of Istria could be described as Italian. But even here one ought to take into account the shifting of the balance of racial preponderance. On the west coast of Istria the towns are mostly Italian and Yugoslav, but on the coast the Yugoslav element is steadily on the increase. The town of Trieste is occupied by both races, like the west coast of Istria. Trieste is at the same time an Italian and a Yugoslav town. It is impossible to divide the races. For good or for evil the two are compelled to dwell together.

An examination of the figures of the official statistics will show that the majority of the population of the Littoral is Yugoslav. According to the latest census, that taken in 1910, the Littoral is inhabited by 437,385 Slavs and only 356,495 Italians. If we compare the three countries of the Littoral, we shall find that in two of them the Yugoslavs are even in overwhelming majority. In Gorica-Gradiska there

is a majority of 154,750 Jugoslavs opposed to a minority of 90,119 Italians. In Istria the Jugoslavs number 220,382 and the Italians only 145,525. It is only in Trieste that the Italians are in a majority. The town has 118,959 Italian and 60,074 Yugoslav inhabitants.

Official statistics distinctly tend to understate the true number of the Slavs in favour of that of the Italians. The Italians, although well aware that the result of every census is calculated to the detriment of the Slavs, maintain that the Government, in taking the census, magnifies the number of the Slavs. Nothing could be farther from the truth than such a statement. If the Government were to deal justly, it would order a census in which not only the language of daily intercourse but the native tongue of the individual would be taken into account, and the Italians would probably be far from satisfied with the result of a census taken on such just and reasonable lines.

In the number of votes recorded in the Reichsrat elections for the Slovene candidate, however, we possess an excellent means of checking whether the results of the census are false or accurate. As the vote for the Reichsrat is universal and direct, it is an easy matter to obtain the statistics of the voting. In the electoral districts of the city of Trieste the Slovene candidate in the last Reichsrat elections

polled 9,119 votes, although the first, unrevised census only accounted for 45,731 Slovenes. If Italian Nationalist statistics are true, the purely absurd deduction would be, that every other Slovene had a vote, and that the Slovene population included practically no children and minors !

In the Reichsrat elections of 1911 the Slovene Nationalist Party polled a total of 9,119 votes in the town and territory of Trieste, and the Italian Nationalist candidates a total of 15,752 votes. In the city of Trieste the Italians polled 14,560 votes (or 70 per cent.) and the Jugoslavs 6,355 votes (or 30 per cent.). In the territory of Trieste the Jugoslavs polled 5,006 votes (or 81 per cent.), and the Italians only 1,192 (or 19 per cent.).

The result in the city of Trieste was the following : 1st electoral district, 2,586 Italian Liberal, 1,168 Slovene National votes ; 2nd electoral district, 5,579 Italian Liberal, 3,107 Slovene National votes ; 3rd electoral district, 4,047 Italian Liberal, 1,006 Slovene National votes ; 4th electoral district, 1,778 Italian Liberal and 1,074 Slovene votes.

On the strength of these simple facts we can safely assume that the Slovene population of Trieste numbers at least 66,000 souls, or in other words, very considerably more than the official statistics admit, so that it is absurd to speak

of the statistics as being biased in favour of the Slovenes. The ballot, after all, affords striking proof of the contrary. As a matter of fact, the Slav population of Trieste has of late increased considerably. But on the other hand, it is an equally remarkable fact that in 1851 Trieste was more of a Slav city than it is now. In that year the number of Slovene inhabitants of the town amounted to 29.71 per cent. of the entire population. In 1880 the Slovenes numbered 21.79 per cent., and in 1900, when the whole apparatus of the Italian local administration was employed to minimize the number of the Slovenes, the percentage sank to barely 16.35 per cent.

Apart from Trieste, there are two other towns in the Illyrian Littoral where the struggle between Italians and Jugoslavs is exceedingly keen. These are the towns of Gorica and Pola. In Gorica, which lies in Slav territory, 10,792 Jugoslavs are opposed to 14,812 Italians. The latter are, however, scarcely in an absolute majority to-day, because the town has several thousand German inhabitants as well. During the last elections for the Viennese Parliament, 1911, the Italian candidate polled in Gorica 1,792 votes and the Yugoslav candidate 1,166 votes. In Pola the elections yielded a similar result. The Yugoslav candidate polled 3,428 votes and the Italian candidate 3,877. According

to the official census Pola has 15,931 Jugoslavs, 29,108 Italian, and 9,046 German inhabitants.

In June 1913 there was an election of the Diet of Trieste. The *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna) of June 4th wrote as follows on these elections: "The National Liberal Italians inaugurated their electoral campaign with great zeal. In all their meetings the decision of the Germans to vote with the National Liberal Italians was sympathetically emphasized."

On June 14th the *Neue Freie Presse* wrote: "The elections of the general electoral class for the Diet of Trieste threatened also this time to introduce Slovene members for the city of Trieste into the Diet. The German electors who usually put forward independent candidates decided this time to abstain from doing so and to support the National Liberal candidates against the Slovenes. The result was that of the sixteen mandates of the city of Trieste, eleven were carried by Italian Liberals and five by Italian Socialists. The *Tribuna* (Rome) joyfully hails the assistance which the Germans of Trieste so disinterestedly tendered their Italian fellows, who were hard pressed by the Slovenes and Social Democrats. In this alliance the *Tribuna* sees the germ of deep-reaching transformations in the mutual relations between Germans and Italians, who, being equally threatened by Pan-Slavism, should forget the old contrasts and defend their cultural interests shoulder to shoulder."

Germans and Italians were also allies in the municipal election in Gorica, March 1914. The *Neue Freie Presse* of March 29th published the following information from its Gorica correspondent: "The local German political union has issued an appeal to the German electors, calling upon them to vote in to-morrow's elections for the Italian candidates." And on March 30th: "They [the Italian parties] were joined by the numerous German electors."

The Slovenes were defeated only because the Germans supported the Italians. Italian irredentists elected an Austrian major. On the day of the Gorica elections Serbian students held a meeting at the University of Belgrade against Italian aspirations regarding Trieste and Gorica. A telegram of sympathy was sent to the Slovene political society of Trieste, "Edinost."

As a rule the officials of the Austrian bureaucracy know nothing of the country they are deputed to administer. An Austrian official of high rank in Vienna once said to an Italian (the author of the book "L'Italia d'Oltre Confine"): "Down in the south, in Trieste, all is Italian." No doubt the official in question had visited the Citta vecchia, where the washing, hung on poles from the windows, recalls an impression of Naples, and where black-eyed Italian women gazed at the haughty German visitor. And if the good man had travelled through Dalmatia

at the time when the province had just thrown off the yoke of Italian supremacy, he would have probably carried away a similar superficial impression. Even now, forty years after the Yugoslav victory in Dalmatia, the towns of the province present almost the same aspect as those of the Illyrian north.

We have said that the Slav population of Trieste has greatly increased of late and also pointed out that nevertheless Trieste was really more of a Slav town in 1851 and 1857 than it is now. But this was merely because at that time the Slav population was relatively greater than it is now.

The Italians are anxious to prove that the majority of the Government officials employed in the administration are Slavs. As a matter of fact, the opposite is the case. The Austrian administrative system differs completely from the British. Local self-government, in the English sense, simply does not exist in Austria. The administration of the State is in the hands of professional public officials. Only men who have taken their University degree and are backed by social influence are admitted to the higher, responsible appointments. The official staff of the Littoral, in spite of the great Slav majority of the population, is only partially Slav. There are altogether 130 Government officials in the Littoral; of these, 43 are Italians, 53 Germans,

and only 34 Slavs. Among the officials employed in the Finance Department the number of Italian officials possessing a University education is four times as great as that of the Slavs. The same proportion is to be found in the Revenue Offices. In the Post Office the number of Slav officials employed is also merely one-quarter of that of the Italian officials. Further examination will show that statistics apply not only to the whole of the Littoral, but also to Dalmatia, Carniola, and Carynthia, for which Trieste is in some respects an administrative centre. The gross injustice done to the Slav population is amply proved by these figures. The Slav deputy for Trieste drew attention to all these facts in an interpellation in the Reichsrat on July 9, 1913.

In a polyglot country a knowledge of the local languages is an important asset. But the Italian officials decline to learn either of the other official languages of the country, namely Croatian and Slovene. They seriously uphold the principle that a knowledge of the Slav tongues would constitute a danger to Italian civilization, and refuse to realize that a knowledge of the Croatian tongue opens up the wide, as yet unexplored world of Slav literatures. It is obvious that in a province where the overwhelming majority of the population is Slav, every public official ought to be capable of dispensing justice and administering the country in the Slav language. The Italians

were slow to learn the Slav tongues, but the Jugoslavs were good Italian scholars. Consequently the Jugoslavs have now a better chance in the Civil Service than the Italians, and hence the result that the Italian element is no longer supreme in the Civil Service.

An Englishman, writing in a distinguished English review, criticized the Austrian Government for having introduced the Slav language into the law-courts, which up to that time had been purely Italian. But in doing this the Austrian Government was merely remedying an intolerable injustice, a flagrant violation of the laws of the Empire. It was the Italian policy which was short-sighted on this occasion. The British nation has, of course, the advantage of experience in questions like these. But national tolerance is a quality indispensable to a nation which has the ambition to become a great colonial Empire. The Italian is very reluctant to learn Serbo-Croatian, whereas English officials in India are obliged to learn the various languages spoken in their district.

A judge who administers justice in a language which is not understood by the accused is a criminal. The honour, life, liberty, and property of a man often depend on the correct comprehension of a single word or phrase. It is one of the most elementary rights of subjects and citizens that they should be judged by men of

their own nationality, or, failing that, by men who have a perfect knowledge of the language of the population.

Public education in Austria is organized on a system which differs absolutely from English methods. In a wealthy country education may safely be left to private enterprise. But in a poor country the national education must be a national matter. And this is the case in Austria. But, lest education should prove a lever in the evolution of the younger (Slav) nations, the State—which is intent on Germanizing—and the German and Italian municipal and local authorities have always endeavoured by every means in their power to prevent Slav children from attending Slav schools. In direct contravention to the fundamental law of the land, the municipal administration of Trieste refused to grant a primary school to a population of sixty thousand Jugoslavs. The school budget for the town of Trieste amounts to 3,666,000 kr. ; but not even a fraction of this is devoted to the Yugoslav minority, which is so considerable. The Yugoslav artisan and peasant is compelled to pay for the foundation and upkeep of his school out of his own pocket, and the Government does nothing to remedy this state of affairs. The above-mentioned English writer in his article blamed the Government because Trieste contains no Italian primary school maintained by the State

Government, but evidently he was not aware of the fact that the primary public instruction is under the control of the local municipal authorities.

But in spite of this circumstance the State Government interferes with the primary school systems whenever it is a case of artificially cultivating the German element. The State maintains no Slovene primary school in Trieste, but there are no less than two German secondary schools, and four German primary schools in Trieste, all of which are maintained by the State. Only one-third of the number of children attending these schools are of German extraction. One-third are Slovenes and one-third Italians by birth.

The Slovene School Union "Druzba Svetega Cirila in Metoda" spends almost the whole of its annual income on the Slovene schools in Trieste. Both capital and income of this Society are practically a war fund against Italianization. There is also a Croatian School Union in the Littoral, which disposes of an annual income of 213,000 kr. and a capital of 340,000 kr. This society defrays the upkeep of fifty-six schools; as the annual income of the Slovene society is 145,000 kr., this means that the Croats and Slovenes put together spend 400,000 kr. annually on their schools in the Littoral. The Italians also have their School Union, the "Lega

Nazionale." In 1911 this society had 42,041 members, its capital amounted to 1,128,382 kr., and its annual income to 613,931 kr. Being richer, the Italian school organization is naturally in a stronger position than the Yugoslav societies. The reason for this superior wealth is that the Italian society receives financial help from Italy and that the Italian Government has also seen fit to send contributions. By contrast the 400,000 kr. spent by the Yugoslavs represent the contributions of poor peasants and artisans.

The part played by the Italian element would have disappeared by now if the administration in the Illyrian Littoral had been democratized before the war. It is paradoxical, but at the same time perfectly correct to say, that the true preserver of the Italian element has been the Austrian Government, which by means of an anti-democratic electoral system prevented Italians from being politically swamped. The Austrian régime, with its repugnance towards free democracy in any shape or form, was the protector of the Italians. On the day when direct universal suffrage was introduced both for the local government and the Diet, the days of Italianism would have been numbered.

It is interesting to note that it is in the name of democratic ideals and political liberty that the Italians claimed those provinces from Austria, of which Austria, in the name of a reactionary and

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anti-democratic policy, was carefully making a preserve for future Italian conquest.

To these arguments one might add another train of ideas which is unacceptable from a democratic point of view. The Jugoslavs are not yet a nation with sharply differentiated class distinctions. They have no social traditions ; not all classes of society are fully developed. For this reason, then, they are to be reckoned inferior to the Italians, and not permitted to aspire, like the nation which has during the course of centuries organized itself towards social and national equality.

It is our duty to consider this argument, even while pointing out that its anti-democratic and anti-national character deprives it of all real value.

It is an argument which is very well known in Austria. The German proclaims his national superiority over the Czech and the Slovene, and the Pole his over the Ruthene. The German and the Pole argue: "Only the nation with an historical past, only the nation in which all social classes are developed is entitled to claim full national equality." But this argument has the drawback that both time and fact give it the lie. What is an historical past? The young nations can readily retort by asking: In what does our national life consist? In the efforts of past generations to preserve our race. In spite of everything we are here, and your frenetic efforts to destroy us only

afford conclusive proof of our strength and our existence. You tell us that we have no middle class, and that we have no aristocracy. Our middle class is developing, and as regards an aristocracy we have no need of it.

Within the compass of a few years the Germans have witnessed the development of a vigorous, healthy, and independent Czech middle class. A little later the same phenomenon appeared among the Slovenes.

The argument that only such nations as are "complete" may aspire to the same rights as those accorded to the older nations comes into collision with the cold logic of facts when applied to the Jugoslavs. Do the Serbs possess an ancient middle class or an aristocracy? Or are the generals of the Serbian armies and Serbian diplomats not the sons of peasants? And yet there is nobody who would cast a doubt on the fact that the Serbian nation can fairly compare with the great nations of history.

To return to the rival claims of Jugoslavs and Italians in the *terre irredente*, there is one question which must be discussed before all others. Are the Italians of the Illyrian Littoral a complete nation according to German and Italian definition of the term? Certainly the Italians cannot claim to possess an aristocracy in the Littoral, because the aristocracy there is exclusively German. According to the admission of a writer with

chauvinist views, the Italians can boast of an upper middle class, but both trade and capital on a large scale in Trieste have always been in the hands of a cosmopolitan, non-Italian element. The leading families, a few of whom are of Italian origin, are *austricanti*—i.e. tenacious partisans of the Austrian Empire, strongly opposed to Italian nationalism.

If we, then, examine the position of affairs before the European War, we shall find that capital was controlled mainly either by foreigners or by Jugoslavs. There was not one great Italian bank in Trieste. The wealthy bourgeoisie there is a mixture of all races ; it is not at all purely Italian. The Italian stratum is the lower middle class, the small tradespeople, and its growing preponderance is due to the constitutional movement. It is a curious fact that this lower middle class has only very tardily and recently emancipated itself from the Austrian element.

The Italians realized the danger that was involved in the creation of a Yugoslav middle class. The agricultural masses and the working classes are Slav. If they were supported by an enlightened Yugoslav middle class, the Italian cause would be doomed. The racial struggle became fierce as soon as the Yugoslav middle class began to take root in Trieste. As a matter of fact, it is of recent growth ; it has been reproached with being non-indigenous. But nevertheless Trieste will sink

into insignificance if the town is cut off from the Slav hinterland. One would deprive Trieste of a primary condition of progress by obstructing the influx of the new and industrious element which derives its strength from the wholesome breath of the soil and the small hamlets and villages of the Yugoslav lands.

2. THE PAST.

It is the fate of history to be exploited by politics. Unfortunately, historic facts are used to furnish arguments for the exigencies of political life. As a matter of fact, if the argument of history is to be put forward in politics, it is necessary to subject it to very careful scrutiny indeed.

It may be objected that the rationalism of the great Revolution has for ever destroyed the importance of historic facts for present-day politics. On the other hand, it is intelligible that in countries where the Constitution has preserved the continuity of historic claims, the argument of history should still be taken into account. But in a country like Italy, founded on the principle of the sovereign rights of nationality and constituted by the destruction of the historic claims of other States, the argument of history appears as an anachronism.

We do not deny that the Littoral was once under the Roman rule. Let us point out, e.g., that it

is also in virtue of an historic claim that Hungary aspires to the possession of Serbia and Bulgaria, which were in the Middle Ages vassal States of the Crown of St. Stephen.

Moreover, it is open to question whether the Italians of the Littoral are descendants of the Romans. As a matter of fact, it is extremely difficult to determine the different races which constitute the Italian nation of to-day. There is little of the Roman blood left to-day, even in the central province. What can we say of the Italians of the Littoral whose names, which are often Slav, certainly do not point to a Roman descent? All these questions of race must be regarded with infinite caution.

After the Romans, the Littoral passed under the domination of the German feudal system. It is true, however, that the Italians might put forward a historic claim to Trieste and part of Istria, because these two provinces were at one time dependencies of the Republic of Venice. But it must be remembered that the Venetian domination over Trieste was merely temporary; ever since 1382 the fate of Trieste has been linked with that of Austria. Venice and Trieste were always rival cities; no political and economic union has ever existed between them. Concerning this Angelo Vivante remarks most truthfully in his "*Irredentismo Adriatico*": "The town has a foe in front, in the flank, and in the rear; it is

obliged for dear life to desire the death of Venice."

The Venetian rule in Istria and Dalmatia was mere colonial exploitation in its cruellest form. Both countries were not treated like the other possessions of the Most Serene Republic in Italy, but as colonies altogether foreign to the sovereign State. The Slav peasant was systematically exploited in virtue of a regimen which scarcely differed from the Spanish system of colonization. There was neither pity nor economic common sense.

The past of the eastern part of Istria was altogether different. The country formed part of the Holy Roman Empire, and German feudalism took deep root there.

It was the Holy Empire which played by far the most important part in the history of the Illyrian Littoral, right up to the nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, the Empire was the House of Habsburg. To these southern countries the Empire was an abstract idea, whereas Austria was a tangible fact. Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola shared the fate of the Littoral. They were governed by the same laws, they were under the same administration, the same political principles and similar social conditions prevailed, brought about by the common geographical position of the entire group of provinces.

Thus it is clear that the historic claim based on the Roman occupation is confronted by a rival

of more recent growth—i.e. the German Empire of the Middle Ages. Decidedly the historical argument is a two-edged weapon.

Gorica-Gradiska also passed under the sway of German feudalism. The Counts of Gorica were German, and they sought to Germanize the country by encouraging German colonists and introducing German laws and customs.

If, therefore, we are to accept the standpoint of the historic claim, it would be Germany, as legitimate heir of the Holy Empire, who would be entitled to enforce her claim, rather than Italy.

It is not so easy to decide whether Trieste was also incorporated in the Holy Empire, and, indeed, this is a matter distinctly open to discussion. In this connection it is interesting that in 1848 Trieste elected deputies for the Frankfort Parliament—in other words, for the Parliament of the German Empire.

An insistence on the historic claim must lead us to conclusions which are not in the least gratifying to the Italian point of view.

Besides this, not only Germany but France also might prefer, from the point of view of historic right, a claim to the Littoral. The French occupation forms a chapter in the Napoleonic epic. This French occupation of the unredeemed countries forms one of the most important, interesting, and far-reaching periods of their history, and opens an entirely new vista in the fate of these countries.

The French rule, lasting from 1809 to 1813, exercised a very special influence over the Littoral. The former attempts at centralization were logically continued. The Illyrian provinces were transformed into a kingdom of Illyria. The Littoral was united with Carniola and Carinthia. Up to 1848 the Littoral, Carniola, and Carinthia were all under the same administration. It is an indubitable fact that the separate administration of to-day was created in order to weaken the Slav movement in these provinces.

Under the pernicious rule of the German Liberal Party the Slovenes, the westernmost of the Jugoslavs, were parcelled out in four provinces, and their political life was disastrously decentralized in six Diets.

All these facts prove that the decentralization which to-day prevails in the provinces of Austria proper is not in keeping with the historic development of the country, but was arbitrarily created in order to destroy the Slovene political movement.

The greatest obstacle to the progress of the Jugoslavs in the Littoral lay, not in Austria's internal but in her external policy. The Triple Alliance was a most baneful event for the Jugoslavs of the Littoral. In Crispi's Memoirs one finds many instances which prove the efforts made by both Italy and Germany to compel Austria to adopt a pro-Italian policy in the Littoral.

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Austria's political weakness, sure sign of decadence, tolerated this shameful interference. The Austrian Government favoured the Italians everywhere ; the schools, local government, the Church, political life—all were Italianized.

Naturally, a policy of this type was fairly calculated to foment the most bitter strife between the Jugoslavs and Italians in the Littoral. It was exasperating for the Jugoslavs to find themselves the victims of a hopelessly false foreign policy, which did not aim at furthering the progress of the nationalities, but exclusively at establishing the overpowering hegemony of the Magyars and Germans and the destruction of the Jugoslavs.

But the Triple Alliance was not a permanent institution, and when it fell into abeyance, its influence on Austria's internal policy in the Littoral ceased. This change took place at the beginning of this century : the Government ceased to favour the Italian element, and sought to inaugurate a policy which, although it scarcely yet corresponded to the new social force and intelligence of the Jugoslav masses, at least was not absolutely hostile to them.

The Government was still far removed from the standpoint of full national equality and true justice, and the régime of the "Red Prince" Hohenlohe, the man so detested by the Italians, did not mean that the country was administered in accordance with the wishes of the majority of its

inhabitants, but merely that his system permitted the free development of the Slav social forces.

One may read in every Italian book dealing with Nationalist conditions in the "unredeemed provinces" that the development of the Jugoslavs was evoked and furthered by the Government. But it was not the Government, but a perfectly natural, social, and economic evolution which caused this progress. The social purblindness with regard to this subject in even the best Italian authors is exceedingly interesting.

Of course the evolution of the Jugoslavs in the Littoral is making itself felt; they form the majority of the population, and we live in an age where, even in Austria, the masses command respect. The Slavization of Trieste is due to the economic development of the whole of Southern Austria, and principally to the new Alpine railway by which Trieste is more closely united with its hinterland than it was in time past. Moreover, numerous Jugoslav banking institutions have within recent years become almost the predominant factors in the economic life of Trieste. As the Italian *intransigent* writer Gayda puts it in his book "L'Italia d'Oltre Confine," "There are branches of German and Slav banks, but not one exclusively Italian bank of any importance."

Besides these economic reasons, there are certain ethical reasons. The Jugoslavs are at

this moment a nation filled with all the pride of race peculiar to young and healthy peoples. Naturally, among the Slovenes, the vanguard of the Jugoslavs, this feeling of rising strength is bound to create a disposition to struggle yet more fiercely against the foes of centuries. The Jugoslav renaissance simultaneously awakened a strong manifestation of public opinion and a very strong and vital intellectual movement. This movement equalized the Italian and Jugoslav intellectual forces.

In spite of everything, however, the Italians reiterate that all is due to the Government. The truth is that the Jugoslavs are the children of their own labours, and that they have progressed, not by the support but contrary to the will of the State.

With regard to Trieste, Austria was in a difficult position. To the detested Red Prince, Governor of Trieste, it was a fact that the Italians of Trieste desired a union with Italy. Former governors had sought to win the regard of the Italians by the simple expedient of oppressing the Jugoslavs, who formed the majority of the population. During the time of the Triple Alliance, Austria's foreign policy was the complement of her Anti-Slav home policy. Both Germans and Magyars with naïve enthusiasm supported a pro-Italian policy, which was clearly doomed to crushing defeat. While Crispi ruled Italy, it was

an easy matter for him and Bismarck to force Austria-Hungary to favour the Italians and oppress the Yugoslavs. In all the larger towns, Italian influence was stronger than Yugoslav in consequence of an unfair and undemocratic electoral law. An absurd and reactionary Constitution of the Provincial Diets favoured the political oppression of the majority of the population. The Italians were backed by a Great Power ; the Yugoslavs had no one to support them.

The Austrian Government has achieved very little in the Littoral ; only in one matter has it been completely successful, to wit, in utterly undermining the attachment of the Yugoslavs to the Dynasty. When the Empress Elizabeth was assassinated in Geneva by an Italian, riots against the Italians broke out in the Littoral. The Slav masses, which were then still animated by a warm regard for the Dynasty, saw in their own oppressors the foes of the Royal House as well. Innocent demonstrations against the Italians were punished with cruelly severe terms of imprisonment, and the Slovene peasant had to go to jail for his patriotism. Even the cry of "Long live Austria !" was forbidden and made punishable in the interests of a pro-Italian foreign policy.

It is the instinct of self-preservation which compels the majority of the population in the Littoral, i.e. the Yugoslavs, to fear an annexation by Italy, which would mean national death to the Yugoslavs

of that country. For this reason the Yugoslav policy was opposed to that of *Italia irredenta*. But the Austrian system of exasperating police prosecution and persecution was bitterly repugnant to Italians and all Slav parties alike.

3. THE PRESENT DAY.

The social structure of the Littoral cannot be summed up in the simple phrase, that the towns are Italian and the country Slav. Modern life, with its manifold means of communication, industry, and growing commerce, attracted the rural Slav element to the towns, where always was an indigenous Slovene population. Surely the simplest method to check this tendency would have been simply to forbid the Slavs to settle in the towns; but this would have been a too drastically undemocratic interference with the right of the individual to move from one place to another to be practicable in all its crudeness.

Trieste became a large cosmopolitan town, the Hamburg of the south, a great commercial centre of economic evolution, the greatest port on the Adriatic, and within recent years it has increased out of all proportion by a perfectly natural process. By a second railway line, uniting it with Germany, Vienna, and Prague, Trieste became a cosmopolitan city. A city of such size and importance requires a great army of workers. The Yugoslav districts to the north of Trieste

have a rural population which needs work. Trieste is close at hand and nothing is more natural than to go to Trieste to seek work. This migration of Yugoslav labour is an economic fact, a natural outcome of the economic growth and development of Trieste, and of course, as a result of this economic evolution, the Slav element in the city increased. The Italians offer a more ingenious explanation of the increase of the Slav population in Trieste. They declare that it is the Government which imports Slav labour. This is wrong. The Government has power to make war and to conclude peace, but the regulation of demand and supply in the labour market is a matter of economic evolution. Only in one branch of industry native labour has been definitely preferred to Italian. Formerly workmen from the kingdom of Italy were employed in the naval dockyards.

Even English writers have questioned the fact that Trieste requires the Yugoslav hinterland for its economic evolution. But these doubters should remember that for centuries Trieste has been in constant communication with its hinterland, that it always traded with the countries lying to the north, and that it was always in competition with Venice. One cannot lay too much stress upon the fact that Napoleon I assigned Trieste to the Illyrian provinces.

Any one acquainted with the historic develop-

ment of Gorica will not marvel at the fact that the German element has always been very strong there. Before the Habsburgs acquired the county it was ruled by the Counts of Gorica, who were of German-Tyrolean descent, and brought German feudal law, German customs, and German colonists into the country. Until quite recently an old aristocracy of German landowners still existed there, which mixed with the local Italian aristocracy until both were merged in the Austrian element. Nor was the Italian middle class ever very strong in Gorica.

The Slovenes developed a native Slovene middle class in Gorica, and the Italian contention that all prosperity, civilization, and education in the Littoral are Italian had long lost all meaning in Gorica.

As Gorica is completely surrounded by Slovene territory, and the rural population is constantly gravitating towards the towns, it is not in the least surprising that Gorica is becoming more of a Slovene town from year to year. The citizen is dependent upon the dweller in the country, who is his best client, and the man from the country is likely to be guided by Nationalist considerations in the choice of the merchant with whom he deals, and to purchase for preference from his own countrymen ; and thus a new native urban element grows up in pluro-lingual towns.

In Istria the position is a peculiar one. Here

the Italian urban element is strongest on the west coast, and the towns on the west have still to a great extent preserved an Italian character. The social stratum of wealthy landowners, about one hundred families all told, is very thin. These five score Italian landowners of the better class exercise a privileged vote for the Diet, in virtue of which they send five Italian delegates to the Istrian Diet. These few families form the true mainstay of the Italian element in Istria. But they stand in sharp opposition to the Slav rural population. Usury is practised in its worst form by the Italian "signori" who have taught the Slovene peasant that his national and his economic interests go hand in hand. The Istrian urban lower middle class is not very capable of holding its own. This is because the inhabitant of the Istrian coast towns is also a farmer, i.e. he also cultivates vineyards and corn-fields outside the town. But an economically hybrid position of this kind is incompatible with the requirements of the times, and as a result, the land on the west coast is passing more and more into the hands of the persevering and frugal Yugoslav peasant.

There is something very true and significant in the dictum that the Italian element represents the buttons on the Slav coat. The great mass of the rural population is Slav. These Slav masses were neglected, not only under the

Venetians but even more so under the political tyranny of the "signori." The Slavs were given no schools.

It was a favourite political method of the Istrian Italians to contend that there were no less than eleven different kinds of Slavs in Istria, who had nothing in common with each other. That different dialects are spoken in one and the same country is a thing not unknown elsewhere, and least of all in Italy, and yet no one would venture to deny that all Italians belong to the same nation. The Venetian has considerable difficulty in understanding the Piedmontese, far more than the Slav peasant from Istria finds in understanding the Jugoslavs of Dalmatia or Bosnia. One proof of the speaking the purest Serbian language character of this argument of the eleven Slav nations may be found in the fact that it gradually disappeared, and it was finally admitted that the Istrian peasants are simply Jugoslavs.

During a long lapse of time the Austrian Government devoted itself to Italianizing the Littoral. The delegate Spincic was justified when in 1894 he indignantly exclaimed in the Reichsrat: "In those days [1848] Istria was still designated a Slav land, and only to the Austrian Governments of more recent date are due the credit, and the honour that in consequence of their activity, in all branches of the administra-

tion, whole towns, villages, yea, whole districts have become Italian ! ”

Blind and effete as ever, the Austrian Government indiscriminately echoed the phrases concerning Italian culture and superiority, without ever approaching the nucleus of the problem.

The nineties of the last century were especially stormy in these southern lands. In those years Slavs and Italians came virtually into collision in a hard, vehement conflict, which was waged on both sides with Southern heat and temperament. The destruction of vines and olive-trees became a favourite weapon of the Italian political terror. The debates in the Reichsrat between 1894 and 1897 tell many a tale of this kind.

The leaders of the Italians of the Littoral never understood true democracy. The Italian parties were reared on pseudo-Liberal principles ; all power really reposed in the hands of a small clique, which exploited the Slav peasant both politically and economically. The fight against the Yugoslav peasant was at the same time a fight against democracy.

The question of Italy's natural boundaries forms an interesting chapter in itself. One of the arguments heard most frequently is that Italy requires Gorica, Istria, and Trieste, because these territories constitute Italy's natural strategic boundary. Every State desires to possess strategic boundaries, not only Italy but also Italy's

neighbours. In fact, Italy's one-sided claim to a strategic boundary cannot fail to provoke an equal desire in her neighbours.

Italian geographers have not yet decided among themselves whether to adopt the line of the Julian Alps as the boundary created by Nature. It is more a poetic aspiration than a fact of political geography that the Italian frontier passes along the Carnian and Julian Alps from Trbiz (Tarvis) down to the Gulf of Quarnero. The fact is that the Julian Alps are broken up by wide valleys and that this ring of mountains is by no means a connected chain. The whole length of the range is 260 km., and only 80 km., from the Predil to the Idrica, form an uninterrupted Alpine range. The Baca and Idrica valleys are a couple of deep and wide expanses which completely break the continuity of the Julian Alps. The district between the Baca valley and the Vipava valley is crossed by a central range possessing no sharply defined profile at all. And who would venture to assert that the plateau of the Carso is at all suitable for a strong demarcation of the Italian frontier? The phrase concerning Italy's "natural boundaries" is a political catchword of the usual type, without any real justification.

That Nature has indicated Italy's true confines is another patriotic sentence. The climate of Vipava and Gorica is more meridional

than that of Carniola ; the vegetation is richer, but still that does not prove that " these districts belong to Italy." The " eternally blue sky of Italy " broods equally over Dalmatia, Hercegovina, and many other countries.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the Jugoslavs of the Illyrian Littoral dislike Italy and the Italians. On the contrary, they are greatly in sympathy with Italy's democratic life, her great past, and her present civilization. The Jugoslavs of Dalmatia, who are the most advanced among the Jugoslavs from the point of view of the national problems of the race, like Latin spirit ; thus we do not find perpetual antagonism of the souls of two nations, and two opposing civilizations at war in the hearts of the Jugoslavs of Dalmatia, but rather an ardent desire for harmonious concord. But between Germans and Jugoslavs a similar understanding would be impossible.

Jugoslav sympathy with Italian civilization was adversely affected by a particular obstacle created by the political conflict between Jugoslavs and Italians in the Littoral. Any one writing a sociological history of Austria would have to make mention of the Slav renegade as a type. This type has flourished greatly among the dominant and privileged races, such as the Germans, Poles, Magyars, and Italians.

A renegade is always the bitterest enemy of

his compatriots of yesterday, and he acts as a kind of *agent-provocateur* among countrymen of his adoption. The renegade is the product of social egotism, and also of social corruption. It is not too much to assert that Nationalist struggles would lose much of their bitterness if this extremist element could be eliminated. In our case, it is safe to say that the relations between Italians and Jugoslavs would become more natural at once but for the renegade element in whose interest it is to destroy the possibility of national agreement.

There is a strong German colony in the Illyrian Littoral. Unfortunately, it cannot be denied that the Italians were guilty of allying themselves with the Germans, of supporting them in the times of political and administrative elections. They themselves introduced the enemy into the country. It was purblind of the Italians of the coast-land to favour Pan-Germanism in the Adriatic region ; and it is interesting to note that at the present moment Italy herself is enthusiastically and with well-grounded arguments proclaiming the dangers of Pan-Germanism for Italy.

Obviously, reconciliation with an adversary who called the common enemy into the country was most unlikely. The action of the Italians was inspired solely by a wish to weaken the Jugoslavs. A wise policy would have been one diametrically

opposed to this. The Italians ought to have eliminated the Germans and sought to arrive at an understanding with the indigenous population, with whom they were obliged to live side by side. The first step on the part of the Italians towards establishing such an understanding would have to be the adoption of a clearly anti-German attitude.

As for the Jugoslavs, they are forced to declare that it is themselves who are in the majority in these *terre irredente*. Yet they recognize the national rights of the Italians in a spirit of liberalism and justice.

The Jugoslavs have never thought of imposing the prerogative of the majority, which has the sanction of the democratic institutions of the day, but have shown themselves willing to respect the Italian minority and guaranteeing it full and free development.

They are not demanding a position of supremacy over the other nation, but an equitable situation based on full autonomy for either nation.

The Italians will find the Jugoslavs imbued with a spirit of conciliation, a strong desire and the frank and generous intention of achieving the goal which is so important for them, viz. the good understanding between Italians and Jugoslavs.

This understanding would also be of paramount importance for Italy's Balkan policy.

A reconciliation with the Jugoslavs of the Illyrian Littoral is a primary condition for any Balkan policy on the part of Italy. Failing this, any Italo-Balkan alliance would merely lead to a repetition of the Austrian checkmate. Austria failed in her penetration of the Balkans because of the well-deserved dislike she evoked by her dualist policy, because of the Magyar hegemony and because of her oppression of the Jugoslavs. The Triple Alliance was first endangered and subsequently buried by the Nationalist questions which divided Austria-Hungary and Italy.

The Jugoslavs see more clearly than the Italians what the situation of to-morrow is likely to be, more especially in the "unredeemed countries," concerning which the Italians cannot discard certain obsolete conceptions founded on the ideas of a bygone day.

The intellectual adaptability of the Jugoslavs is not a proof of weakness but of strength, which is in itself the result of an absence of false and ingrained traditions, and of a social system which is imbued with an invincible faith in the ideas of to-day and to-morrow.

As far back as 1848 Cavour said of the Jugoslavs: "The Slav race, energetic, numerous, oppressed for several centuries, desires to emancipate itself completely. . . . Its cause is just and noble . . . that is why it is destined to triumph in a distant future."

It seems as if the prophecy of the creator of the Italy of to-day were now to be fulfilled. Is it likely that one of the greatest events in history will at last solve the Yugoslav question, and, by giving it national independence, put an end to the tragic martyrdom of a race that has hitherto been torn apart and condemned to misery, but always full of life and energy?

This moment compels Italy to be guided by infinite prudence in the choice of her attitude.

No one can deny the great importance of the Illyrian Littoral for the Yugoslavs. After all, they are at home there. One must know the true national resources of the Yugoslavs to be convinced that this western territory of theirs is the true nursery of all that is most important for the life of the Slovene nationality. Culture and political life are well advanced there in every respect. Statistics show that the number of illiterates is smaller there than in any other Yugoslav country. It is also worth while to note that the number of illiterates is proportionately far greater in the Italian section of the littoral than in the Yugoslav section. The figures for 1910 are: Environs of Gorica (Slovenes), 14.64 per cent. illiterates; Tolmin (Slovenes), 15.12 per cent.; Sezana (Slovenes), 14.19 per cent.; Gradisca (Italians), 17.97 per cent.; Monfalcone (Italians), 22.10 per cent.

Trieste is the gate by which the Yugoslavs

stand in communication with West Europe. The Italians took up a wrong standpoint with regard to this matter. They demanded Italy's intervention in the war on the plea that the supreme moment had come in which to make sure that this territory should not be lost to them. The formula "too late" would expose the absence of true national strength, it would be a confession of defeat. A nation whose existence is not artificially bolstered up ought to be able to survive the greatest dangers. It ought to be able to do so without a time limit.

Let us in a few words define the problem of Trieste and the Illyrian Littoral. The majority of the population is Yugoslav. By having organized the masses and developed an urban middle class, they have become an important factor in the financial and economic life of Trieste. Contrariwise, the Italians are basing their claims on historic arguments which to-day are anachronisms. Their Italian Nationalist *petite bourgeoisie* is in conflict with the Slav labour element, and even with the Italian labour element, which is Socialist and Internationalist in Trieste and Clerical and Austrian in Gorica-Gradisca. Moreover, that *bourgeoisie* lacks a strong organization and financial support, which is a fatal drawback in a place which is, like Trieste, above all things a commercial centre.

All historic claims, the brilliant phrases of a

bygone age, all the Latin historical phraseology, should be abandoned.

The unworthy prejudices which have warped the Italian spirit must go, and they must realize and admit that in the Illyrian Littoral, including Trieste, Gorica, and Pola, the Jugoslavs are in every way their equal. But one thing is certain. Certain prejudices will have to be given up, and a certain conception of national justice accepted.

The principle of protection for national minorities, which obtains in Austrian Moravia, is still fairly new to the British public. And yet—whatever the ultimate fate of the Illyrian Littoral—it must be made a *sine quâ non* that national interests, no matter whether Slovene or Italian, are duly and legally protected. A nationality law of this kind should enjoy international protection. The main outlines ought to be as follows. All members of a given nationality form the native community, which is organized as a juristic body and has absolutely autonomous control over certain branches of the administration, principally the school system. Every citizen, whether belonging to the Jugoslav or to the Italian nationality, must make a statement concerning his nationality and be registered in the records of his particular nationality, whose legal organization is based on these records. In order to obviate the possibility that the minority should be taken advantage of in the administration of

such spheres as come under the joint control of both nationalities, the law of proportionate voting should be introduced.

A sane nationalism, founded on the facts of the present day, could reconcile Jugoslavs and Italians. The old contempt and the old race-hatred must be laid aside. The living National forces, the actual situation of to-day, must be the starting-point, and not historical quibbles ; not supremacy, but equality founded upon the mutual recognition of reciprocal rights.

If Italian Imperialism were to clash with Jugoslav aspirations, the conflict would be fraught with considerable danger.

By refusing to recognize Jugoslav Nationalism and repeating the outworn formulæ of another age the Italians can only damage themselves. It is obviously difficult to establish an understanding between an old nationality, steeped in traditionalism, and a new one.

The war of to-day partakes of both social and political idealism. Italy's best men behold in it the great conflict between the ideas of yesterday and social progress ; they look upon Germanism as representing social and political reaction. Consequently they will have to beware of imitating Prussian Imperialism. And this Imperialism aimed at strangling on principle, at crushing every movement towards national autonomy and national justice. This Imperialism has proved itself the

negation of civilization, the negation of true social progress. The great obstacle in the path of Prussian Imperialism was the Slavism of the Jugoslavs which barred all direct access to the East.

The Austrian Government was the blind instrument of Pan-Germanism. By corruption, by brute force and German money, they sought to Germanize the Slovenes. In Croatia, Hungary was the cruel executor of Germany's will. The abrogation of Croatia's constitutional rights, her economic misery, incarcerations, the destruction of political liberty—these were the tender mercies of the Hungarian policy. Last, but not least, Serbia was the most energetic and the most obstinate enemy of Pan-Germanism.

German action was the same in each country, but the political effects differed. But how much suffering, how many vexations, what privations we had to endure in order to withstand the German *Drang!* The whole world ought henceforth to benefit by the Jugoslav tenacity.

All those who are to-day so bitterly condemning the methods of this extraordinary manifestation of the worship of force ought to be consistent with regard to places where a new Imperialism is threatening to develop. And we fear that Italy is on the way to yield to such a movement ; but this would be a betrayal of the most precious ideals which are to-day arrayed against Imperialist Germany.

4. THE DEAL WITH ITALY. VOICES OF BRITISH AND FRENCH PUBLICISTS.

In the foregoing chapters we have set forth the facts, social, economic, and political, whereby the Yugoslav problem in the Littoral is fully elucidated. Starting from the principle that true, good policy is inseparable from a thorough knowledge of facts, the diplomatic negotiations preceding the Italian intervention have somewhat surprised us. The dynastic, strategic, and imperialistic considerations have been the decisive factors. The will of the nation inhabiting the territory whose cession is being contemplated—the Principle of Nationality—is not being taken into account. We feel as if we were turned back into an age when kings and princes shared, pawned, gave away and dowered their daughters with their lands. When the World-War is brought to a conclusion European democracy will not fail to subject the diplomatic history of the Great War to a searching criticism.

Nobody can deny the justice of Italy's title to the Trentino. On the ground of the principle of nationality, Italy had a right to demand the Trentino from Austria-Hungary. The objections raised by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy are quite peculiar. The question as to what should be done in future with regard to the title of "Count of the Tyrol," which is one of the titles borne by the Emperor of

Austria-Hungary, is vastly more important in the eyes of a Viennese diplomat than that of the national affinity of the Trentino. After all, in the eyes of the Viennese courtiers, the principle of nationality is no better than red revolution, a horrible product of modern times.

It was no less a person than Mazzini who, in his book "The Duties of Man," spoke thus to his countrymen: "Take a map of Europe and place one point of a pair of compasses in the north of Italy or Parma, point the other to the mouth of the Var and describe a semicircle with it in the direction of the Alps. This point, which will fall, when the semicircle is completed, upon the mouth of the Isonzo, will have marked the frontier which God has given you. As far as this frontier your language is spoken; beyond this you have no rights." It is the Soca (Isonzo) line, therefore, which Mazzini claims as the national political frontier of Italy.

The demands of modern Italy are far in excess of the demands of her creator. On April 8th, Baron Sonnino formulated Italy's demands from Austria-Hungary as follows: Cession of almost the entire province of Gorica-Gradiska, besides the Trentino. The new political boundary was to be drawn from the Rombonne, eastward of Bovec, down the Soca (Isonzo) as far as Tolmin, then via Cepovan east of Gorica, across the Kras at Komen, until it reached the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste in the neighbourhood of Nabrezina,

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Trieste, with Nabrezina, Koper, and Pirano, was to form an independent, sovereign State. The islands of Hvar, Vis, Korculja, Lastovo, Pusac, Pelagruza, and Mert were to be ceded to Italy. This was to be the deal with Austria.

But at the same time Italy was also negotiating with Russia. But Russia was asked to promise far more than Austria in return for Italy's adherence. There was no longer any suggestion of a free State of Trieste. The river Rasa in Istria was to mark the boundary between Italy and the future Croatia. Part of Carniola was to fall to Croatia's share. That meant, that Russian diplomacy was to give the other part of the heart of Slovene territory to Italy. The other Slovene lands are not even mentioned in these Russian proposals to Italy. As regards the Dalmatian Isles, Russian diplomacy endeavoured to arrive at a compromise between the principle of nationality and the Italian General Staff.

Towards the Triple Entente Italy advanced yet further claims, which a Frenchman, Charles Vellay, in his "*La Question de l'Adriatique*," summarized in the following words: "Italy categorically—one might say, brutally—expressed a desire, which was not embarrassed by any considerations of justice or reason, and she plainly avowed her aim, viz. the destruction of all rivalry by sea, absolute ascendancy." I have purposely quoted the words of this distinguished Frenchman. Bare facts speak

loudly enough. The future Croato-Italian frontier was to run south of Fiume. In other words, Fiume was to become Italian territory. The coast, from the mouth of the Zermanja to that of the Narenta, was to be handed over to Italy—five hundred kilometres of one of the most beautiful coast-lands in the world! All the Dalmatian Isles were to belong to Italy.

The Italian programme is neither modest nor idealistic. And yet there are enthusiasts who still dream of the principle of nationality, the deliverance of nations, and a durable peace!

We are often told that "the soup is never eaten as hot as it was cooked," as the Germans say. But even if Italy were to renounce her claim to Dalmatia, almost six hundred thousand Jugoslavs in Carniola and the Littoral would still be handed over to her. Even Italy's minimum programme, embracing only Trieste, Gorica-Gradiska, and Istria, would mean that the Slovenes would suffer a mortal blow from which they would never recover.

In order to rightly elucidate the Yugoslav-Italian conflict, so far as Trieste and the rest of the Littoral are concerned, may I be permitted to quote the opinions of English and French publicists who have studied the problem? This method will absolve our contentions from the charge of bias.

We will give precedence to the British writers,

and then quote the French in their turn. As a matter of fact, the British are far less favourably disposed towards the Slovenes than the French, among whom a display of "Latin sympathy" would have seemed more natural.

Two influential British publicists—Sir Arthur Evans and Dr. Seton-Watson—adjudge the Littoral to Italy without further ado. Sir Arthur Evans expressed his standpoint in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* on May 13, 1915. Dr. Seton-Watson, even in his more recent publicist writings, adhered to his views concerning Trieste, which he had already put forward in "War and Democracy." In this case we can only reply as follows to this admirable writer, who has already rendered such distinguished service to the Yugoslav cause. Since when has the principle of nationality been spoken of? Only since our own age, in which the national country State has come to be recognized in contrast to the former city State. A city State, founded on the principle of nationality, is an anomaly. Now, Trieste, situated in Yugoslav territory, is certainly a city, which might possibly be constituted a city State. But this city State could not exist independently from the surrounding Yugoslav territory. But if the principle of nationality is to be applied, it must at least be applied to the whole of the Littoral, seeing that the territory of Trieste is an integral part of the Littoral. But as soon

as we consider the Littoral as a whole, it is clear that this territory, the majority of whose inhabitants are Jugoslavs, cannot be claimed by the Italians on the strength of the principle of nationality. Seton-Watson contends that the "extremists among the Jugoslavs" claim Trieste. As a matter of fact, in this question the Yugoslav Committee has the Yugoslav nation behind it to a man, and the programme of the committee is well known. Seton-Watson puts forward the same point of view in his pamphlet "The Balkans and the Adriatic." Yet he is obliged to admit that Trieste, detached from its Hinterland, would be economically doomed. It is a natural thing that economic factors are the consequence of geographical and ethnological conditions. An economical anomaly is also bound to be a political and national anomaly.

In his book "Nationality and the War," Arnold J. Toynbee devotes a whole chapter to Trieste, under the title "Trieste and Italy." It is characteristic of this writer, who often displays a striking degree of acumen side by side with a certain lack of detail, that he deals with the political future of the Slovenes in the same chapter. He is not very well acquainted with the past and present of Slovene politics and national existence, or with the part which the Slovenes are destined to play in the fate of the entire Yugoslav nation. But as regards Trieste, his judgment is perfectly

sound. Toynbee never doubts but that Trieste would have no future before her as an Italian city. "Trieste has a great future before her, and it is very important for the prosperity of Europe to keep unbroken all her economic links." He says quite plainly, that Italy's political economy ought to gravitate towards the Mediterranean, and not towards the Adriatic, as it does not belong to the economic sphere of the Adriatic. This is the reason why Trieste must not be handed over to Italy. Italy must be compensated elsewhere.

Fayle, in his "The Great Settlement," also deals with the problem of Trieste. Fayle does not know exactly the strength of the Yugoslav element in Trieste, and yet he lays stress upon the fact that the social claims of the Yugoslavs, no less than the economic relations between Trieste and its hinterland, must be considered (p. 147). Fayle advocates the creation of an open port, and even suggests a "purely self-governing" régime for Trieste.

These are the most important voices from England. British political literature is never quite free from the insular touch. In order to get a complete picture we must turn to the French publicists.

First and foremost, it is M. Ernest Denis, historian of the Sorbonne, who bravely enters the lists for the Yugoslavs. In his "La Grande Serbie" he says the following: "Certains

publicistes Italiens reclament ainsi pour leur pays non seulement Trieste, mais Rieka et même la plus grande partie de la Dalmatie. Leur programme, s'il était accepté par leur nation, préparerait à l'Europe les plus grands périls et à l'Italie les plus lamentables déboires " (p. 315). (" Certain Italian publicists thus demand for their country, not only Trieste but Rieka, and even the greater portion of Dalmatia. Their programme, if it were to be accepted by their nation, would prepare the gravest perils for Europe and most lamentable mortifications for Italy.") ;

The great danger of Italian Imperialism for Europe is energetically exposed in this sentence. With eloquent words Denis seeks to rouse the conscience of Italian democracy. " La Serbie, libre, intacte, entière, est une garantie de paix ; la Serbie, mutilée, injustement dépouillée de son domaine légitime, frustrée de prix naturel de ses efforts héroïques, est condamnée a une politique aventureuse de revanche." (" Serbia, free, intact, and complete, will be a guarantee of peace ; Serbia, mutilated, unjustly despoiled of her legitimate domain, debarred from the natural reward of her heroic efforts, will be condemned to an adventurous policy of *revanche*.") Denis exhorts Italy to refrain from engaging in a Bismarckian policy. Germany is approaching the abyss, and this in consequence of a mistaken policy of annexation, Denis has defended the

existence of the Slovenes of the Littoral with cordial eloquence. Ancient wrong and wrong about to be committed is always grievous, and the weighty words of the French historian are balm to the wounds from which the Slovenes are smarting.

Modern political literature contains few books on statistical problems which are written in so sprightly and interesting a manner as Arthur Chervin's "*L'Autriche et la Hongrie de demain.*" Chervin, late president of the Parisian Statistical Society, follows Nicederle's lead, in dwelling on the extreme importance of the Slovenes, whose task it is to prevent Germany from stretching from the North Sea, from the Belt, through to the Adriatic. Chervin, too, devotes an interesting chapter to Trieste. On the strength of statistic facts, Chervin proves the error of speaking of the "*italianità*" (Italian character) of Trieste. Chervin has the happy inspiration to quote Sonnino, who said on one occasion that to annex Trieste would be to carry the principle of nationality too far. But we will let M. Chervin speak for himself: "*Je pense donc, très sincèrement, qu'il serait préférable pour les intérêts Italiens de ne pas disputer Trieste aux Slaves du Sud, et que son internationalization serait une solution élégante, donnant pleine satisfaction à tout les intérêts en jeu.*" ("I therefore think, most sincerely, that it would be more advantageous to Italian interests not to contest the possession

of Trieste with the Jugoslavs, and that her internationalization would be an admirable solution, giving full satisfaction to all interests at stake.”)

The warm, cordial words of Chervin on behalf of the Slovenes remind us of the fact that it is to France that the Slovenes owe their first experience of the blessings of a well-ordered modern administration, and that the splendid administrators of the Illyrian provinces were true sons of France. Chervin, like Denis, earnestly warns the Italians of the dangers which an unjust peace will bring in its train.

It is Charles Vellay who, in his book “*La Question de l’Adriatique*,” most fully discusses Italo-Jugoslav relations. What a contrast between Vellay and those Italian publicists who accuse the Austrian Government of slavizing Trieste! Vellay’s point of view is altogether different. The fate of Trieste lies in the “*impassibilité inébranlable, qui donne au slavisme le caractère d’une sorte de loi naturelle et fatale, dont rien ne paraît pouvoir arrêter la marche*” (“the steadfast passivity which gives to Slavdom the character of a kind of natural and final law, which apparently nothing can check in its course”). Not the favour of the Government, but the inherent vitality and native strength of the Jugoslavs, has made Trieste into a semi-Slav town. It is to be hoped that Englishmen of the type of Mr. Marriott will make a note

of this. Vellay fully recognizes that Italy's present policy will create an Irredenta compared to which the difficulties which Austria has had to face in the Italians of the Littoral and the Trentine will appear mere child's play. Vellay's whole book is a strong warning to Italy. In his final summary the author advances the following principle: If the problem is to be justly solved, then Italy's political frontier must coincide with her national frontier. This is merely to restate in a different wording, that the Italians cannot claim anything beyond the Soca (Isonzo) frontier.

5. THE QUINTESSENCE OF THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM.

The problems of Trieste and the Slovene Littoral are only part of the general problem of the Adriatic. A closer analysis soon reveals that it is a mistake to try to keep these two problems separate, as people unfortunately sometimes attempt to do. Italy's endeavour to make the Adriatic into a mare clausum is only an extension of Italy's aspirations to the Littoral. The arguments put forward by Italy are almost the same in both cases. We stand in danger of merely repeating ourselves if we devote a few lines specially to the Adriatic problem.

The beautiful coast from Trieste to Kotor, with its picturesque fjords, and the marvellously

beautiful Dalmatian archipelago, is such an economic and scenic jewel that no nation could resign itself to its loss, let alone a nation of such impetuosity in political matters as the Yugoslavs. An endeavour to keep a people of this type shut off from the sea would be an act with incalculable consequences.

Now, what are the arguments by which Italy is trying to defend her action? They are both Nationalist and strategic.

Italian Nationalism is inspired throughout by historical tradition. The fact that Venice once ruled as she pleased in the Adriatic is exhaustively exploited. But did the ancient oligarchic Republic of Venice merit the name of a Nationalist State? Surely the old aristocratic republic was a most insidious foe to Italian unity, as defined by Machiavelli. What has ancient Venice to do with modern Nationalism? If Venetian *provveditori* misgoverned the Dalmatian Isles, and fleeced and oppressed the Yugoslav peasant, that certainly conveys no claim for an annexation. A new age has dawned, and nations have the right to direct their own destiny. The modern Italian State owes its existence to the political principles of the age. To annex a country and its inhabitants without consulting their wishes is a method of the past. Ask of the Yugoslavs whether they desire to become Italian citizens. Let a plebiscite decide the

problem over which Italians and Jugoslavs are divided.

We are often met by the argument that the Adriatic has never long had two masters, but that by a kind of historic law it was invariably the master of either the east or the west coast who was also lord of the Adriatic. A contention of this kind is always somewhat hazardous. Why should not two States share the possession of the Adriatic? The days when a *mare clausum* in peace time was justifiable are long dead and gone, and surely this is an appropriate moment to point out that it was precisely England which killed the principle of the *mare clausum* in her wars with the Spaniards and the Portuguese. And now the creation of a *mare clausum* in another part of the world is being seriously contemplated, and would certainly not be to the advantage and profit of English economy and sea-trade.

Now for the strategic point of view. Italy should be sole mistress of the Adriatic because her flat east coast is too exposed from a military point of view. But Italians cannot ignore the fact that a young State, even though numbering twelve million inhabitants, is bound, during the early period of its existence, to pass through most trying financial and administrative crises—the infantile diseases of a State, so to say. Have the Italians already forgotten the record of their

own first twenty years or so? And the United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes will have to face far greater crises than these. And is it likely that any nation will be in love with armaments after this war? Surely it is more probable that pacifist counsels will prevail and imperialistic programmes of armament meet with an international veto?

Most certainly Italy possesses important economic interests in the Ægean and in Asia Minor ; but surely it is not necessary for her to close a whole sea in order to have a base for military operations ! The great colonial peoples of the West, such as the English, have acted quite differently. First the trader entered the country, then the soldier and the official.

The strategic argument advanced by Italy shows even less sound common sense. In order to protect the east coast of Italy, the greater part of the Dalmatian coast is to become Italian, and Split and Dubrovnik (Ragusa) are to lie within range of Italian guns. The foundation upon which this argument rests is as weak as that other, demanding that Italy should occupy the Littoral for strategic reasons. But a glance at an orographic map will suffice to show that the Illyrian coast-land is not separated from the orographic system of the Balkans.

It is always best to be frank. Let the Italians confess that they need the sole control over the

Adriatic in order to economically dominate the Yugoslav State of the future. Yugoslavia is to be a dumping-ground for Italian industry, and Italian trade is to have the monopoly in the Balkans, so that the development of a native industry may be checked from the very outset. Perhaps they even think of directing the stream of Italian emigration towards the Balkans, and dotting the country with Italian colonies.

It is never wise to tell tales out of school. An Italian political economist, Mario Alberti by name, has explained why Italy must be sole mistress of the Adriatic. If Italy possesses the Adriatic it will be the leading Power in the Mediterranean; in other words, Italy requires the Adriatic as an Italian lake, in order to obtain the hegemony in the Mediterranean.

The Convention, a secret diplomatic treaty, whereby the Adriatic was handed over to Italy, was concluded at a time when (the spring of 1915) the Russian front in Poland had already begun to give way. It was extorted from Russia at the moment of a national and military catastrophe. But shall a treaty by which the fate of a million human beings is decided not be amenable to the same laws which apply to every ordinary private contract?

Is it not an immeasurable tragedy, that by the signature under a secret treaty more than a million human beings are to be annexed against

their will, and the Yugoslav State to be exposed to a position of constant economic and political peril? Do not these considerations bring us back to the idea that secret diplomatic treaties are a disease in politics? Can European democracy permit this abrogation of the sovereign right of nations?

In one of the most distinguished English reviews a pro-Italian writer has just expressed the view that England should not interfere in the difference between Italians and Yugoslavs. In this case the English should take it that silence is golden. If the advice of the above-mentioned writer is taken there will in the future be a new Alsace-Lorraine on the Adriatic. But there was the French population of Alsace-Lorraine, no more than 210,000, and it caused European unrest. In Germany is a Danish Question, although there are only 160,000 Danes. We had thought that in this age the sense of national justice was alive. But he who turns a deaf ear to the cry of the oppressed is likewise guilty of a terrible injustice. What has it profited England that in time past she has always sided with the Turks against the Balkan nations? In the World War Germany, England's greatest enemy, was mistress at the Golden Horn, and Britain lost a hundred thousand of her best and bravest in killed and wounded in Gallipoli. Only a just and generous policy, which is never deaf to the voice of the oppressed, is truly practical and therefore successful.

CHAPTER XII

SLOVENE ECONOMICS¹

IT is not possible to arrive at a correct understanding of the Austrian Nationalist struggles unless they are considered from the standpoint of economic interest. These struggles did not centre merely around the official language, public notices, and similar matter, but around the *State*, and Slav influence in the State, which, of course, under Slav guidance would have led the Slavs towards economic prosperity.

The Germano-Magyar monarchy had no interest in furthering the development of the Slavs ; nay, on the contrary, it actually strove to compass the economic ruin of Croatia. It is interesting to observe the effect produced upon the various Slav nationalities by a monarchy so constituted. The Czechs, without in the least considering the State, strongly developed their own national economic resources with a view to strengthening

¹ The following article and MSS. were utilized by the author in writing this chapter, viz. : Josip Agnetto, "Gospodarski položaj Slovencev," *Veda*, vol. iv., and two anonymous papers in MS.

their national position. The Slovenes followed the lead of the Czechs on a more modest scale, yet in a manner not to be disregarded, for they were not slow to realize that their Nationalist struggle would remain barren of result so long as they failed to bring economic resources to bear upon the issue. And they proceeded to create their own national economic system after the Czech pattern.

Economically speaking, the Slovenes are to this day a nation of peasants. Seventy-five per cent. of the population belong to the peasant class. To this day agricultural districts form the greater part of the Slovene lands, and it is a significant fact that from 91·6 to 99·9 per cent. of the peasant properties are small-holdings or minor properties up to 50 hectares. The Slovenes are not a nation of great landlords ; the land is fairly equally and justly divided, and under improved economic conditions this will prove a basis for a high standard of average prosperity. The largest estates are to be found in Carinthia, and the smallest in Istria, where their smallness tends to render farming unprofitable. The average Slovene peasant property is of such size that the owner and his family are sufficient to work it. The Carinthian and Styrian farmers are the wealthiest, yet ground rent is highest in the Littoral.

Hops are most profitably cultivated in the Slovene part of Styria. No less than 3,559 estates

grow hops, and a very considerable proportion of the Austrian hop produce is of Slovene origin.

Cattle farming is especially developed in the Slovene Alpine districts, where this branch of farming is capable of great further development. Styrian cattle farming is far ahead of the cattle farming in other Austrian provinces. Cattle farming is least developed in the Littoral, where the farming, except in the hill-country, bears an entirely local character.

Owing to the favourable climatic conditions of the Littoral, farming presents many peculiar features there. The culture is the most intensive in all Austria. Sub-tropical fruits, vineyards, horticulture—these are the resources of the Istrian farming population.

If Gorica and Gradiska were to be annexed by Italy, both would be financially ruined. Neither county possesses any local industry worthy of notice, and 80 per cent. of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits. Wine and fruits are the only exports. In 1913 these two counties produced a million hectolitres of wine, and almost one-half of the total was exported. The cost of the production of wine is twice as high in the Littoral as in Lower Italy. If these districts were to come under Italian rule, the local wine industry would speedily be crushed by Italian competition, and viticulture in Gorica and Gradiska would consequently have to cease.

But this would entail the closing of one of the most important sources of wealth to the inhabitants, and the whole rural population of the two counties would be fatally impoverished. Economic ruin would be all the more certain as the local fruit-growers would be equally handicapped in competing with the Italian fruit-growers.

But the abandonment of wine and fruit growing for some other form of industry would be attended by exceptional difficulty in the Littoral ; because there are parts of the country, such as, for instance, the Brda, the Vipava Valley, the Kras, and parts of Istria, where the soil is quite unsuited to any form of cultivation but wine and fruit growing, where cattle farming could never be made to yield even a living, and corn can only be grown at a loss.

So far the use of machinery in agriculture is not at all widespread in the Slovene lands, and, indeed, the prevalence of small-holdings in Gorica and Istria is not favourable to its introduction. The introduction of agricultural machinery in Upper Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia would undoubtedly increase the productivity of the soil in these districts.

Trade and industry are yet in their infancy in the Slovene lands, although the beginnings of their development date back as far as the seventies. In those days were founded the Carniolian Industrial Company, the Leykam-Josephsthal Joint

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Stock Company (1870), the coal-mines of Trbovlje (1872), and the Pliberk Mining Company (1870). But all these great concerns are financed almost exclusively with German capital. This influx of German capital constituted an extremely grave danger to the Slovenes, and it is of the greatest importance that English and French money markets should begin to take an interest in industrial enterprise in Slovene territory. A strong argument in favour of these assertions is the fact that of the total capital of 119,000,000 kr. which is invested in industrial concerns in the Slovene lands and Dalmatia, only a negligible fraction is of Slovene or Croat origin. There are 165 joint-stock companies in the Slovene lands, with a total share capital of 191,000,000 crowns. In 1903 there were 1,506 industrial concerns in the Slovene lands, and in 1911 this number had already increased to 1,924. This is surely in itself sufficient proof that the initial stages of industrial development have been successfully passed in the Slovene lands.

It would also be a mistake to assume that the industrial possibilities of the Slovene lands—with the exception of the Littoral—are incapable of considerable further development. These countries are rich in coal deposits, and exceptionally rich in other mineral deposits and mines. One of the greatest mercury mines in the world is the Idrija mine in Carniola.

Unfortunately, wholesale manufacture is mostly in foreign hands ; the small industry, on the other hand, is exclusively Slovene. The industrial statistics of Carniola show that 88·85 per cent. of the industrial concerns in the province do not employ more than five workmen. Concerns of medium size amount to one-third of the whole number, and the percentage of wholesale manufactures is only 2·15.

Thus the Slovenes possess a typical class of small industrial owners and workers comparable to the owners of small-holdings among the peasant class. The small manufacturer in Carniola usually employs motors driven by water power, the total number of which amounts to almost one-third of the number of motors of this type employed by the small manufacturers in Bohemia.

The Slovene lands possess an inexhaustible reservoir of water-power which can be tapped for industrial purposes. This, the water-power of an Alpine country, is in itself a guarantee of great industrial possibilities.

In some ways the lack of industrial enterprise on a large scale has led to evil consequences. By the agrarian crisis the agricultural class was compelled to seek industrial employment, and as the local demand for industrial labour was not sufficiently great, emigration offered the only solution. The Slovene peasant farmer either becomes an industrial labourer in the mines of

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Upper Styria or is compelled to seek employment beyond the ocean. Whole districts have thus become depopulated by emigration. The Vienna Parliament showed itself incapable of directing the stream of emigration into the right channels and thus warding off the great social loss entailed by it.

At the present day, 75·4 out of every 100 Slovenes are landowners, 13·4 belong to the industrial class, 7·7 are in Government employ, and only 3·5 are in trade. Slovene commerce is unfortunately still very undeveloped, although—especially in Trieste—Slovene commercial enterprise has made great progress. That Slovene commerce is not more developed is largely the fault of the Government, which declined to grant the Slovenes a commercial college until they perforce created their own system of commercial schools in Trieste.

The Slovene has great natural aptitude and talent for business, and most certainly the Slovenes are capable of developing a capable, reliable, and efficient commercial class. With one of the world's harbours, such as Trieste, in their hands, the Slovene would speedily develop his commercial abilities to the full.

The commercial rise of Trieste has been truly phenomenal during recent years. The import and export of the harbour of Trieste amounted to 7·17 million quintals in 1860, to 30 million quintals in 1905, and in 1909 it even rose to

50·5 million quintals. The development of Trieste has made, especially, great strides since the new Alpine railway was completed. The town also possesses several great industries connected with the working-up of the imported raw materials, such as rice, paraffin, iron, and oil ; and Triestine ship-building, both of men-of-war and trading vessels, affords employment to thousands of workmen.

Fiume could not easily become a dangerous rival of Trieste. It is true that the harbour of Fiume possesses certain not inconsiderable advantages, but in comparison with that of Trieste it is far too small to compete successfully with it, and the enlargement of the harbour of Fiume would cost many millions. Even if this expense were incurred it would still be far from certain that the whole overseas trade of the Yugoslav lands could be directed through Fiume. Moreover, the next generation of Yugoslavs in Fiume will still lack the necessary stock of experienced business men with commercial relations with foreign places. Neither could the local banking system be developed sufficiently to support the financial business of a great trading centre. Experienced officials and skilled qualified labour would likewise be lacking. In short, the idea that Fiume could be made the rival of Trieste must be supposed as being fraught with many difficulties.

Should Italy's political influence rule the Adriatic, Italy would easily succeed in controlling

the Yugoslav markets with the products of her own industries ; and owing to the advantageous conditions of freighting the products of Italian industry would be in a position to exclude British competition altogether. Italian industry is making unprecedented headway, especially in the provinces which will adjoin the Yugoslav lands in the future, and with its many ramifications might easily gain complete possession of the whole Yugoslav market. If Trieste is given to Italy and Italy rules the Adriatic, the indispensable preliminary conditions for the creation of Yugoslav national industry will be discounted from the very outset, and Yugoslav trade and industry placed absolutely at the mercy of Italy.

Even so Italy has already established herself so firmly in the harbours of the eastern Adriatic that not many opportunities are left for the British and French mercantile fleets. In 1912 the total tonnage of the shipping that entered the harbour of Trieste amounted to 4·6 million tons, and the total tonnage that left the harbour to 4·7 million tons. Of these, 4,336,000 tons sailed under the Austrian flag, 1,795,000 under the Italian, and only 490,000 under the British flag. If Trieste were handed over to Italy, these proportions would doubtless be greatly modified in Italy's favour. If, however, the eastern Adriatic is given to the Yugoslavs, the share taken to-day by the French, and especially the British mercantile fleets

in the trade of Trieste will be greatly increased at the expense of those of other nations.

It is difficult to understand the Slovene national struggle and Slovene economic development without a due appreciation of the Slovene co-operative system, which owes its existence to Michael Vosnjak. Michael Vosnjak, Slovene leader and political economist, began to organize Slovene capital in mutual loan societies. So long as Slovene capital was deposited in German and Italian loan societies and banks it was easy to maintain that only the Germans and Italians had any capital at their disposal. Under the co-operative system the Slovene peasants and artisans were enabled to obtain credit on easy terms, and thus rendered independent of German and Italian capital and of the system of oppressive denationalization. The co-operative organization of Slovene capital became a powerful weapon in the national struggle against both Germans and Italians. In almost all the larger towns on the linguistic frontier Slovene financial concerns founded "hostels for the people," which soon became the centres of the various Nationalist organizations. They also assisted Nationalist unions and schools, and founded bursaries for colleges and secondary schools. It is almost impossible to imagine the Slovene Nationalist struggle without the part played in it by the Slovene co-operative societies. In 1883 Vosnjak

inaugurated a union of the Slovene loan societies. This was the third union of the kind to be formed in Austria, and for a long time the only one of its kind in Southern Austria. Vosnjak's institution became the pattern for similar foundations in all the Austrian Yugoslav lands, and both Slovene and Croatian capital is represented in it.

In 1910 there were 1,207 co-operative societies in the Slovene lands, 952 of which were purely Slovene. The total capital deposited with these co-operative societies amounted to 365,000,000 kr., and their reserve funds to 137,000,000 kr. About 750,000,000 kr. are invested in Slovene joint-stock companies and limited liability companies or deposited with mutual loan societies. Throughout the Slovene lands the average sum of invested capital per inhabitant amounts to 350 kr., which is only slightly below the Austrian minimum. In 1905 the deposits with the loan societies alone amounted to 314 kr. in Carniola, and in Carinthia to 222 kr., against an average of 233 in Bohemia. The increase from 1902 to 1905 amounted to 6·7 per cent. in Styria, to 11·3 per cent. in Carinthia, to 4·8 per cent. in Carniola, and only to 10·3 per cent. in Bohemia. This is proof conclusive that Slovene prosperity is steadily increasing.

The rise of the co-operative system was followed by a promising development of the Slovene bank system. In the Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka and the Jadranska Banka the Slovenes

possess two important banking concerns. Within a few years the Ljubljanska Kreditna Banka increased its capital from 1,000,000 kr. to 8,000,000 kr. The deposits amount to 30,000,000-40,000,000 kr., and the annual turnover was something like 3,000,000 kr. The Jadranska Banka in Trieste is a comparatively recent institution, but it already occupies an important and respected position in the Triestine exchange. Many German and Italian firms have been financed by the Jadranska Banka.

Before the foundation of the Jadranska Banka there was only one local bank in Trieste, the Italian Banca Commerciale Triestina. All other banks were merely branches of Viennese houses. In consequence of its slow business methods the Banca Commerciale scarcely succeeded in increasing its invested capital to 8,000,000 kr. within the course of half a century, and in the end found itself obliged to amalgamate with the Wiener Bankverein in such a way that the whole management passed into the hands of the Viennese concern. Thus it may truthfully be said that Trieste possesses but one independent local bank, which is the Jadranska Banka. In consequence of the rapid prosperity of the Jadranska Banka, two great Czech banks, the Zivnostenska Banka in Prague and the Ustrednc Banka, decided to found branch establishments in Trieste, with the result that the Slav banks have become a

strong factor on the Triestine Exchange, and that the German economic *Drang* towards the Adriatic found a dangerous and successful rival in Slav capital.

The beauty of the Slovene Alps, of the sea-coast, the wealth of scenic beauty to be found in the Slovene lands is such that with but little effort the tourist traffic could be developed into a considerable source of income for the country. As soon as the capital for the required investments is available, and the tourist can be assured of the necessary comforts, the Slovene lands are certain to become an important centre of the European tourist traffic. Nature herself has provided the preliminary conditions, and the natives, who are industrious and exceptionally well fitted for the working of hotels, etc., will take readily to this new avocation. In the Alpine countries several tourists' hostels have already been founded which experience no difficulty in successfully competing with foreign inns. The Slovene lands may yet become a favourite tourist resort; the beauty of the landscape certainly warrants such a forecast.

A nation cannot fully and freely develop its native economic resources unless it is politically and financially independent. Handicapped by their unremittent struggle for bare national existence, the Slovenes have not been able to

progress as rapidly as their own native ability and the geographical position of their country warrant. But if they were united with the other Yugoslavs, the Slovenes would soon prove that they possess the necessary material for developing into a powerful economic factor.

The geographical position of the Slovene lands is unique ; they form an unrivalled link between the Teutonic north and the Italian and Yugoslav south. Great political and economic interests are bound up with the ownership of these lands. Capital of the allied nations has not even begun the exploitation of these territories, which are still, comparatively speaking, virgin soil as regards industrial development. And yet this would be an enterprise which could only benefit their general economic evolution. Moreover, important political considerations come into play here, which weigh heavily in the balance.

The territory between the Drave and the Adriatic is a dyke holding back the tide of Germanism. It is of vital interest to the allied nations that this dyke should be proof against attack, and that the German spring tide should not be strong enough to break it down and penetrate into the Balkans, and turn the latter into a province conquered by German capital, and part of a German Empire extending as far as Bagdad. It would inflict a most severe set-back on Germany's economic schemes of

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conquest if the northern Adriatic territories were drawn into the economic sphere of the allied nations. If England and France help in ousting Germany politically and economically from the Adriatic, they will have struck a great blow at German schemes of world-domination. There are few spots in Europe where this could be done with equal effect.

In all this we must not forget that the small nation of Slovenes, exposed to remorseless national, political, and economic pressure, has, *for more than one thousand years*, contrived successfully to withstand the German *Drang* towards Trieste, and to frustrate the completion of the German bridge from the Belt to the Adriatic. What may not be expected of a nation which achieved thus much in bondage, when once it is accorded the possibility of a free development of all its ethical and economic resources!

But if the Powers permit the Slovenes to be weakened, if they are rendered incapable of offering stout resistance by having part of their territory added to foreign States, they will no longer be able to fulfil their mission of forming a protective dyke against Germany. An unjust preference of Italy and the breaking up of Slovene or any other Yugoslav territory would merely create a conflict between the Yugoslavs and Italy, a conflict which would impair the Yugoslav capacity for holding back Pan-

Germanism—an inevitable conflict which would provide opportunities by which Germany could not fail to profit and to use the rift in the Yugoslav territory to reach Trieste by that road, with the net result that in the end neither Italy nor the Yugoslavs would be masters of Trieste. Only a strong and united Jugoslavia is equal to the task allotted to it, of checkmating German influence in the Adriatic.

A Jugoslavia whose western branch, the Slovenes, is to suffer serious injury—the amputation of a right arm, so to say, not merely a minor, harmless operation, as many people seem to think—would, in its weakened condition, scarcely be able to hold back the might of Germany. The Slovene territory is the closing link in the chain which is to enclose the German economic territory. Shorn of any essential part of its territory, the western branch of the Yugoslavs would not be in a position to fulfil their historic mission, and for want of support from within, the north-western part of the great dyke would be flooded and destroyed; yet not only the Yugoslavs would suffer by this, but also France and England, and with them all that part of Europe which is at present fighting against German predominance. The vital interests of France and England, foremost among the States who are conducting the struggle against Germany's effort to make herself mistress

of the world, imperatively demand that the Jugoslavs shall be rendered economically strong to resist the German onslaught, the terrific force of which the Great War has disclosed to the world.

CHAPTER XIII

THE JUGOSLAV IDEA

ON the threshold of the twentieth century the old Habsburg Monarchy found itself confronted with an ominous problem. Like a terrible spectre the *Jugoslav Question* arose before the eyes of the Viennese potentates. No one had the courage boldly to grasp the nettle and to find a sound solution of the problem. And yet the very existence of the Monarchy was at stake. As Vienna was not capable of grappling with a full solution, attempts were made to put down the movement by petty methods. Secret police officials, informers, and the State prosecutor usurped the office of the statesmen. The Zagreb (Agram) High Treason Trial, and the Friedjung Case were signs and tokens in the heavens, premonitions of the coming storm.

So long as Jugoslav national feeling was weak, the effects of the Dualism were not yet aggressively obvious. During the first decades of its existence, it did not yet assume the definite form of a Magyar hegemony. Croatia was still treated with comparative clemency. But in proportion

as the political centre of gravity in the Monarchy was shifted to Budapest, the tremendous mistake of this constitutional system became increasingly apparent. Dr. Lueger, Mayor of Vienna, was the greatest enemy of the Magyar element. Gifted with true political insight, he realized that the Magyars were tampering with the stability of the State, and like a true parasite nation, would eventually bring the Monarchy to rack and ruin.

As Germany became a world-Power, she showed herself increasingly desirous of an alliance with the Magyars. Even Bismarck had already sought to employ the Magyars for his own ends. German and Magyar Junkerdom, the German and Magyar policy of oppression, were splendidly suited to one another; both politically and socially these two mentalities were admirably calculated to supplement each other. The policy of force in Berlin and the policy of force in Budapest—each suited the other.

Already Berlin and Budapest believed that they had almost achieved their object of corrupting and crushing the Jugoslavs. Croatia's autonomy was treated as a dangerous fiction, which was no longer in accordance with practical politics. The Slovenes were wholly taken up with absurd party conflicts, and had temporarily forgotten the great Yugoslav aims. In Belgrade, Magyarism turned the Serbian House of

Obrenovic into a pliant agency. Serbia was corrupted, and a foreign policy which was both pro-German and pro-Magyar reduced the country to a state of almost complete dependence upon Budapest.

But with the accession of the Karageorgevici, all the calculations of the Magyars were doomed to miscarry, for the emancipation of the Serbian land and people began in earnest, and Serbia developed with fresh and youthful vigour. The Croats began successfully to resist the Magyar policy of brute force and violence.

In consequence of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina several million more Jugoslavs came into closer political touch with the Austrian Slavs, and the solution of the Yugoslav problem within the Monarchy became an immediate necessity. But this would have meant the sacrifice of the Dualism.

The Magyars knew very well that within a few years the Monarchy would have to concede a new political status to the Jugoslavs; when Germany assumed her bellicose attitude, the Magyars were convinced that a successful war was the only means of crushing the Jugoslavs. And here lies the reason why Germany's aggressive war-policy found such an enthusiastic echo in Hungary, which is equally guilty with Germany of the horrors of the World-War.

In this connection it is a matter of interest to

explain how the Yugoslav Question gradually matured in the Monarchy. It is no exaggeration, but a statement in accordance with facts, to say, that no idea possesses greater importance for a correct estimate of Croatian conditions than this—that *Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs form one nation, as regards their racial, intellectual and mental life; in other words, they form one "culture-nation."* Needless to say, we are here adopting that terminology which discriminates between "culture-nations" and "State-nations." Within a very short time the idea that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes form one "culture-nation" has gained general acceptance, and the Serbs living within the confines of the triple kingdom have likewise shown themselves equally ready to accept their adhesion to the Croatian "State-nation." But it is necessary to go into the past in order to prove that the Idea of Unity is not an ephemeral product of the politics of the day.

The true and traditional name of both Serbs and Croats was not originally that of the politically differentiated Serb and Croat "State-nation," but that of a people who called themselves the *Slovinci*, without regard to political allegiance. The division into separate State forms by no means destroyed the ethnical and ethical unity of the "culture-nation," and although it is true that in past centuries this unity became somewhat obscured, yet it

reasserted itself with full vigour in the nineteenth century. The Illyrist movement was only a first, unsuccessful attempt to give this unity a new form. But this attempt was succeeded by two others which proved of the greatest importance for the party-formation among the Jugoslavs.

In 1849 Vuk Karadjic published his treatise "Srbi svi i svuda" ("Serbs all and everywhere") in the *Kovcedjic*, a journal appearing in Vienna. In this treatise he advocated the view that all Jugoslavs are Serbs, and speak the Serbian tongue. As a matter of fact, Vuk Karadjic merely voiced the Idea of Unity in his article, but in a crudely extremist form, since, logically speaking, it denied the existence of the Croats. It is distinctly one of history's ironies that this very Idea of Unity gave rise to some of the sharpest conflicts between Croats and Serbs.

On the Croatian side it was Ante Starcevic who propounded a formula, which likewise expressed the idea of unity, but involved the negation of the Serbs. The whole train of thought of both these men may be summed up in the following sentence. Vuk Karadjic was convinced that *all* Jugoslavs were Serbians, and Ante Starcevic was convinced that *all* were simply Croatians. But it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that both men must be considered pioneers of the movement in favour of Unity.

Still, a considerable period had to elapse ere

the time was ripe ; and the passionate dissensions, whose true cause lay in a distorted conception of a sociological idea, could not fail greatly to injure the Yugoslav cause. But it was of the utmost consequence that the true conception of the Idea of Unity—complete national equality for both parties, absolute unity of the “ culture-nation ” and differentiation between the national and the politico-constitutional standpoint—should win recognition at the very moment when the Croato-Hungarian Union was beginning to lose its power of attraction. The unity of Serbs and Croats became the fundamental idea, the most characteristic feature of the modern spirit of Croatia, the vital nerve of her national life of to-day.

For the better understanding of our subsequent exposition it is necessary to indicate in a few brief sentences how it is that we can speak of a Croatian supremacy in the Yugoslav world at this juncture, at the time when the old Croatian State had to give place to the Nationalist State. The year 1848 marks the division between the two periods. At that time the Croats were in every way in advance of the rest of the Yugoslavs. The primitive state organism of the Serbs had scarcely yet developed the full character of a *State*, the Bulgars were unknown even to philologists and their country was a Turkish province. At that time the Croats

were the only Jugoslavs possessing both an aristocracy and a middle class, the only Jugoslavs who could look back upon an uninterrupted administrative history, and with whom all spheres of social life were equally developed. The Croats were a nation possessing political, intellectual, and social traditions tinged with certain aristocratic leanings.

First of all, it is from an economic point of view that the year 1848 marks a turning-point in Croatian history. The agrarian reforms brought an economic revolution in their train which was fatal to the fortunes of the great aristocratic landlords, and above all to the landed gentry. Apart from this the new, centralistic county constitution could not fail to break the political prestige of the aristocracy in the County Assemblies. On the one hand the financial ruin of the aristocracy led to widespread democratization in public life ; but the most important result of this economic process was a thorough democratization of all social conditions, and above all, of politics. From being a people of aristocratic traditions the Croats became a democratic peasant nation, with the inevitable consequence that the social rift between them and the Slovenes and Serbs, whose chief characteristic is the absence of a socially privileged class, was now automatically bridged over. Thus this democratization became a strong factor in the development of Yugoslav aspirations towards unity.

Contemporaneous with these reforms another change took place which seriously affected the old State Constitution. This second change was mainly of a political nature. The indispensable pre-condition of unionism with Hungary is the State, in which all classes are represented, with the balance of power in the hands of the aristocracy. The union between two such States, linked together by a non-national State language, was bound to break down as soon as the "class State" was compelled to give place to the national State, and the universalist culture of intellectual enlightenment was transformed into national culture. The instinctive animosity displayed by the Unionist elements towards Illyrism, which was an intellectual Nationalist campaign, was perfectly logical from this point of view. The difficulties by which Unionism is to-day beset date from the moment when the "estates of the realm," especially in Croatia, were transformed into a national and democratic State; for the Union undeniably still partakes of the nature of the old "estates of the realm," being based on treaties and compromises.

For the conception of even the possibility of the existence of a union between the two kingdoms of the Crown of St. Stephen, it is of paramount importance to realize what value one purposes to attach to the cessation of the class State as a factor for disruption.

To every man understanding the conditions of

the Slav south it was clear that a consolidation of the political life of the Balkan Slavs would profoundly affect the relations of the Yugoslavs to the Monarchy. The Balkan War was the great event which transformed a petty provincialism into proud political self-consciousness. In order to grasp the full import of these events we would point out that no national-political union was ever compassed with such impetuous vigour as that of the Balkan peoples. The Italians unified their State more or less because of military reverses and with foreign help. In Germany the constitution of the Union was the fruit of long and slow development. With the Balkan peoples this spontaneous outburst of energy was utterly unexpected.

It is important to point out the effect exercised by the formation of the two great Nationalist polities of the nineteenth century upon the Austrian Italians and Germans. Before the political unification of Italy there was no Italian Nationalism in Austria. The beginnings of an Italian movement with strictly Nationalist aims do not go back beyond the sixties. A far more disastrous effect, however, was exercised upon the fate of Austria by the unification of Germany. It is certainly in keeping with subsequent facts that Hohenwart and Schäffle would have carried through a Federalist Constitution if France had not so ignominiously broken down in 1870.

Whilst the problem of Serbo-Croat unity

occupied the chief place of interest from the very first, Slovene party politics stood aside for a long time. They were the indispensable third party in the alliance. In the past century the ideal of Pan-Slavism was the very factor which belittled the importance of Yugoslav unity. This great all-Slav ideal, conceived on lines of gigantic and far-reaching scope, for a long time forced the more practical, realizable Yugoslav idea into the background. Here in the south Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs dwelt side by side ; all were threatened by one common foe, all were at the same stage of social development. Compared to this tiny reality, Panslavism was a beautiful dream ; but the great differentiation between such Slav nations as already possessed ancient intellectual and political traditions rendered the realization of an immense all-Slav macrocosm difficult. When in 1908, at the All-Slav Congress in Prague, Russians and Poles joined hands in the spirit of reconciliation, a very significant thing occurred. The Slovene, Croatian, and Serbian members of the Congress joined together in a Yugoslav group, so that a united Yugoslav group appeared beside the Russian, Polish, Czech, and Bulgarian groups.

Although true brotherly cordiality has always existed between Slovenes and Croats, the Dualism provided an insurmountable barrier between them, dividing the Slovenes from the Croats. Up to the beginning of the present century their mutual

relations were mainly formal—many words and few deeds. On the Slovene side it was that admirable scientific and literary institution, the “*Matica Slovenska*,” which established the much-needed mutual intercourse and rekindled the interest in the necessary preparation for future intellectual unity. The Slovene scientific journal *Veda* fulfils the highly important task of drawing the intellectual circles of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs closer together. It became the rule for all professional and trade journals to appear simultaneously both in Slovene and Croatian.

All this progress in the mutual relations between Slovenes and Croats was due to the efforts of the younger generation, which gradually began to dominate public life. The young men of the Sloveno-Serbo-Croats, the men who were responsible for the publication of the *Nase Doba* in Prague—these began to exercise an ever-increasing influence in public affairs. In Croatia the Serbo-Croat Coalition, a result of the ideas of the new generation, scored a political triumph. The old Magyarophil Party was crushed, and on the ruins of the so-called Unionist Party the idea of Serbo-Croatian unity developed with ever-increasing vitality. Among the Slovenes the dead point was passed a little later, and with them it was not so much in the life of party politics as in the world of science and journalism that the new Yugoslav idea made vigorous headway. In this revival of

the Yugoslav idea among the Slovenes the publicist activity of the *Veda* proved a decisive factor.

Nor must the importance of several other new links between the Slovene lands and Zagreb (Agram) be under-estimated. Slovene scientific men were called to the University in Zagreb, and this introduced a totally new element into the mutual relations between Croats and Slovenes. In Zagreb, Slovene professors lectured to Bosnians, Dalmatians, and Istrians. The idea of Yugoslav unity showed ever clearer upon the horizon, and the idea of Yugoslav solidarity found its way to the heart of the Slovene intellectual classes, irresistibly, like one of Nature's forces.

When in 1913 a Slovene University lecturer in Prague attempted to criticize the new Yugoslav movement he met with an energetic and unmistakable refusal on the part of the Slovene academic world. Everybody realized that the days of Slovene particularism were numbered, and that Slovene national life imperatively needed the strong support of its Yugoslav brothers. What were one and a half million Slovenes—politically and economically weak—in the gigantic struggle which presently broke out between Germanism and Slavism? Only a united Yugoslav element could hope to count at all in this conflict. The World-War and the terrible power of Pan-Germanism, which would undoubtedly have utterly crushed the Slovenes, have proved to what a degree the new

Jugoslav idea had become an inevitable necessity, one might almost say a dictate of Nature.

The fundamental principle of this idea, as it has taken root among the Slovenes, is admirably defined in a resolution passed by the younger Slovene intellectuals in 1913, and which runs as follows :—

“ As it is a fact that we, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, constitute a compact linguistic and ethnical group, with similar economic conditions, and so indissolubly linked by common fate on a common territory that not one of the three can aspire to a separate future, and in consideration of the fact that among the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs the Yugoslav national thought is even to-day strongly developed, we have extended our national sentiments beyond our frontier to the Croats and Serbs, just as among them also the idea of national reciprocity with the Slovenes is spread abroad. By this we all become members of one united Yugoslav nation. This is the spirit by which all Jugoslavs must be animated. As regards the Slovenes, we would lay special stress upon the fact that the evolution of their sense of national responsibility towards the creation of the broad foundations of Jugoslavdom, is already to-day greatly strengthening their resistance against denationalization and foreign Imperialism.”

But not only the intellectuals, whose influence was already making itself felt in public life, but

also the academic youth in the high schools and secondary schools was energetically drawn to the Yugoslav ideal. Numerous periodicals appeared, edited by high school students, and devoted to the cause of Yugoslav propaganda. In many an impassioned article the folly of Slovene party politics was held up to obloquy, the pettiness of local interests ridiculed, the great original strength of the Yugoslav idea eulogized. A new spirit manifested itself in the Slovene intellectual world. It seemed as though it were inspired by new energy and a new optimism. The apathetic indolence, the heavy pessimism of the last twenty years suddenly seemed to have yielded to a sturdy national self-consciousness. The spirit of decadence which had invaded Slovene literature was almost swept away by a strong wave of a clean new nationalism. But not only the world of intellect, the masses also began to adopt the idea of Yugoslav unity with growing energy and devotion. Upon the masses the victories of the Balkan Alliance during the first Balkan War created a most profound impression. The call of the blood and the claim of the race were overpowering. Now men realized that both intellectuals and common people were being welded together by the irresistible force of a living idea.

It would be wrong to assume that from the outset this train of thought had been such as to be hostile to a peaceful evolution. There were

different aspects to the Yugoslav idea. The unification of the Serbs and Croats of the Monarchy in one single administrative unit was certainly a political idea, but it was a thoroughly loyal conception throughout, and free from even the slightest trace of Irredentism. On the contrary, the constitutional reform entailed by uniting the Slovene lands, the Kingdom of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, would have proved of immense advantage to the Monarchy. Such a step would—so people believed—have pacified the southern provinces, it would have put an end to a state of constant political tension, contributed to an improvement in Austrian foreign politics, and, finally, obviated the catastrophe of 1914-15. This was the opinion of many Germans.

The minority of the Yugoslavs live outside the Monarchy. It is impossible that a political frontier should completely divide sons of one and the same race. The Germans of Austria and Germany maintain a close relationship, and as regards artistic and intellectual life, the political frontier is non-existent. Is there any such frontier between the French cantons in Switzerland and Italy? And yet none the less both French and Italian Swiss are loyal citizens of Switzerland.

The Monarchy ought to have permitted the Yugoslavs on both sides of her frontier to enjoy similar intellectual reciprocity. Intellectual reciprocity between peoples inhabiting different States

is the most ordinary thing in the world. But the Austrian Germans and Magyars were much too fanatical and obstinate to realize this, and the most absurd police regulations frustrated every chance of continuous intellectual intercourse between the Jugoslavs of the Monarchy and Serbia. The most innocuous Belgrade journals were stopped in Semlin, and it was almost considered tantamount to high treason to profess the belief in Yugoslav cultural unity.

When Austria mobilized in 1914, all Slovenes who were known to be adherents of the Yugoslav idea were arrested and imprisoned, although no acts of high treason could be proved against them. It was proof enough for the Austrian myrmidons if a man owned to being a Yugoslav. The victims belonged to the social *élite* of the Slovenes, and were representative of every class in society, from University professors to board-school teachers, from mill-owners to peasants.

The mighty manifestation of Yugoslav national sentiment during recent years preceding the outbreak of the World-War was a curious and significant sign of the times. It was a premonition of the titanic struggle which was in preparation and was soon to flood Europe with a sea of blood. The Jugoslavs were compelled to admit: "*Tua res agitur!*" The World-War must entail the solution of the Yugoslav Question, seeing that it was largely conditioned by the antagonism between Germans and Jugoslavs.

There is still one question open. The days of Slovene particularism are numbered. But what is to become of Slovene literature and the Slovene language? And will the latter have to yield to the Serbo-Croat tongue? Compulsion must not decide these questions. Practical considerations will prove so strong that without compulsion, simply, and in the natural course of events, they will bring about complete fusion in the future, coupled with due protection of all that is individual.

CHAPTER XIV

THE STRUGGLE FOR INTELLECTUAL LIFE

AFTER the loss of their political independence and down to the end of the Middle Ages, the Slovenes could not continue the development of their literature, the beginnings of which are shown in the records of the eleventh century. Two great movements of world-wide importance have also been decisive for the life of Slovene literature, the Reformation and the French Revolution. The three great Yugoslav reformers, Trubar, Vergerius, and Flaccius Illyricus, were all three natives of the Sloveno-Croatian lands. Trubar is not the strongest personality among these three men—he was not in such close connection with the leaders of the Reformation as Vergerius ; but Trubar is the creator of the Slovene literary language, and his rôle is the same as that of Luther as regards the Germans. The Slovene translation of the Bible is an event of unique moment for the national life of the Slovenes. The first Slovene books were printed in 1550, and that same year saw the establishment of the first printing press in Ljubljana. The first Slovene grammar was

published in 1584 by Adam Bohoric, and the first Slovene dictionary was published in 1592.

The Reformation was an intellectual renaissance for the Slovenes. The foundations of a new national life were prepared by the religious movement which had Nationalist consequences. But this resurrection was soon stifled by the will of the House of Habsburg, for whom the interests of the Church were those of the Dynasty. Meantime the seed was not lost.

During the years in which the French Revolution was preparing there was a very strong and active literary movement in the Slovene lands. A circle of literary men was gathered together in the house of Zois, one of the most learned mineralogists of his day, who was in communication with many French contemporary scientific men. The most important man in this circle was the liberal-minded priest Vodnik, who, under the French domination, organized the public instruction in the Illyrian provinces. Vodnik's poem, "Illyria Resurrected," is the song of the Slovene resurrection and at the same time a glorification of the French Empire. The first Slovene journalist was Vodnik, who edited the journal *Ljubljanske Novine* during the years 1797-1800. In 1843 Bleiweis began the publication of the *Kmetiske in Rokodelske novice*.

Slovene intellectual life, like Slovene political life, knows no slow evolution. There are long periods of stagnation and abrupt changes to

intense activity. The poetic genius of Presern had no precursor. All of a sudden Slovene literature had found an incomparable master who was on a level with the intellectual life of his age, and who gave to his nation a poetry which may claim equality with the masterpieces of European literature.

The Slovenes have given the world a whole line of scientific men, more than one would expect from a nationality of one million and a half. The glory of the Slovenes is Slav philology. Kopitar and Miklosic, who was called by the Germans the greatest grammarian of the century, are masters in this branch of philology. But the Slovenes excel also in mathematics. Vega, who lived towards the end of the eighteenth century, was one of the best known mathematicians of his day.

The evolution of the Slovene press in our own day is proof of a strong intellectual movement. In 1912 there were 122 Slovene papers. (All the Poles together have only 600 papers.) The circulation of the political dailies is from 10,000 to 30,000 copies. The *Domoljub*, which is published exclusively for the Carniolian peasantry, has a circulation of 51,000; the popular journal *Slovenski Dom* has a circulation of 28,000. The agricultural weekly paper has 50,000 subscribers in Carniola alone. Gorica was one of the centres of Slovene press activity. Five political papers

and many literary and scientific reviews were published there, among which the *Veda* must be mentioned as one of the most influential with regard to Yugoslav political ideas. The literary life and productivity of Ljubljana was also well developed, and the oldest of the Slovene literary reviews were published there.

According to the official statistics of 1910, 85·34 per cent. of the Slovene population can read and write. Yet in Hungary only 62·02 per cent. can read and write, and in Italy 62·40 per cent. In some Italian provinces the number of illiterates amounts to 85 per cent. In Rome, the capital of Italy, the illiterates number 65 per cent. (Borghese, "L'Italie Moderne"). The number of Slovene illiterates is 23·26 per cent. in Carinthia, 14·75 per cent. in Gorica, 12·86 per cent. in Trieste, 12·46 per cent. in Carniola, and 11·54 per cent. in Styria.

One of the saddest results of the Nationalist struggles in Austria is that the resources of culture have been pressed into the service of Nationalist warfare. The educational system has become the most important battle-ground of all, and of course the advantage lies with the nationality that possesses a prosperous middle class, enjoys the favour of the Government, and may hope moreover to receive financial subsidies from abroad. In all these respects the Slovenes are distinctly placed at a disadvantage.

The various Nationalist school unions have already been referred to in the chapter dealing with the Nationalist struggle of the Slovenes against both Germans and Italians. At present we are dealing with a different problem, which is to examine what the State is doing for Slovene education, and what manner of educational system exists in the Slovene lands.

Of all the Slovene lands, Carinthia is the worst off for schools. In this province there are only two primary schools to provide for the needs of 100,000 Slovenes.

The so-called "Utraquistic" schools are an institution without any legal status and constituting, in fact, a grave infringement of all legislation concerning primary schools. It is a shame and even a scandal that in the Slovene lands 56.7 per cent. of the Austrian State schools belong to this type. An "Utraquistic" school is neither more nor less than a school in which during the first term of the first school-year the tuition of Slovene children is carried on in both German and Slovene, and after that exclusively in German. This is, of course, a grave infringement of one of the first principles of pedagogy, which is, that tuition should be imparted solely in the mother tongue of the pupil. In the "Utraquistic" schools the tuition is in the hands of teachers who are neither acquainted with the Slovene tongue nor true pedagogues, but first

and foremost fanatical Nationalist Chauvinists. The results of such instruction may readily be imagined. The children are forcibly denationalized, but on the other hand, they do not acquire a thorough knowledge of German either ; so that the " Utraquistic " school system entails a very grave danger to the moral qualities of the Slovene rising generation, in view of the problems of later life.

And here we must briefly mention that the primary school system in Trieste is likewise exceedingly detrimental to the Slovene interests. The mere fact that not *one* single primary school is provided for the 60,000 Slovene inhabitants of Trieste conclusively disproves the Italian allegation that the Government favours the Slovenes. In Trieste, in Pola, and in Opatija (Abbazia) the Government maintains German primary schools for a small, non-indigenous colony of German immigrants ; but the Slovenes, who are the real natives, are left unprovided for.

As the primary school system forms a very important department of the provincial administration, in which the Italians—owing to an undemocratic and reactionary electoral system—still possess a majority, the backward condition of the school system constitutes a grave reproach to the ruling party. In Istria there are no less than 14,000 Yugoslav children of school age who are without any school instruction whatsoever,

because there are not enough primary schools in the country. It certainly cannot be said of the Italians in Istria that they display great interest in the progress of culture.

I need hardly explain that English conditions cannot by any means be compared with Austrian conditions. England possesses an educational system which is suitable for a wealthy country. In a poor country like Austria all education must be public and not a matter of private enterprise, as otherwise education would speedily become the privilege of a small stratum of the upper middle classes, while the great majority of the people would be debarred from its benefits and thus indirectly deprived of all possibility of improving their position in life. Such nationalities as have no middle class, or among whom the middle class is a thing of recent growth and not yet fully established, would, under a system of private education, be cut off from all possibility of making their voice heard in public life.

As regards secondary schools in the Slovene lands, the State is well aware that a nationality without secondary schools cannot progress. With truly admirable energy the State renders assistance to German secondary schools in the Slovene lands, while in every way endeavouring to prevent the institution of Slovene secondary schools.

The way in which the Government has pro-

ceeded in the Littoral affords perhaps the most characteristic example of its methods. In the Littoral the Government maintains five complete secondary schools for 27,000 Germans, viz. 4,000 in Gorica-Gradiska, 14,000 in Trieste, and 12,000 in Istria, and not even one complete secondary school with Slav tuition for a population of 250,000 Slovenes. The solicitous care of the Government for the Germans of Gorica-Gradiska is almost amusing. The 4,000 Germans of Gorica possess two secondary schools. In 1909 only thirty-five of the 585 pupils attending the Gymnasium were Germans, and since then the number of Germans has materially decreased. Surely these facts prove clearly that the German element in the southern provinces is artificially fostered and preserved.

The number of scholars attending secondary schools provides a very good criterion for the intellectual development of a given nationality in the Austrian Empire. Although the State has neglected the Slovenes to an inexcusable extent, and Slovene schoolboys are compelled to pursue their studies at gymnasia where tuition is imparted in an alien tongue, yet the number of scholars attending secondary schools is very considerable in the Littoral. Of the total number of scholars attending gymnasia (secondary classical schools) in the Littoral 1,072 are Slovenes, 362 Croats, and 3,845 Italians. Of the total number attending

real schools (secondary modern schools), 998 are Slovenes, 319 Croats, and 3,574 Italians.

In the purely Slovene province of Carniola the State, even to this day, does not maintain even one secondary school where the tuition is purely Slovene; in all schools the tuition is partly in German, partly in Slovene. In Styria there are twelve secondary schools; but there is not one Slovene secondary school for the half-million Slovene inhabitants of the province, and in only two secondary schools a few subjects are taught in Slovene as well as in German.

Up to the present the Slovenes are very inadequately provided with professional training schools; only Ljubljana (Laibach) possesses a technical professional school. The Jugoslavs of the Littoral do not possess a single professional training school where the tuition is in Slovene or Croatian. The technical college in Trieste is Italian, and so are the two naval training schools in the Littoral.

It might be objected that a nationality without a proper system of secondary schools is not entitled to a High School. But in this case such an argument would be pure sophistry. The sole reason why the Slovene system of secondary schools is developing so very slowly and gradually, is the fear of the Government lest the German influence should be weakened.

The Slovene language is fully developed, and

periodicals and books on all subjects in all spheres of learning appear in it. The Government refuses to provide the Slovenes with a Nationalist school system, *not* because they are not sufficiently advanced, but because they would become too dangerous rivals to the German element if they had it.

During the short but glorious period of French rule in the Slovene lands, Napoleon gave the Slovenes a kind of Academy. Subsequently the demand for a Slovene Academy was particularly emphasized in 1848. In Ljubljana the lectures on civil and criminal law were given in Slovene in 1849. In the Styrian provincial University of Graz the well-known Slovene jurist Kranjec lectured on Civil Law in the Slovene tongue. Although the Slovenes constitute one-third of the population of Styria—and surely their language is entitled to some consideration in the provincial University, just as Italian lectures are held in the University of Berne, and German lectures in the Universities of Geneva and Lausanne—the Slovene lectures at the University of Graz were soon suspended for fear that the German character of the college should be imperilled.

No Austrian Government has had the courage to deny the justice of the Slovene claim to a University. In Austria there are five Universities for nine million Germans, two for four million Poles, and there is one for the six million

Czechs. The four million Ruthenes, seven hundred and sixty thousand Italians, and two million Austrian Jugoslavs possess no national Universities of their own. No Austrian Minister of Education can deny that the Universities and Academies ought to be nationalized, but as yet none has taken the task in hand. The Minister of Education, Hertel, in especial, expressed great sympathy with the claims of the Slovenes to a national University. It is certainly the height of absurdity that the future judge, advocate, and administrative official has to pass his examinations in German, although he will be subsequently called upon to judge and plead in the Slovene tongue and to employ it in the exercise of his official duties.

The Austrians could solve the question of a Slovene University in a moment and without incurring even a halfpenny of expense. The Francis Joseph University in Zagreb (Agram) is the oldest Jugoslav University. The syllabus includes lectures on Austrian law besides those on Croatian law, and several members of the staff are Slovenes. Ever since the University was founded in the seventies, a scheme of reciprocity between it and the Austrian Universities has been in contemplation. The Austrian Croats and Slovenes demand that a student should be able to qualify for the Austrian Civil Service by passing his examinations in Zagreb. In Austria

this demand was opposed chiefly by the German Universities, who would lose financially by such an arrangement. For if the reciprocity scheme were put in force, the German Universities would lose their Yugoslav undergraduates. But the Zagreb University has a far more potent antagonist in the Hungarian Premier, who would fain keep the Slovene and Croat academic youth in Zagreb from realizing how humiliating and crushing is the effect of the present political system upon the Yugoslavs.

The Slovenes demanded Home Rule in the past, but not Home Rule in the Irish sense. Their demand included a demand for Home Rule in all branches of intellectual life. They possessed a literature in an idiom of their own and the beginnings of independent scientific activity. Their scientific and literary association—the Slovenska Matica—which was dissolved by the Government upon the outbreak of the war, has the traditions of a half-century of steady growth and successful activity. The most important Yugoslav scientific Institution in the Monarchy, the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Fine Arts in Zagreb, is the common heritage of both Slovenes and Croats. The Academy was founded by one of the greatest champions of the Yugoslav idea, Bishop Juraj Strossmayer.

It would be a mistake, moreover, to assume that knowledge and education are restricted to

the leading classes. Slovene civilization is not exclusive or aristocratic, the privilege of a small circle—on the contrary, it has always shown a tendency to be a true, democratic civilization of the whole people.

CHAPTER XV.

SLOVENE PARTY POLITICS

IT is not easy to sketch the political party life of a small nation. It is far easier to describe the party politics of a great nation, where there can be no lack of great outlines and striking personalities who set their mark upon their party and their age. In a small nation all this is reproduced on a small scale ; still, the essentials are the same, and here, too, we meet with strong individualities, creating and leading parties. Only the whole political life is adapted to the visual angle of small interests, which only too often coincide with personal advantage or detriment.

All this is exceedingly true as regards the Slovenes. Yet they never lacked one fundamental leading principle, which frequently saved Slovene politics from the slough of petty party conflicts. This was ever and always the idea of national Slovene autonomy. Whenever the political life of the Slovenes sank to a particularly low level in the workaday stress of party conflicts, this period

always coincided with a time in which the chief end was for a time lost sight of. On the other hand, all bright and optimistic periods of their political life were times when the ideal of Slovene independence had strongly captured public opinion. The days of decline were always those in which party squabbles gained the upper hand and the final goal was forgotten.

In 1848 Slovene party structure was exceedingly simple. A handful of educated Slovenes represented a peasant nation. There was no time to create different party standpoints on account of religious differences. Some politicians were Conservative, others inclined towards Liberal ideas. They adopted a given attitude without having been entrusted by their electors with a mandate to represent this or that point of view. Politicians voiced their own opinions, not those of their electors. There was no question of forming groups according to party programmes.

In the sixties a certain amount of progress had already taken place. Party organization—even though of a somewhat ill-defined type—had become increasingly necessary, since the Slovene programme had penetrated the masses. But in those days the Slovenes were united. Against the sturdy Nationalism of that age clericalism could make no headway. Moreover, at that time all minds were too fully occupied with the great national issues to have leisure to spare for other

problems which might have proved points of departure for party politics. The first division took place in the seventies, when the younger generation parted from the older, and the Young Slovenes formed a party apart from the Old Slovenes. But this division was mainly of a tactical nature; there was no question yet of fundamentally differing party programmes. Only the Young Slovenes were more strongly Nationalist than the Old Slovenes, and also more radical in their attitude towards the Government. Nor did the Young Slovenes form an anti-clerical party, and Churchmen were fairly frequent in their ranks. The *Slovenski Narod* became the principal news-organ of the new party.

But the new party system did not permit of united action in Nationalist questions. Slovene politicians showed themselves unable to combine a party system with complete solidarity in national affairs. Consequently, a diminution of the political influence of the Slovenes soon became apparent, and the Germans derived unquestionable advantage from disunion. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the Young Slovenes lost courage too quickly, and by their amalgamation with Conservative elements paved the way for the future Clerical parties. Before Mahnic made his appearance Slovene party conflicts partook more of the character of newspaper polemics and discussions, such as may

occur between members of one and the same political union. But in the eighties we come to a definite breach.

With a truly amazing zeal and unimpeachable logic a young Catholic priest named Mahnic propounded the thesis that Nationalism is a sin, and that the Slovenes have a right to exist only so long as they remain faithful to Roman Catholicism. All Slovenes who fail to obey the dictates of the Church ought to be eliminated entirely from political life. It is a gospel of intolerance, religious struggle and persecution that permeates the pages of Mahnic's journal, the *Rimski Katolik* (1888-96). The mere name—*The Roman Catholic*—is highly significant. Slovene politics had reeled from one extreme to the other. If the former lack of differentiation in political matters had been an evil, certainly the new virulent party spirit, with its excess of party hatred and its refusal to recognize the Slovene national fight for existence, was a far greater misfortune. In extenuation it may be said that with a young nation possessing no political traditions, the party spirit is apt to assume exaggerated proportions.

The liberal-minded Opposition replied by founding the *Slovan*, a paper intended to become the intellectual focus of the Radical Party. But the tendency represented by Mahnic was powerfully backed by the dogmas and political

philosophy of the Catholic Church. The Radicals were far too idealistic, and proved unequal to the task of building up a political party on the foundations of well-established ethical conceptions. In fact, the apostles of future progress lacked the courage to formulate a consistently Liberal programme which would be in definite opposition to Clerical aspirations. The Slovene Progressives organized themselves into a party in 1894. Yet time and again attempts were made at establishing an understanding which had become impossible as the breach was now complete. The Catholics created a strong party organization, the true foundations of which were laid on the first Slovene "Catholic Day" in 1892.

The All-Slovene gathering in 1897, in which both Clericals and Progressives took part, was really a piece of political insincerity, as it was already clear that each party would have to go its own way separately. The "Christian" foundation which was adopted by both parties as a platform formula became an unmitigated Ultramontanist in the hands of the Catholics. The "Catholic Day" of 1900 clearly demonstrated the immense progress made by the Clerical Party, which now scored one victory after another. The Clerical Party was the enemy of the Slovene middle class, of the Progressive tradesman and large landowner. It was in favour of universal,

equal, and direct suffrage, and strove to gain the support of the masses chiefly by democratic organization of the co-operative system. In contrast the Progressives were more Conservative, they were not greatly in favour of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, and they were more behind-hand as regards questions of economic organization. On the other hand, the Clerical régime was not without its dangerous drawbacks. Clerical party politics relegated Nationalist questions to the background, created a co-operative system on an unsound basis, and took not enough interest in the emigration question, which was becoming an economic problem for the Slovenes. Clericalism was also responsible for the growth of an extremely bitter party feeling in the country. The advent of the Clerical Party into power brought universal strife in its train instead of healthy political vitality. The introduction of the universal, equal, and direct vote for the Imperial Parliament finally established the political predominance of the Clericals, and an extension of the vote for the Carniolian provincial Parliament placed the provincial administration of Carniola in their hands.

Between the Progressives and the Clericals a third party, that of the Social Democrats, plays a very modest part. Industry is not greatly developed in the Slovene lands. . On the other hand, all the great cities containing large numbers

of Slovene working men are of mixed nationality, like Trieste and Graz. In Trieste, which is a great centre of industry, the Socialist Question is quite absorbed by the Nationalist Question and Slovene Nationalism. Moreover, the Social Democrats were far too inclined to make common cause with German and Italian working men's Associations, laying far too little stress on the Nationalist standpoint, which was another reason why Social Democracy failed to make much headway.

When the onslaught of Pan-Germanism became more violent a revision of Slovene party politics became inevitable. Doctrinarianism and the political party feuds in Carniola had always been unpopular in the south. The Triestines created a party of their own, and in 1912 the younger Gorician politicians organized the Slovene Independent party, which scored a decisive victory over the Clericals in the provincial parliamentary elections of that year. The fundamental principle of the Triestine and Gorician parties is that the Nationalist Question takes unqualified precedence of religious and social questions. Be Nationalist first, and only secondarily Clerical or Socialist! Before the Great War it seemed as if this course had been recognized as the only necessary and inevitable one by all intelligent Slovenes, and that the new Independent Party was going to overshadow all the older ones. Thus, even in

party politics the nation evinced sound political instinct with regard to the great international problem which the World-War was to lay bare in all its acuteness.

Both Socialists and Clericals followed the development of the Yugoslav Problem with lively interest. The Socialist Party called itself the "Yugoslav Social Democracy," and adopted the unification of the Yugoslavs as a plank in its own platform. The Clerical Party amalgamated officially with the Croatian Right a few years ago in Opatija (Abbazia), and adopted the constitutional programme formulated by the Croatian Right in 1894 in its entirety. This party professes the principle that Slovenes and Croats form one national unit, and it aims at a union of the Croatian and Slovene lands. At the time of the Bosnian annexation all parties in the Carniolian Diet, with the exception of the Germans, voted for the union with Croatia.

In this way the Yugoslav idea has profoundly influenced even party politics. Although the various party programmes have not yet clearly expressed the political aspect of the idea, yet it is safe to assert that even before the outbreak of the war Slovene public opinion had accepted the idea of union with Croatia as a fundamental political principle of the near future.

CHAPTER XVI

THE GREAT AIMS OF A SMALL PEOPLE

IT was a small and a humble world in which until lately the Slovenes lived, moved, and had their being. Theirs was not a *national life*, throbbing with glad initiative and the sturdy joy of living. A ghastly nightmare weighed upon the little nation. Two powerful nations, unified into Great Powers, constantly menaced its very existence and strove to crush it with the terrific weight of huge numbers and the tremendous resources at their disposal. And the little nation refused to yield in the conflict, although the odds were so unequal. And yet, now that we can more clearly survey the full power of the German Colossus, we must own that the Slovenes could scarcely have prolonged their resistance to Germanism for more than a few years. If the World-War had not broken out their fate would have been sealed ere long.

Thus we are brought face to face with a simple question. Is there an object in preserving the existence of the Slovenes? Are they useful members of the family of Slav nations? If the Slovenes

have no great task to fulfil, they are mere ballast in the European community of nations. But if we take the trouble to examine the true state of affairs, we are forced to admit that the Slovenes not only have the right, but even the duty, to maintain their position in the land where Providence has placed them.

A glance at the map will suffice to show the incalculable importance of the Slovene territories from a politico-geographical point of view. This narrow wedge, driven in at just that point between Germanism and Italy, possesses an importance all its own. It may be regarded on the one hand as a bridge between North and South, or again as a dividing element, assuring the maintenance of a just balance of power.

It would be a disastrous mistake if England and France failed to recognize the importance of this strip of country. Its value is not inferior to that of Belgium. A German occupation of the Slovene lands would be not one whit less disastrous than the annexation of Belgium by Germany.

The Slovene people dwelling in this angle where the German, Italian, and Slav worlds meet are well fitted to fulfil the great task of weakening foreign Imperialism in the interests of European democracy, and—with the help of the whole of Jugoslavdom—of keeping it fully within bounds.

The Great War is the Crusade of German Imperialism. But the Slovenes were not only in

danger of being absorbed by Germanism. Their southern neighbour, Italy, was on the point of developing an Imperialism which, although less dangerous, was nevertheless strong enough to threaten the Slovenes with destruction. True, there is a difference between the two which must not be underrated. German Imperialism frankly professes that might goes before right, and that the voice of Junkerdom must decide in the State. Italian Imperialism is more discreet ; it flirts with democratic sentiments, and cannot deny that it was born in a democratic State, although no true son of democracy. But the fact cannot be denied that an Imperialism of this type, aiming at denationalization, is fundamentally illiberal and undemocratic and a blasphemy against the great ideals for whose victory men are striving and dying on the battlefields of Europe.

It is the duty of Europe to deliver the great thoroughfare of the nations which unites North and South, East and West, one of the most central countries of Europe, a sea which Germany with startling effrontery calls its own "lungs," from foreign Imperialism, and to grant the Slovenes the blessing of civic freedom.

The Dualism of Austria-Hungary, with its internal chaos, was one of the true causes of the World-War ; it was a crime against Europe. It is an admitted fact that it would greatly serve the interests of Europe if the fifty million inhabitants

of the Monarchy were delivered from gross political misgovernment, and the Monarchy replaced by rationally organized political units. But this work would have to be carried through consistently. The territory between the Adria and the Drava is unquestionably the key to the scheme of general reform. This strip of land is the most valuable of all, for it is here that the German access to the southern sea can be cut off. And this land is inhabited by a nation whose whole national development is in harmony with those ideas which are to guarantee the happier future of the nations. It would be a wretched piece of patchwork if the Slovenes were from heedlessness or ignorance sacrificed to German or Italian Imperialism.

Democracy has always been the fundamental note of Slovene political life. Democracy stood beside the cradle of Slovene nationalism and could it have been consistently put in public practice, it would have strengthened the position of the Slovenes even within the Monarchy. It was the one battle-cry of Slovenedom. Without an aristocracy, without an ancient nobility, without strongly marked class distinctions, the Slovenes are a nation of self-made men in the best sense of the word. In virtue of their whole nature they will fit well and easily into the European democracy which will arise after the war. The sense of solidarity between the different social strata of the nation is very strongly developed among the Slovenes. As

after the war and with the breakdown of socialistic phraseology the tendency towards solidarity within the scope of the individual nation will be stronger than ever before, the Slovenes will then afford a good example of the sense of national solidarity of all classes.

Besides the establishment of democracy and social solidarity, another result of the great struggle will be a refined Nationalism, freed from Imperialistic dross, full of appreciation of the good and great things created by other nations. Whatever is good and vital in Slovene culture and politics has sprung from National sentiment, from their own proper Nationalism. Without democracy and Nationalism the Slovenes could not exist. England victorious will have the duty of championing national eugenics, i.e. of favouring those nations whose past history has endowed them with a capacity for furthering the great ideas of Democracy and a non-imperialistic liberal Nationalism. Few nations have been schooled for this work by so hard a fate as the Slovenes. By granting them the possibility of political freedom the Powers will ensure that the blood of the Allied armies has not been spilt in vain, and that true democracy and the happiness of the small National units will spring from the blood-soaked soil.

But the Slovene Question must definitely assume the aspect of a European Question when we contemplate it in conjunction with the Yugoslav idea.

Cut off from the rest of the Jugoslavs, the Slovenes are without significance ; united with them, they are one of the most important elements in a Jugoslav State. It was sound political insight that prompted the Serbians to proclaim the inevitableness of Slovene-Serbo-Croat unity. They know that the Slovenes will bring an element into the State which will make for political consolidation on a sound basis. It might even be said that it would be a misfortune for the young State if the Slovenes were to be excluded from it.

The Slovenes, like the Serbs, are without social traditions, without the terrible ballast of class prejudice and social distinctions. The national life of both springs from the peasant class, and is permeated by the wholesome breath of the soil. But if the social foundations are almost the same in both cases, in other respects there are great differences. We have just said that the Slovenes and Serbs are without traditions. But during the long period of national dependence, during which they were debarred from creating anything they might call their own, they were exposed to foreign political and social influences. The Serbs languished under the shameful yoke of Turkish mismanagement, and the Slovenes under a foreign rule which, in a spirit of patriarchal Absolutism, strove to denationalize them, not so much by force as by far more insidious means. The effect of Turkish brutality upon the Serbs was to rouse their

indomitable love of liberty to the highest pitch. The Slovenes were in a different case. Beside the State, which was governed according to Hispano-Habsburg maxims, the Church was equally determined in its endeavours to stifle all sense for freedom among the Slovenes. It is due to these two factors that the Slovenes entered the constitutional era without a sturdy sense for civic liberty. But luckily this misfortune was bound up with a great advantage.

Through living in constant mutual relations with the great cultured nations of the West, not only the Germans and the Italians, the Slovenes became a Western people. They were educated in discipline and order. Whatever faults may be laid to the charge of Austrian bureaucracy it cannot be denied that its administration, however hidebound and pedantic, was nevertheless responsible for a considerable measure of political order. [The Slovenes have lived for eight centuries under Austrian rule, and it is not altogether surprising that a love of order and purposeful work should be no less developed among the Slovenes than among other inhabitants of the Austrian Crown lands. A happily blended temperament united to the influences of centuries of regular administration has endowed the Slovenes with every aptitude for proving themselves a well-organized, disciplined, and at the same time an attractive and versatile people. The Slovenes would contribute much that is valuable

to the future Yugoslav community. They would represent the sound element of labour, organization, and economic occupation.

Not unless the new Yugoslav State is permitted to include the Slovenes will it be able to enter completely into the world of Western culture and gradually to discard the last remnants of Oriental manner and Byzantine traditions. A State whose frontier will pass over the Triglav and, we hope, west of Trieste, is situated fully within the circle of Western culture.

A rigidly centralistic régime would evoke a never-ending series of misunderstandings, the revival of half-forgotten prejudices. A nation which has always existed under many different Governments, and has been exposed to the most divergent religious, social, and intellectual influences, can only hope for untrammelled development if it does not attempt in its Constitution to deny the divergences incurred by the past. And this will be all the more easily accomplished as national union will with a mighty impetus draw the individuals together and spur them on to fruitful, united enterprise.

The Slovene mentality, like the Serbian, possesses the qualities peculiar to a nation without tradition, and only just about to form its society, the unexhausted strength, the primitive instinct, the aversion to the stilted differentiations accepted by the older nations. They are opposed to all

that is formal and ceremonial, and incidentally to social artificiality and insincerity. It cannot be denied that there is something uncouth, sometimes even rude and immature, in types like these. The temperament is not yet fully controlled by social tact, that irreplaceable something which is only acquired in the course of generations. But all these deficiencies are balanced by an admirable adaptability which is peculiar to all the Yugoslavs.

But are the Slovenes, the sons of a young, scarce-arisen nation, truly so different from their neighbours, the sons of nations boasting an ancient culture? A comparison affords absolute proof of educational experiment. A Slovene advocate, scholar, or engineer whose parents were peasants differs in no way from a German or an Italian with a classical education. Although sprung from the working classes, a Slovene easily learns to move in society, provided he is afforded an opportunity of doing so, and he will take a greater interest in intellectual matters than his German or Italian social equal.

As a matter of fact, a love of intellectual life is far more innate in the Yugoslav people than in the German or Italian masses. Modern culture is democratic, and her doors are open to all without class distinction. This fact tends to depreciate the cultural traditions of those older nations whose culture was a prerogative of the upper classes and anchored in the domain of ideals of the past,

instead of being rooted in the virgin soil of the democratic ideals of to-day.

The cultural traditions of the great, older nations of Europe are becoming the common heritage of an international democracy. The truly national literatures of the present age are those which have sprung from modern life and are rooted in modern thought and modern sentiment. But even the young, traditionless nations, whom modern Democracy has raised upon the shield, are capable of developing a literature and civilization of this type consonant with the needs of their age and the present day. Our age knows of no monopoly of culture as is fabled by the Italians when they wax eloquent over a culture of two thousand years. It is strange how very little the nations without traditions really need yield the pride of place to the older ones whenever they are given a chance of free development. Perhaps they lack the hyper-refinement of decadent sentiment, the pungent charm of satiety, but, on the other hand, these are only to be found in the wealthiest social strata of an historical nation and not in the democratic masses. It is the inevitable fate of the culture of the present day to become a culture of the masses. The nations without traditions are spurred on by a boundless craving for education ; in feverish haste they are endeavouring to obtain what criminal fate has withheld from them so long.

There are two possible paths open to those

Powers who desire to give more justice, greater peace, and prosperity to the nations of Europe : either to create patchwork, to let the Slovenes perish by inches by handing them over once more to a Germanizing, Absolutist system of government, thereby infusing new vitality into German Imperialism ; or to complete the task by enabling the Slovenes to achieve free, untrammelled political development in community with the rest of their Yugoslav brothers.

No one nation, with the exception of the Czechs, has battled so desperately and tenaciously for its life with Germanism as the Slovenes. In truculent determination, a people of a million and a half faced the huge Colossus, who, in order to clear his own path to the southern sea, and filled with the purblind, infatuated arrogance of reactionary Junkerdom, sought to make an end of a young and democratic nation aspiring to legitimate development. It would be a ghastly irony of fate if, at the very moment of the great decision, it were to be sacrificed by the very Powers to whom it has pointed the way by its own struggle, a nation which has suffered in its own body all the insane cruelties of a clique of degenerate worshippers of force, and has resisted them to the utmost of its feeble strength, but with steadfast purpose. It would mean that in an age when the privileges of the undemocratic master-nations are doomed the Slovenes would be redelivered to

their old masters as guerdon for having afforded in their own existence and political history the most impassioned protest against the domination of the master-nations. Such a proceeding could not be counted an act of wisdom.

Perhaps no generation has ever awaited anything with so much anxiety, and yet also with such a world-wide optimism, as that with which the present generation is awaiting the great change which will be the consequence of the war. Before our vision arises the new land of a new and better Europe, a democratic federation of States, of a life embodying greater social service. Should a young nation whose whole soul and being is a living protest against Germanism be excluded from this happier, new-born Europe of the future?

The Europe of to-morrow owes it to itself to give a free path and free development to a nation which has honestly earned the right of self-government by its sturdy defence against Germanism, in poverty, humiliation, and the constant struggle against the civic slavery imposed upon it by its mighty antagonists.

In an hour of great moment, such an hour as comes but once in the lifetime of a nation, a small nation is looking with full confidence to the great teacher and representative of political liberty and economic resource, to the sea-girdled realm of England, and it would fain ask: Will

this great and mighty people help us to that which is the starting-point and pre-condition of all intellectual and material prosperity, to political freedom and the free union with the Yugoslav nation of which we are part?

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
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
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